Missile Defense Monitor: How the conflict in the South Caucuses is impacting Congressional views on missile defense

Last week, I noted that some Republican lawmakers have indicated that they intend to use Russia’s invasion of Georgia to overturn the funding and construction restrictions imposed by the Democratic-led Congress on the Bush administration’s proposal to place a missile defense system in Europe.

According to CQ’s Josh Rogin, Senate Republicans are already all but declaring victory:

Appropriators and Armed Services panels in both the House and Senate had conditioned funding for the European sites on four major elements. They include ratification of the agreements by the Czech and Polish Polish parliaments, which could occur by the end of the year; a required analysis of alternatives by an independent research group, which was was completed and sent to Congress in July, and certification by Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates that the missile defense system can actually shoot down incoming missiles.

“Every objection has been addressed and every demand raised by the Democrats has now been met,” said Senate Armed Services panel member James M. Inhofe , R-Okla. “It is now left to Congress to act swiftly in fully funding the European site.”

Added one Senate GOP aide: “Republicans will think they have a very strong hand now. They’re argument will be that NATO wants it, Poland wants it, the Czech Republic wants it, so why don’t the Democrats want it?”

Except that every objection has not been addressed and every demand raised by the Democrats has not been met. First, neither the Czech nor the Polish parliaments have approved the agreements. While parliamentary approval appears likely in Poland (both the government and the lead opposition party support the deal), Czech parliamentary approval remains in doubt. Czech officials hope to submit the agreement to the Czech parliament sometime in November, although some analysts maintain that the deal will not be voted on until 2010.

Second, someone should duly inform Senator Inhofe that the system has yet to be tested. According to an October 2007 report by Dr. Charles McQueary, the Department of Defense's Director, Operational Test & Evaluation “the effectiveness of the European assets cannot be assumed.” A robust test program of the system consisting of at least three flight tests is necessary for any determination of operational effectiveness.

The Missile Defense Agency hopes to complete all three tests by 2010. Yet tests of the existing U.S.-based system have frequently been delayed, in some cases for many months. In addition, given that only 7 of the previous 13 tests of this system have been successful, more than three tests could be required to confirm the system's operational effectiveness.

Encouragingly, House Democrats appear to be standing firm. In the words of House Strategic Forces Subcommittee Chairwoman Representative Ellen O. Tauscher (D-CA):

The events in Georgia have nothing to do with the interceptors the U.S. is considering deploying in Poland, and Congress believes that this system is untested and fails to defend against current and emerging threats….Congress will not be funding an untested system, period.”

Tauscher and Nearly 30 Other Reps. Urge Bush to Extend START

Hats off to Rep. Ellen Tauscher, Chairman of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, who announced yesterday that she and nearly 30 other Representatives were sending a letter to President Bush urging him to extend the first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) until a new agreement is reached.

The impressive group of Reps. included chairmen from three key committees, including Chairman Ike Skelton of the House Armed Services Committee, Chairman John Conyers of the House Judiciary Committee, and Chairman Tom Lantos of House International Relations Committee.

As previous reported, the Bush administration announced in May that it plans to let START I expire when it runs out at the end of 2009. The Treaty barred its signatories from deploying more than 6,000 “countable” nuclear warheads atop a total of 1,600 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers.

While both the U.S. and Russia are well below these limitations, START I also established an elaborate scheme of inspections, data sharing, advance missile test notifications and satellite surveillance, which later provided the foundation for monitoring compliance with the toothless Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), also known as the Moscow Treaty.

SORT requires the U.S. and Russia to reduce the number of operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads (on ICBMs, SLBMs, heavy bombers, or otherwise) to 1,700-2,200 by the end of 2012. But because SORT doesn’t require the destruction of the warheads, they could instead be removed from service and stored in reserve stockpiles where the warheads could quickly redeployed at a later time.

Consequently, one problematic result of the Bush administration’s decision to not extend START I is that both the U.S. and Russia will lose one of the most reliable ways of making sure that both countries are meeting the required reductions under SORT. As I mentioned earlier, this decision has upset not only the U.S. intelligence community, but also Sens. Biden and Lugar, the leading senators on the Foreign Relations Committee.

Below is the full text of the letter Tauscher et. al sent to the President.

July 24, 2007

The Honorable George W. Bush
President of the United States of America
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, DC

Dear Mr. President:

We write to urge you to work with the Russian Federation to extend the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) after it expires in December 2009.

We were pleased that, in a joint statement issued July 3, 2007, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov reiterated the intention of the United States and Russia "to carry out strategic offensive reductions to the lowest possible level consistent with their national security requirements and alliance commitments." We are also pleased that both acknowledged the need for "a post-START arrangement to provide continuity and predictability regarding strategic offensive forces."

