Cirincione on Obama’s Nuclear Future

The National Journal’s Lost in Translation has a great interview with Joe Cirincione on President-elect Obama’s nuclear future here.

The interview includes further potential reductions with Russia, prospects for the CTBT, missile defense, and de-alerting nuclear weapons.

Good stuff. Check it out.

U.S. and Russian Publics Strongly Support Steps to Reduce and Eliminate Nuclear Weapons

The University of Maryland’s Center for International and Security Studies (CISSM) and its Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) recently released a new WorldPublicOpinion.org poll of American and Russian attitudes toward recent cooperative nuclear risk reduction proposals.

The key findings of the study are:

1. De-alerting Nuclear Weapons

Large majorities of Americans and Russians favor reducing the number of nuclear weapons on high alert. Robust majorities on both sides would even favor a mutual agreement to take all of their weapons off high alert, if the two countries established a verification system. Few Russians or Americans think their country should have a policy of launching nuclear weapons on warning of a potential attack.

2. Deep Cuts in Nuclear Arsenals

Very large majorities endorse the U.S.-Russian SORT agreement to reduce the number of active nuclear weapons in each arsenal to about 2,000 weapons by the end of 2012. Most think such cuts should be made even sooner. Majorities in both countries also favor cutting the arsenals below the 2,000 levels. Americans and Russians would favor lowering U.S. and Russian arsenals to the level of 400 nuclear weapons if all other nuclear powers also promised not to increase the number of weapons in their arsenals.

Both Russians and Americans believe nuclear weapons are of very limited military utility: A majority of both Americans and Russians say that nuclear weapons should be used only in response to a nuclear attack and a large majority of Americans say that the United States should have a policy of never using nuclear weapons first. When Americans are asked how many nuclear weapons are necessary for deterrence, the median response is just 500. When asked how many nuclear weapons do you think the U.S. has, the median response is 1000 – much lower than the actual size of the U.S. arsenal (approximately 10,000 total warheads).

3. Eliminating Short-Range Weapons

A large majority of Americans believe the U.S. should agree to eliminate its short-range weapons based in Europe if Russia agrees to eliminate its short-range nuclear weapons based in western Russia. (Russians were not asked this question.)

4. Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)

Overwhelming majorities of Americans as well as Russians think their country should participate in the treaty banning all nuclear weapons testing. Indeed, a clear majority of Americans assume that the United States already does.

5. Controlling Nuclear Weapons-grade Material

Very large majorities of Russians and Americans say that their countries should put a top priority on cooperating with each other to prevent terrorists from acquiring nuclear weapons. Majorities, especially in the United States, favor an agreement among all nuclear powers to share information about the number of nuclear weapons and the amount of weapons-grade nuclear material they have. Americans, however, lean against highly intrusive bilateral monitoring systems, while Russians lean in favor of them. Americans also lean slightly against providing money and technical assistance to aid Russia in securing its nuclear weapons and materials, while Russians are lukewarm about the idea.

6. Getting Control of the Production of Nuclear Fuel

Americans support various proposals for gaining greater international control over the production of nuclear fuel. A majority favors the idea of discouraging countries from building their own facilities through an agreement that would provide them with fuel in return for a promise not to produce it themselves. A modest majority also favors having a UN affiliate control all facilities that process nuclear material, while guaranteeing countries a supply of fuel for nuclear power plants. (Russians were not asked these questions). Both Russians and Americans who are aware of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) tend to view it positively.

7. Ban on Producing Fissile Material

A majority of Americans and Russians favor having a ban on any further production of fissile material suitable for nuclear weapons.

8. Intrusive and Multilateral Verification

Americans and Russians believe that achieving deep cuts in nuclear arsenals would require verification by an international body. A majority of Americans believe that international inspectors charged with verifying compliance with arms control agreements have too many limits on what they can do. Russians lean toward this belief but are largely unsure.

As explained above, majorities, especially in the United States, favor an agreement among all nuclear powers to share information about the number of nuclear weapons and the amount of weapons-grade nuclear material they each have. Both publics prefer this to a bilateral information exchange and monitoring arrangement.

Americans overwhelmingly believe that when the U.S. and Russia agree to a nuclear arms reduction it should be done through a legally binding and verifiable agreement rather than a general understanding that both sides decide how to implement.

