Senate Subcommittee Cuts GNEP—Cites Concerns with Cost, Technology, and Nonproliferation

The Senate Energy and Water Development Appropriations Subcommittee approved the FY 2008 Energy and Water Development bill on June 26th, which includes the bulk of funding for nuclear weapons and energy programs. Overall funding for the Senate version of the bill was $32.27 billion, about $1.8 billion above President Bush's budget request.

I previously provided analysis on the nuclear weapons funding, as well as the text on nuclear weapons language from the Committee Report.

Also included in the bill is funding for the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP), a Bush administration proposal that would reinstate commercial nuclear reprocessing in the United States after having abandoned it almost three decades ago. The administration believes that nuclear reprocessing, when uranium and plutonium are separated from waste materials in spent nuclear fuel rods, will reduce the amount of nuclear waste that will need to be placed in a permanent geological repository such as the Yucca Mountain site in Nevada.

The Senate allocated $242 million toward GNEP. While this is $153 million below the administration’s $405 million budget request, it is also $75 million over the funding that Congress allocated last year. The House only allocated $120 million for GNEP in its version of the bill.

The Committee Report limits GNEP funding to research, development and technology demonstrations at existing facilities, meaning no funds can be used “beyond conceptual design of new facilities.” Overall, the Committee Report directs the Department of Energy to focus less on commercial deployment of reprocessing facilities, and more on demonstrating the technical feasibility as well as a proven safety track record for nuclear reprocessing.

Ranking member on the subcommittee and staunch fan of all-things-nuclear Pete Domenici (R-NM) released a somewhat modest statement to the press on the GNEP funding:

Although I share the President’s desire to address our spent fuel inventories by recycling and reducing this material, I recognize that the new Congressional leadership is seeking a more modest program that can more fully demonstrate the technical and commercial feasibility of closing the nuclear fuel cycle as other countries have done.

GNEP NOT THE SILVER BULLET

The Committee Report, a beast of a document that details the subcommittee’s reasoning for funding on every program, outlined five concerns with nuclear reprocessing: cost, pace, science, technology, and non-proliferation concerns.

COSTS

Reprocessing is more expensive than purchasing new uranium and making uranium fuel. According to the Guardian Unlimited, officials from Britain’s shut-down Thorp reprocessing facility at Sellafield stated that even when operational the plant did not make money.

There are also serious costs associated with storing the waste that still remains after reprocessing, in addition to the costs associated with cleaning up reprocessing sites after they are decommissioned. The United States stopped reprocessing in 1976 after closing its only operating reprocessing plant at West Valley, New York, where the still on-going clean-up from commercial nuclear waste reprocessing is expected to cost U.S. taxpayers $5.3 billion.

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

The West Valley plant was shut down in part due to concerns about the underperforming technology. The facility managed to only process one year's worth of nuclear waste although the plant operated for six years, an amount equivalent to about one percent of that which is currently stored at US power plants.

In 2005 Britain shut down its only reprocessing plant after a hazardous leak was discovered. Two years later, a 2007 UK Energy White Paper reported that “The Government has concluded that any nuclear power stations that might be built in the U.K. should proceed on the basis that spent fuel will not be reprocessed." This is after a reopening of the plant scheduled for early 2007 had to be postponed when more technical problems with the facility were discovered.

NON-PROLIFERATION CONCERNS

The Committee Report also states that, “the policy of reinitiating the recycling of spent nuclear fuel in the United States is a significant issue and one that has international implications.” This statement is especially true when considering the non-proliferation concerns associated with nuclear reprocessing.

The separation of fissile materials from nuclear waste presents a serious non-proliferation concern, in that non-nuclear weapons states can use this material to build nuclear weapons. Commercial nuclear reprocessing was abandoned almost three decades ago by the United States due in part to these serious proliferation concerns. North Korea and India have both detonated nuclear weapons made in part with plutonium extracted from reprocessing reactors, demonstrating that the weapons proliferation threat associated with nuclear reprocessing is more than speculation.

CONGRESS CONCLUDES: SLOW DOWN

Given these concerns, it is no surprise that Congress is hesitant to push full ahead with expanding U.S. reprocessing capabilities. The Committee Report properly concludes, "The administration must come forward with greater scientific, technical, and policy information that examines more alternatives in the fuel cycle and recycling process."