We are concerned however that both governments have not agreed to extend START in its current form and have just begun working on a post-START agreement. Without a legally binding follow-on agreement that includes a commitment to verifiable reductions in both countries' nuclear arsenals below the levels contained in SORT (Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions), the United States and Russia risk creating greater strategic uncertainty and further eroding the international nonproliferation regime. The continuing risk that nuclear weapons could fall into the hands of terrorists coupled with the possibility that additional nations will consider developing nuclear weapons should compel the United States and Russia do everything within their power to reduce the global nuclear danger.

The START treaty, signed on July 31, 1991, imposed new limits on long range nuclear forces, and both Russia and the United States achieved those reductions by the required date of December 5, 2001. Under START, both countries reduced their deployed strategic nuclear forces from approximately 10,000 warheads each to no more than 6,000 apiece. The accord also limits each side to 1,600 delivery vehicles-ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and heavy bombers.

Yet the arms limits imposed by START are not the treaty's only enduring legacy. START also included a comprehensive verification regime, including formal data exchanges, notifications, and on-site inspections. The transparency required by the START verification regime has bred confidence in both Russia and the U.S. enabling cooperation on a range of nuclear arms issues. Moreover, verification directly supports U.S. national security interests by giving insight into Russia's arsenal of nuclear weapons. While changes to these verification measures may be appropriate, their core elements must be extended.

As your nominee for Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General James Cartwright, said in an interview last summer, "The attributes that you would seek [in a START extension] are transparency, the ability to generate warning time, and confidence in what the intentions are of a counterpart." General Cartwright also noted that if the verification measures could not be modified, they should remain in force, rather than be allowed to expire. We agree.

The START treaty requires the United States and Russia to begin discussions regarding the future of the treaty no later than one year prior to December 2009. Given this requirement, we are interested in better understanding the administration’s approach and request that you keep us fully informed regarding your plans and objectives. We also ask that the intelligence community provide the Congress with an assessment of our ability to monitor Russian nuclear forces in the absence of START.

We ask that you carefully consider extending START in its current form in order to enable your and President Putin's successors to negotiate a new legally binding agreement that achieves greater, verifiable reductions in each nation's nuclear forces.

Finally, we ask that you consult with Congress on your approach and on the framework that you develop.

Reducing the global nuclear danger is a legacy we all would like to achieve for the sake of our children and future generations. We stand ready to work with you to achieve this goal.

Co-Signers

The following Members of Congress signed the letter authored by Rep. Ellen Tauscher:
Chairman Ike Skelton, Chairman John Conyers, Chairman Tom Lantos, Reps. John Spratt, Adam Smith, Yvette Clarke, Tom Allen, Barbara Lee, James McGovern, Dianne Watson, Ed Markey, Jesse Jackson, Sam Farr, Doris Matsui, Darlene Hooley, Tammy Baldwin, Betty McCollum, David Loebsack, Howard Berman, Raul Grijalva, Henry Waxman, Zoe Lofgren, Mike Honda, Maurice Hinchey, Joe Crowley, Lynn Woolsey, Rob Andrews, Ralph Hall, and David Wu.

House Armed Services Subcommittee Debates Role of Nuclear Weapons in World

Lawmakers on the Energy and Water Development Committees in both the House and Senate have demanded a debate on the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security, citing a lack of long-term strategy or even discussion on the topic. They demonstrated their dissatisfaction with the status quo by axing all funding for the Reliable Replacement Warhead program in the House, and cutting some funding for the program in the Senate.

Last week, Rep. Ellen Tauscher (D-CA) delivered. As Chairwoman of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Tauscher called in experts to debate, as she phrased it,

… the United States' nuclear weapons policy and discuss our options regarding the future size and composition of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. Led by this subcommittee, the House Armed Services Committee has called for a vigorous and open debate on the future direction of the United States' strategic posture and a fresh examination of our nuclear weapons policy in particular.

Here was the round-one lineup:

* Dr. William Perry, Secretary of Defense under Bill Clinton
* Dr. Sidney Drell, professor and deputy director emeritus at the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center
* Dr. Keith Payne, a principal architect of the most recent Nuclear Posture Review and current professor at Missouri State University

For the sake of brevity I am only providing brief excerpts from Perry and Payne - the entire audio transcript can be listened to here if you want more.

DR. WILLIAM PERRY – NOT DOWN WITH THE RRW

The United States should not pursue the development of a new generation of nuclear weapons through the Reliable Replacement Warhead program.