9. Elimination of Nuclear Weapons

Large majorities of Russians and Americans favor an agreement among all countries to eliminate all nuclear weapons, assuming that there is a well-established system for verifying compliance. Most approve of this objective, even though they are unaware that their country has already agreed to pursue it under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Indeed, large majorities on both sides feel that the nuclear powers have not been doing a good job of fulfilling this obligation and very large majorities would like their country to do more. Support for eliminating nuclear weapons softens, however, without an international system for verification and an orderly sequence of reductions. Also, trend line data suggest that support for elimination may have declined in light of the current suspicions about Iran’s nuclear program.

The Nuclear Missile Foul-Up

The Washington Post published today a letter to the editor that I wrote in response to Sunday's article, “Missteps in the Bunker,” that highlighted the dangerous breakdown of extensive Air Force command and control protocols for six nuclear-tipped cruise missiles:

The United States has a nuclear arsenal of nearly 10,000 warheads. Russia holds approximately 15,000.

The frightening B-52 incident seriously calls into question the wisdom of keeping thousands of these weapons on hair-trigger alert, ready to be launched at a moment's notice.

If six live nuclear missiles could be mistakenly sent across the country, despite elaborate safety protocols, it is not impossible to fathom another nightmare scenario: the accidental or unauthorized launch of submarine or land-based nuclear missiles. Faced with accidental or unauthorized incoming American nuclear missiles, Russia, China or some other nuclear power would have to quickly decide whether to retaliate. What started as a mistake could soon mushroom into a global nuclear exchange.

More than 15 years after the end of the Cold War, the United States should give itself some breathing room by leading a gloabal effort to take nuclear weapons off hair-trigger alert.

JEFF LINDEMYER
Policy Fellow
Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation
Washington

One Mistake Too Many

In a moment of shameless self-promotion, I'm including below an op-ed that I wrote on the recent B-52 debacle which appeared today on openDemocracy.


One mistake too many
A slip-up in nuclear weapons controls in the United States is cause for global concern

Much to the disbelief of military officials and nuclear experts, on 30 August an American B-52 bomber accidentally carried six nuclear-armed cruise missiles from Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota to Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana. The accident demonstrates a dangerous breakdown in United States Air Force command and control and represents the most high-profile breach of nuclear weapons safety protocol in nearly 40 years.

The incident is chilling because it shows that, despite rigorous safeguards, accidents involving nuclear weapons can still happen. It calls into question the wisdom of keeping thousands of nuclear devices on hair-trigger alert, ready to be launched at a moment's notice - a policy the United States and other countries currently maintain.

Protocol ignored

Assuming that the B-52 really was mistakenly loaded (and some conspiracy theorists won't even concede that), numerous important security measures were either overlooked or ignored altogether. Each of the six nuclear-armed missiles should have been signed out from its storage bunker, transported by ground, and then loaded onto the bomber, a process that requires strict adherence to several safety protocols. Multiple layers of the chain of command should have been involved.

Large red markings on the nuclear-armed missiles should have made them easy to distinguish from the six unarmed missiles loaded under the B-52's other wing. The weight difference between the two missile types should also have tipped off the flight and munitions crews, who have loaded dozens of these missiles and even won two service-wide safety awards in 2006 for their work. The munitions crews involved have since been temporarily decertified and the commander relieved of his duties.

Especially troubling is that once the missiles arrived in Louisiana, they were not retrieved or even identified as being nuclear-tipped for nearly ten hours. The delay was caused by the inability of the airmen who first discovered the missiles to realise and, more importantly, convince their superiors that they were actually carrying live nuclear warheads.

Compounding this further was that several officers at the Pentagon didn't take the "Bent Spear" message - Defense Department code for this kind of mistake - coming from the Minot base seriously, thinking instead that the message had been sent in error. Including the B-52's three and a half hour flight, the nuclear-armed missiles were loose for approximately 13 hours.

Cause for concern

The Minot incident raises serious concerns about the security measures associated with nuclear weapons. If such a major error could happen once, it could happen again. It may even have happened before without the American ever public finding out.

More frightening are the wider implications of the Minot episode. If an accident of this magnitude could happen in the United States, which has some of the most stringent controls over its nuclear weapons in the world, something similar could very well happen in other countries with weaker controls. What if nuclear-tipped missiles were mistakenly flown to Pakistan's Samungli Air Force Base, where they might sit vulnerable on a tarmac not far from al-Qaida's training camps in northwest Pakistan?