Analysis of SASC Action on the FY08 Defense Authorization Bill

The Center’s Chris Hellman and Travis Sharp released their Analysis of Senate Armed Services Committee Action on the FY 2008 Defense Authorization bill (S. 1547) today.

Included below are some highlights relating to nuclear weapons and nonproliferation issues.

Missile Defense in Europe – Cuts $85 million from the Administration’s $310.4 million request for the proposed deployment of a Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) missile defense system in Europe. Limits the availability of authorized funding until two conditions have been met: 1) approval is given by the countries in which missile defense components are to be located; and 2) 45 days have elapsed since Congress receives a report from the Secretary of Defense on the proposed deployment. [Note: The funding for the GMD system in Europe is part of the Administration’s larger request of $10.1 billion for Ballistic Missile Defense, which the Committee cut $231 million.]

Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) – For RRW funding in the Department of Energy, the bill cuts $43 million from the Administration’s $238.1 million RRW request, limits the funding that can be used for RRW in FY2008 to $195.1 million, and limits RRW program activities to Phase 2A and below. The Committee also zeroed out the Administration’s $15 million RRW request for Navy research and development.

DoD Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) [“Nunn-Lugar”] – Adds $100 million to the Administration’s $348 million request for CTR for states of the former Soviet Union.

DoE Nonproliferation Programs – Adds $87 million to DoE nonproliferation programs. Included in the $87 million increase are $50.0 million for next generation nuclear detection technologies, the nuclear explosion monitoring program, and technologies to support improved nuclear material forensic capabilities; $14.0 million to accelerate shutdown of the plutonium producing reactor at Zheleznogorsk, Russia; $10.0 million for the second line of defense core program; $8.0 million for global initiatives for proliferation prevention; and $5.0 million for international regimes including technical assistance to IAEA for enhanced safeguards activities.

The SASC markup also contains a number of key policy provisions, including:

Space Posture Review – Directs the Secretary of Defense and Director of National Intelligence to conduct a comprehensive review of the space posture of the U.S. The review would cover a 10-year period beginning February 1, 2009 and the report would be due on December 1, 2009.

Nuclear Posture Review – Directs the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of Energy to conduct a review of the nuclear posture of the United States for the next 5 to 10 years. The new nuclear posture review (NPR) would be submitted to Congress in December 2009.

Policy Report on Iran – Prohibits the Secretary of Defense from obligating more than 75 percent of the funds available for FY2008 to the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy until the report on United States policy for Iran, mandated by the FY2007 Defense Authorization bill, is submitted to Congress.

If you’re interested in more information on SASC’s markup of the FY 2008 Defense Authorization Bill, including funding levels for other defense-related programs and the ongoing military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the complete analysis by Hellman and Sharp can be found here.

National Security Legislative Wrap-up, July 2-6 2007

Not much new to report. Congress returns this week from the 4th of July break. The Senate is expected to begin consideration of the FY 2008 Defense Authorization bill, which will provide a vehicle for a number of votes on the Iraq war and other national security issues.

KEY NATIONAL SECURITY BILLS IN 2007

- ENERGY AND WATER APPROPRIATIONS BILL:

On June 26, the Senate Energy and War Appropriations Subcommittee approved a $32.3 billion bill. The Subcommittee appropriated $66 million of the $88.8 million requested for a new generation of nuclear weapons (the Reliable Replacement Warhead program), cut all $24.9 million for a new plant to build plutonium pits (Consolidated Plutonium Program that focuses on the core of nuclear weapons), increased non-proliferation funding by $200 million and cut funding from $405 million to $242 million for the plutonium reprocessing program (Global Nuclear Energy Partnership) to extract nuclear weapons-usable material from nuclear waste.

On June 28, the full Senate Appropriations Committee approved the bill with no change from the Subcommittee level.

- STATE, FOREIGN OPERATIONS APPROPRIATIONS BILL:

On June 27, the Senate State-Foreign Operations Appropriations Subcommittee approved a $34.2 billion bill. The bill includes $4.5 billion for foreign military aid and $2.9 billion for economic assistance, $4.2 billion for the HIV/AIDS initiative. The bill also appropriates $1.4 billion for U.N. peacekeeping, $1.4 billion for the Millennium Challenge Corporation and zero for Iraq assistance -- although the President could draw funding from a $1.7 billion pool of economic aid. The Committee also approved $28 million for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBO) International Monitoring System, $10 million more than requested and $18 million more than the House in order for the U.S. to pay its arrears to the CTBO.

- DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS BILL:

The House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee is scheduled to mark-up or write its Fiscal Year 2008 bill on July 12.

- DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BILL:

The full Senate is scheduled to consider the bill when it returns to work on July 9.

Reminder: Each year, defense bills go through a five or six stage process:

1. Budget Resolution: establishes the overall ceiling for spending by the Pentagon and other agencies (Senate and House Budget Committees)
2. Defense Authorization Bill: establishes program-by-program ceilings (Senate and House Armed Services Committee)
3. Defense Appropriations Bill: provides funding to pay for programs (Senate and House Defense Appropriations Subcommittees)
4. Energy and Water Appropriations Bill: provides funding for nuclear weapons programs (Senate and House Energy and Water Appropriations Subcommittees)
5. Supplemental Appropriations Bill: funding requested outside the normal authorization and appropriations process (Senate and House Defense Appropriations Subcommittees)
6. Continuing Resolution: a bill to provide temporary funding early in a fiscal year when Congress has not completed funding on appropriations bills

Graham Allison: Nuclear Terrorism “Not Only Very Real But Disturbingly Likely”

Speaking of Graham Allison, he recently wrote an insightful op-ed in the Baltimore Sun in which he argues that, contrary to the wishful thinking of some skeptics that the September 11 attacks were “a 100-year flood,” “the danger of a nuclear attack by terrorists is not only very real but disturbingly likely.”

In order to assess the threat of nuclear terrorism, Allison states that it is necessary to answer five questions:

1. Who could be planning a nuclear terrorist attack?
2. What nuclear weapons could terrorists use?
3. Where could terrorists acquire a nuclear bomb?
4. When could terrorists launch the first nuclear attack?
5. How could terrorists deliver a nuclear weapon to its target?

In briefly answering these questions, Grahams paints a disturbing picture of how al-Qaida (or other terrorist groups with nuclear ambitions) could acquire, construct, or steal a nuclear weapon or the materials necessary for a nuclear weapon from Russia, North Korea, or research reactors, which could then be smuggled into the U.S. and detonated. He writes, “Based on current trends, a nuclear terrorist attack on the United States is more likely than not in the decade ahead.”

Allison proposes a strategy for an agenda that “would shrink the risk of nuclear terrorism to nearly zero,” which he refers to as the "Doctrine of Three Nos":

1. No unsecured nuclear weapons or weapons-usable material.
2. No new domestic capabilities to enrich uranium or reprocess plutonium.
3. No expansion of the nuclear club beyond its current 8.5 members, the half being North Korea.

Without sounding too much like a Graham Allison groupie, I would strongly suggest reading the full op-ed or -- better yet -- reading his book, “Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe,” which explains his argument in much more detail.

Nuclear Terrorism Prevention Act: A Step in the Right Direction

Sen. Hillary Clinton circulated a Dear Colleague letter last week, urging her fellow Senators to join her in supporting S. 1705, the Nuclear Terrorism Prevention Act of 2007, a bill she recently introduced. An identical bill, H.R. 2891, was introduced in the House by Rep. Ellen Tauscher the same day, and has seven co-sponsors. The bills are currently in the Senate Foreign Relations and House Foreign Affairs Committees, but could be introduced as amendments to the Defense Authorization bills when Congress reconvenes next week as well.

The letter states that the bill “would establish the position of Senior Advisor to the President for the Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism,” with the “sole focus” of the position being “to develop and coordinate the implementation of a strategy to prevent nuclear terrorism.” Working under the direction of the National Security Advisor, the post would be responsible for overseeing and improving current programs, identifying new initiatives, and overseeing and coordinating the development of budget requests relating to nuclear terrorism.

According to the letter, the bill would also “require the President to work with the international community to establish a specific minimum standard for nuclear security and to work with other countries in meeting and maintaining this minimum standard.”