One specific question faced by this committee is whether to authorize the Reliable Replacement Warhead program. There are two valid arguments for proceeding with that program: first, that it will maintain the capability of our nuclear weapon designers, and it allows the design of a warhead that cannot be detonated by a terror group, even if they were able to get one.

Our countervailing argument is that if the United States proceeds to develop new nuclear warheads, it will undermine our ability to lead the international community in the fight against proliferation. My best subjective judgment at this time is that the proliferation argument outweighs the other two.

DR. KEITH PAYNE - WANTS RRW RESEARCH FUNDING

In a world with myriad unpredictable threats to the United States, nuclear weapons should not be taken off the table.

The painful truth is that now no one truly knows what constitutes a stabilizing force structure or whether or how deterrence will work across the wide spectrum of contemporary opponents, states and circumstances we may confront.

Deterrence is essential, and nuclear weapons still play an important deterrence role.

It's important to understand what types of U.S. deterrent threat would be best suited to deterring a particular opponent in a particular circumstance for a particular purpose. In some cases non- military approaches to deterrence will be best. In others non-nuclear force options are likely to be adequate and advantageous. And in still other cases, nuclear threat options may be necessary to deter.

Research should continue for RRW, but not manufacturing. Also, there is no urgency to build new weapons.

The RRW needs to proceed carefully with research on design modifications before moving ahead to consider development and manufacture of new warheads. In other words, it has to stay at the moment in Phase 2A.

We must recognize that implementing design changes is not time urgent. The legacy stockpile is strong. The pace of the work should not consume human and budgetary resources to the extent of savaging the important and highly successful stockpile stewardship and life extension programs that are going on now. It will take more money, if you want to consider doing that.

Nuclear Terrorism Prevention Act: A Step in the Right Direction

Sen. Hillary Clinton circulated a Dear Colleague letter last week, urging her fellow Senators to join her in supporting S. 1705, the Nuclear Terrorism Prevention Act of 2007, a bill she recently introduced. An identical bill, H.R. 2891, was introduced in the House by Rep. Ellen Tauscher the same day, and has seven co-sponsors. The bills are currently in the Senate Foreign Relations and House Foreign Affairs Committees, but could be introduced as amendments to the Defense Authorization bills when Congress reconvenes next week as well.

The letter states that the bill “would establish the position of Senior Advisor to the President for the Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism,” with the “sole focus” of the position being “to develop and coordinate the implementation of a strategy to prevent nuclear terrorism.” Working under the direction of the National Security Advisor, the post would be responsible for overseeing and improving current programs, identifying new initiatives, and overseeing and coordinating the development of budget requests relating to nuclear terrorism.

According to the letter, the bill would also “require the President to work with the international community to establish a specific minimum standard for nuclear security and to work with other countries in meeting and maintaining this minimum standard.”

The President would also be required to submit an annual report to Congress that would include:

1. a list of all sites worldwide with nuclear weapons and weapons-usable fissile material, including a sub-list of the most vulnerable sites where security upgrades are needed urgently;

2. a prioritized diplomatic and technical plan – including measurable milestones, metrics, estimated timetables and estimated costs of implementation – to eliminate, remove, and/or secure and account for all weapons-usable fissile material at these sites, and to maintain security at these sites once U.S. assistance ends;

3. progress in implementing the diplomatic and technical plan, including a description of other countries’ efforts to secure their own weapons-usable fissile material;

4. an update on efforts to establish and implement the minimum nuclear security standard.

To achieve these goals, “the bill would authorize up to $400 million in additional funding [for FY’08] to energize and accelerate existing programs to prevent nuclear terrorism,” including:

• $50 million for the DOE’s Global Threat Reduction Initiative to convert research reactors around the world from highly enriched uranium to low enriched uranium and to remove the highly enriched uranium from such facilities, typically repatriating the material back to the U.S. or Russia.
• $40 million for DOE’s National Technical Nuclear Forensics R&D Program to further ongoing efforts to develop the capability to attribute the origin of a nuclear weapon if there is a nuclear terrorist attack against the U.S., U.S. forces around the world, or U.S. allies.
• $10 million to State for the IAEA’s Office of Nuclear Security to provide international guidelines on nuclear security (including working with the U.S. and other countries to implement the minimum nuclear security standard) and manage the international database of nuclear smuggling incidents.
• Conditional authorization of $100 million for improvement and expansion of the DOE’s Material Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC&A) program to provide for security upgrades at vulnerable sites and facilities around the world that hold nuclear weapons and materials; to ensure that the security upgrades already in place can be maintained by the host country; and to develop and enforce nuclear security regulations. The money could be released if the Administration certifies to Congress that diplomatic progress has been made that would enable security upgrades at certain Russian facilities that have not yet received them or at facilities in other countries that possess nuclear weapons or materials.
• Conditional authorization of $200 million for the expansion and acceleration of DOE’s “Megatons to Megawatts” program. The money could be released if the Administration certifies to Congress that Russia acknowledges the need to downblend additional HEU that is in excess to its national security needs. The money would primarily be used to assist Russia to enhance its downblending capacity, which would enable the downblending of more HEU each year.