The B-52 incident also goes to the heart of a bigger question. The US currently maintains a nuclear arsenal of nearly 10,000 warheads, thousands of which stand on hair-trigger alert. If six nuclear-tipped cruise missiles were mistakenly sent across the country, despite elaborate safety protocols, the most devastating mistake imaginable remains possible: an accidental or unauthorized launch of submarine or land-based nuclear missiles.

Faced with accidental or unauthorised incoming American nuclear missiles, Russia, China, or some other nuclear power would have to quickly decide whether or not to retaliate. What started as a mistake could soon mushroom into a nuclear exchange between global superpowers.

This is a gloomy scenario, and steps have been taken to mitigate the risk of an accidental launch, but the B-52 incident shows that mistakes can and do happen. The US should give itself some breathing room by leading an international effort to take nuclear weapons off hair-trigger alert. After all, when it comes to nuclear weapons, one error is one too many.

Jerry Grossman: World Needs a "No First Strike" Commitment for Nuclear Weapons

In a provocative op-ed, President Emeritus of the Center, Jerome Grossman, argues that “Since the dawn of the nuclear age, each of the nine nuclear powers — the United States, United Kingdom, Russia, China, France, India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea — has threatened to use nuclear weapons. This threat, which is intended to terrorize other states, must stop.”

These threatening remarks, Grossman contends, “could lead to nuclear war by accident, inadvertence, or error, with the most tragic consequences for all humanity. Most importantly, nuclear threats encourage the spread of nuclear weapons to countries seeking to protect themselves in a dangerous world dominated by nuclear aggressors.”

Grossman instead proposes that the nuclear weapons states, led by the U.S., commit to a "No First Strike" policy for their nuclear weapons, which should likewise be de-alerted from hair-trigger alert status.

Sounds reasonable to me.

Yes, Charlotte, Our Nuclear Weapons Still Are On Hair-Trigger Status

An interesting story by NPR last week reported that while the U.S. recently announced it has increased the rate at which it is dismantling its nuclear warheads, the actual number of weapons dismantled and other figures involving the nuclear arsenal remain secret.

The NRDC estimates that as of January this year the U.S. stockpile contained nearly 10,000 nuclear warheads, including 5,736 active/operational warheads and 4,226 inactive/responsive warheads held in reserve or awaiting dismantlement.

Significantly, however, fifteen years after the end of the Cold War, the U.S. and Russia still have approximately 4,000 nuclear warheads on hair-trigger alert that could be launched within minutes. These warheads alone have the combined destructive power nearly 100,000 times that of the bomb that destroyed Hiroshima.

For contrast, China has since de-alerted its nuclear forces and Britain and France now maintain far lower levels of alert. While their alert status is unknown, India, Pakistan and Israel are believed to be near hair-trigger status.

Enter Representative Adam Schiff (D-CA-29).

Schiff sent out a Dear Colleague letter last week asking his fellow Members to sign on to his not-yet-submitted “Reduce the Risk of Accidental Nuclear Launch Act.” According to the Letter,

The Reduce the Risk of Accidental Nuclear Launch Act would call on the President to pursue a bilateral agreement with Russia to remove both nations' nuclear weapons from hair-trigger alert. It would call on military and defense experts from our two countries to outline steps that can be taken to eliminate any perceived threat that is used to provide continuing justification for the self-defeating and dangerous practice of deploying nuclear weapons on such status. And finally, it would require a Presidential report on any impediments to achieving this goal and the steps being taken to overcome these challenges.

Just over seven years ago, in order to make his plan for an expansive national missile defense system more palatable, candidate-turn-president George W. Bush proposed removing “as many weapons as possible from high-alert, hair-trigger status" and inviting the Russians to do the same.

Now that President Bush has recklessly sped ahead with the missile defense system, it’s high time for him to initiate a dialogue with Russia to remove both countries’ nuclear arsenals from hair-trigger alert. While clearly not exclusively enough to ameliorate the current standoff, the move would go a long ways in improving the frosty relations between the U.S. and Russia. Representative Schiff’s proposed legislation is a major step in the right direction.