The President would also be required to submit an annual report to Congress that would include:

1. a list of all sites worldwide with nuclear weapons and weapons-usable fissile material, including a sub-list of the most vulnerable sites where security upgrades are needed urgently;

2. a prioritized diplomatic and technical plan – including measurable milestones, metrics, estimated timetables and estimated costs of implementation – to eliminate, remove, and/or secure and account for all weapons-usable fissile material at these sites, and to maintain security at these sites once U.S. assistance ends;

3. progress in implementing the diplomatic and technical plan, including a description of other countries’ efforts to secure their own weapons-usable fissile material;

4. an update on efforts to establish and implement the minimum nuclear security standard.

To achieve these goals, “the bill would authorize up to $400 million in additional funding [for FY’08] to energize and accelerate existing programs to prevent nuclear terrorism,” including:

• $50 million for the DOE’s Global Threat Reduction Initiative to convert research reactors around the world from highly enriched uranium to low enriched uranium and to remove the highly enriched uranium from such facilities, typically repatriating the material back to the U.S. or Russia.
• $40 million for DOE’s National Technical Nuclear Forensics R&D Program to further ongoing efforts to develop the capability to attribute the origin of a nuclear weapon if there is a nuclear terrorist attack against the U.S., U.S. forces around the world, or U.S. allies.
• $10 million to State for the IAEA’s Office of Nuclear Security to provide international guidelines on nuclear security (including working with the U.S. and other countries to implement the minimum nuclear security standard) and manage the international database of nuclear smuggling incidents.
• Conditional authorization of $100 million for improvement and expansion of the DOE’s Material Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC&A) program to provide for security upgrades at vulnerable sites and facilities around the world that hold nuclear weapons and materials; to ensure that the security upgrades already in place can be maintained by the host country; and to develop and enforce nuclear security regulations. The money could be released if the Administration certifies to Congress that diplomatic progress has been made that would enable security upgrades at certain Russian facilities that have not yet received them or at facilities in other countries that possess nuclear weapons or materials.
• Conditional authorization of $200 million for the expansion and acceleration of DOE’s “Megatons to Megawatts” program. The money could be released if the Administration certifies to Congress that Russia acknowledges the need to downblend additional HEU that is in excess to its national security needs. The money would primarily be used to assist Russia to enhance its downblending capacity, which would enable the downblending of more HEU each year.

The Nuclear Terrorism Prevention Act would be a major step in the right direction. Numerous policy experts, notably Graham Allison, have long argued for the need of a “nuclear terrorism czar” to develop and coordinate the implementation of a strategy to prevent nuclear terrorism. The establishment of this position would go a long way in matching the dire rhetoric surrounding nuclear terrorism with actual deed by creating a point person tasked with the responsibility and authority to act.

Requiring the President to work with the international community to establish and maintain a minimum standard for nuclear security is similarly a strong policy option, but one that is likely to meet resistance from the current administration (that already claims that existing efforts are sufficient) as being an undue impingement on the executive. Other concerns will hover over what the minimum standard for nuclear security will be and how to persuade or entice other countries to adopt and enact a strong standard.

Likewise, requiring the President to submit an annual report to Congress and authorizing additional funding to energize and accelerate existing programs to prevent nuclear terrorism are also positive steps forward. But success in upgrading and maintaining the security at vulnerable sites and facilities lies heavily on whether diplomatic progress on these issues can be made – something that has proven exceedingly difficult to overcome in a diplomatic climate warmer than the current standoff between the U.S. and Russia.

While still more is needed, the bottom line is that Sen. Clinton and Rep. Tauscher get an ‘A’ for effort in crafting legislation that could go a long way in slowing the ticking clock of nuclear terrorism, but ultimately the proof is in the pudding.

National Security Legislative Wrap-up, June 25-29 2007

Congress is out of session this week for the 4th of July break. Last week, the Senate Appropriations Committee completed action on two bills: the Fiscal Year 2008 Energy and Water Appropriations bill and the State and Foreign Operations Appropriations bill. It is not clear when these bills will be considered by the Senate. When the Senate returns from the break, its first piece of legislation is slated to be the Fiscal Year 2008 Defense Authorization bill, which will bring up a number of votes on the Iraq war.