The Nuclear Terrorism Prevention Act would be a major step in the right direction. Numerous policy experts, notably Graham Allison, have long argued for the need of a “nuclear terrorism czar” to develop and coordinate the implementation of a strategy to prevent nuclear terrorism. The establishment of this position would go a long way in matching the dire rhetoric surrounding nuclear terrorism with actual deed by creating a point person tasked with the responsibility and authority to act.

Requiring the President to work with the international community to establish and maintain a minimum standard for nuclear security is similarly a strong policy option, but one that is likely to meet resistance from the current administration (that already claims that existing efforts are sufficient) as being an undue impingement on the executive. Other concerns will hover over what the minimum standard for nuclear security will be and how to persuade or entice other countries to adopt and enact a strong standard.

Likewise, requiring the President to submit an annual report to Congress and authorizing additional funding to energize and accelerate existing programs to prevent nuclear terrorism are also positive steps forward. But success in upgrading and maintaining the security at vulnerable sites and facilities lies heavily on whether diplomatic progress on these issues can be made – something that has proven exceedingly difficult to overcome in a diplomatic climate warmer than the current standoff between the U.S. and Russia.

While still more is needed, the bottom line is that Sen. Clinton and Rep. Tauscher get an ‘A’ for effort in crafting legislation that could go a long way in slowing the ticking clock of nuclear terrorism, but ultimately the proof is in the pudding.

House Energy and Water update, amendment on moving pit disassembly plant

The House approved most parts of the 2008 appropriations for energy and water development (H.R. 2641), which Jeff and I have talked about here and here.

This is mostly good news for the non-proliferation agenda. While final passage of the House version of the bill is not expected until later in the summer due to some unsettled discussions unrelated to non-proliferation, Democrats and Republicans have come together to oppose the Bush administration’s lack of a coherent strategy (sound familiar?) for the future of the U.S. nuclear arsenal.

Here are some funding recaps:

* Funding to build a new generation of nuclear weapons (the Reliable Replacement Warhead Program, or RRW) has been eliminated. The administration initially asked for $88.8 million.

* Overall nuclear weapons budget was reduced by $632 million, to $5.9 billion.

* Non-proliferation spending programs were increased by $491 million, or 75 percent to a total of $1.7 million.

Although the bill is yet not finalized, these numbers are not expected to change in the House version until the joint-conference where a final version of the bill will be hashed out between the Senate and the House. As I have stated previously, my guess is that the House version will stay low (now true), the Senate version will remain high (currently appropriated at $195 million across multiple accounts), and a middle ground will be found in the joint-conference.

There was one important amendment to the bill relating to nuclear weapons that passed: Ellen Tauscher (D-CA) proposed an amendment (H.Amdt. 329) that blocks moving a pit disassembly plant from the Savannah River Site in South Carolina to the Pantex weapons facility in Texas. The amendment was approved by voice vote.

Members of Congress had initially decided to keep both the Pit Disassembly plant and storage facilities at one site (the Pantex facility) for “obvious security reasons”:

Co-locating the Pit Disassembly facility with the pit storage facilities at the Pantex Plant provides an obvious security improvement and program efficiency element to the PDCF proposal. The Committee finds the Department initial decision to site the Pit Disassembly facility at the Savannah River Site (SRS) not appropriate in light of the post 9/11 security environment. The Committee finds the security vulnerabilities inherent in transporting intact nuclear weapon pits from the storage location at the Pantex Plant to a disassembly operation 1,200 miles across the country too significant and costly to justify constructing the facility at SRS. (House Energy and Water Appropriations Bill Report, House Report 110-185, June 11, 1007)

A plutonium pit is a metal sphere containing plutonium-239 that acts as a “trigger” for a nuclear weapon when compressed by surrounding explosives – as the plutonium is compressed it starts a fission reaction (see images below). Pit disassembly is the last step in weapons dismantlement, and Pantex is the only facility in the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) complex currently authorized to conduct pit assembly and disassembly.

Plutonium Pit Cross Section

A plutonium pit is located near the tip of modern warheads

Overall, $173 million is appropriated for pit disassembly, including $91 million for the new Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility Project at the Savannah River Site. Rep. John Spratt (D-SC), a friend of Tauscher, likely favors relocating the pit production facility to his constituent state of South Carolina.