KEY NATIONAL SECURITY BILLS IN 2007

- ENERGY AND WATER APPROPRIATIONS BILL:

On June 26, the Senate Energy and War Appropriations Subcommittee approved a $32.3 billion bill. The Subcommittee appropriated $66 million of the $88.8 million requested for a new generation of nuclear weapons (the Reliable Replacement Warhead program), cut all $24.9 million for a new plant to build plutonium pits (Consolidated Plutonium Program that focuses on the core of nuclear weapons), increased non-proliferation funding by $200 million and cut funding from $405 million to $242 million for the plutonium reprocessing program (Global Nuclear Energy Partnership) to extract nuclear weapons-usable material from nuclear waste.

On June 28, the full Senate Appropriations Committee approved the bill with no change from the Subcommittee level.

- STATE, FOREIGN OPERATIONS APPROPRIATIONS BILL:

On June 27, the Senate State-Foreign Operations Appropriations Subcommittee approved a $34.2 billion bill. The bill includes $4.5 billion for foreign military aid and $2.9 billion for economic assistance, $4.2 billion for the HIV/AIDS initiative. The bill also appropriates $1.4 billion for U.N. peacekeeping, $1.4 billion for the Millennium Challenge Corporation and zero for Iraq assistance -- although the President could draw funding from a $1.7 billion pool of economic aid. The Committee also approved $28 million for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBO) International Monitoring System, $10 million more than requested and $18 million more than the House in order for the U.S. to pay its arrears to the CTBO.

- DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS BILL:
The House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee is scheduled to mark-up or write its Fiscal Year 2008 bill on July 12.

- DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BILL:

The full Senate is scheduled to consider the bill when it returns to work on July 9.

Former President Clinton Speaks Out Against Bush’s Euro-missile Plans

The Washington Post reported last Friday that former president Bill Clinton is skeptical about the expansion of missile defense sites into Poland and the Czech Republic.

"My facts may be wrong, but my impression is that we are creating a crisis here when none is necessary."

"I don't think the missile defense system is reliable enough to create an impact."

"Unless they work better than I think they do, it's a colossal waste of money."

Clinton’s facts are not wrong. Missile defense is the most expensive item in the defense budget--the non-partisan Congressional Budget Office projects the average spending for the missile defense system to be $13 billion per year between 2006 and 2024. Well over $100 billion has been spent on missile defense to date.

With such a high price tag you would think the system works. Nope. Missile defense is being deployed even though tests of the system continue to fail or remain far from real world conditions.

Congress is skeptical of the Euro-missile plans as well. The House has cut the administration’s $310 million request by half, and barred construction of new European sites until a series of benchmarks is met. Among the many benchmarks are:

* The U.S. must sign agreements with the Czech Republic and Poland. Even if the Czech and Polish leadership can push missile defense without losing their jobs (a task looking increasingly unlikely as these leaders’ constituents are sharply opposed to the missile defense plans), signing formal bilateral agreements could take years to finalize.

* The Pentagon must demonstrate that the systems being deployed are reliable. Tests so far have not demonstrated missile defense reliability, but don’t take my word for it… you can test the system yourself.

Nuclear Programs Language from Report on Senate FY2008 Energy and Water Appropriations Bill

Last week the Senate Appropriations Committee approved its markup of the FY2008 Energy and Water Appropriations Bill, which I already wrote about in detail here.

The Committee has released its report on the bill, which explains in detail its funding decisions for each program. Below is the report’s language for two of the biggest nuclear weapons programs, the Reliable Replacement Warhead and Complex 2030, which together seek to design a new generation of nuclear weapons and build the infrastructure to support subsequent production of these new warheads. I have highlighted some of the key statements from the Committee.


RELIABLE REPLACEMENT WARHEAD

The Committee is divided on the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) program, but unified in its desire to review and discuss our national strategic defense policy and the role of nuclear weapons in the post-cold war and post-September 11th world. The President requested $88,000,000 for the RRW program and the bill will provide funding of $66,000,000. This is the amount required to complete phase 2a, design definition and cost studies, of the RRW research and planning outline. Following the completion of phase 2a, Congress will have to authorize any continuation of the RRW program.

To clarify, "phase 2a" is fancy jargon for saying that the funding can only be used for research and design. The RRW program cannot go into production or deployment if the funding is restricted to phase 2a activities.

The information developed from phase 2a will be helpful in assessing the role RRW might play in the reliability, safety, and nonproliferation areas of the nuclear weapon arsenal, but the information alone will not be enough upon which to base a decision on it construction or deployment. Congress should have a more vigorous analysis and debate of our national strategic defense policy prior to deciding whether to continue or terminate RRW development.

Specifically, we need to decide the type and size of our future inventory of nuclear weapons. We have thousands of warheads. Under treaties we have committed to substantial reductions and eventual elimination of nuclear warheads. We must decide the methodology of meeting those obligations and over what time. In the meantime, we also have to determine how we maintain the warheads we decide we must keep. Do we continue the Stockpile Stewardship Program, which has been used for many years to maintain our nuclear deterrence, or do we develop the RRW program to replace the current nuclear warheads with new ones?

These are important questions that must be answered before we decide whether to continue with or terminate the RRW program. Some of these answers will be influenced by how long the current nuclear warheads can be maintained in the Stockpile Stewardship Program without degradation. New evidence suggests that the life of those warheads is decades longer than previously estimated. The future funding requirements for a new RRW program will also have to be weighed against and compared to the costs of the Life Extension Program within the Stockpile Stewardship Program.

We should also consider what impact the RRW program would have on international nonproliferation efforts. The United States is engaged around the world on trying to halt the spread of nuclear weapon capability and we must consider the role of RRW in those efforts. These are among the most important issues policy makers will face in the months and years ahead. The question of whether the RRW program should be continued must be based on accurate information and thorough debate.

The Committee favors the development of a bipartisan commission created by the Congress to evaluate and make recommendations on the role of nuclear weapons in our future strategic posture. That commission should engage the administration, the Congress and the best minds in the public and private sector to evaluate the future role of nuclear weapons as a part of our defense and strategic policies. That Commission report can form the basis of information and advice from which the President and the Congress can make decisions about the future of RRW and other weapons programs.

So, the Senate bill allocated $66 million for the RRW program, which is significantly more than the House version of the bill—the House allotted ZERO dollars for RRW. However, both the House and Senate agree that nuclear weapons programs will not be expanded until there is a serious discussion about the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security policy. Furthermore, the Senate emphasized that future nuclear programs must help the U.S. fulfill its treaty obligations to reduce and eventually eliminate its nuclear weapons arsenal.


COMPLEX 2030

Complex 2030 is a comprehensive plan to update, reorganize, and rebuild the nuclear weapons complex. Both the House and Senate have expressed deep skepticism about he program.

The Committee rejects the Department's premature deployment of the NNSA Complex 2030 consolidation effort. This plan was based on the adoption and deployment of the Reliable Replacement Warhead systems. The Government Accountability Office found this proposal to be lacking critical details about the size and military mission of the RRW system, which of course would dictate the size and makeup of the future stockpile including the necessity for a new pit manufacturing capability.

The Committee has previously canceled the Modern Pit Facility, because the National Nuclear Security Administration, the Nuclear Weapons Council and the Department of Defense were unable to make a compelling case for a significantly larger pit manufacturing need. The Committee has not provided any funding for the Consolidated Pit Center for the very same reason.

For as much thought as the Department has given to supporting Complex 2030 and its deployment, the Committee is concerned about sustaining the science capability at the laboratories and ensuring a balanced program that continues to make critical investment in improving the scientific mission. For example, the NNSA has established a preeminent capability in super computing to simulate warhead reliability without underground testing. However, the Department has no plans to advance the field of high performance computing, but instead proposes to reduce computing capacity within the laboratory system. This, however, doesn't mean that the NNSA doesn't have plans to purchase additional platforms in the future, but it is unclear what is driving these decisions. The Committee is frustrated by the lack of planning to ensure that the laboratory mission is not compromised.

The Committee directs the Department to provide a comprehensive computing proposal that involves the input from the weapons laboratories that includes a long term strategy to maintain the necessary simulation capabilities within the complex and to drive innovation and competition for technology and performance. The Committee is also frustrated with the lack of scientific development vision for the labs. The NNSA has focused on its transformational plan, based on the RRW systems, but appears to have given little thought to the scientific path forward.

The Committee directs the Department, drawing on the resources within NNSA and the Office of Science, to provide to the Committee a research and development plan that addresses unresolved physics and materials questions that win support national security mission as well as contributed to improving our energy independence, nonproliferation mission and to support biomedical applications. This plan should explore technology options that can be deployed and provide an added capability to our R&D program to update the scientific capabilities at each of the laboratories.