U.S. and Russian Publics Strongly Support Steps to Reduce and Eliminate Nuclear Weapons

The University of Maryland’s Center for International and Security Studies (CISSM) and its Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) recently released a new WorldPublicOpinion.org poll of American and Russian attitudes toward recent cooperative nuclear risk reduction proposals.

The key findings of the study are:

1. De-alerting Nuclear Weapons

Large majorities of Americans and Russians favor reducing the number of nuclear weapons on high alert. Robust majorities on both sides would even favor a mutual agreement to take all of their weapons off high alert, if the two countries established a verification system. Few Russians or Americans think their country should have a policy of launching nuclear weapons on warning of a potential attack.

2. Deep Cuts in Nuclear Arsenals

Very large majorities endorse the U.S.-Russian SORT agreement to reduce the number of active nuclear weapons in each arsenal to about 2,000 weapons by the end of 2012. Most think such cuts should be made even sooner. Majorities in both countries also favor cutting the arsenals below the 2,000 levels. Americans and Russians would favor lowering U.S. and Russian arsenals to the level of 400 nuclear weapons if all other nuclear powers also promised not to increase the number of weapons in their arsenals.

Both Russians and Americans believe nuclear weapons are of very limited military utility: A majority of both Americans and Russians say that nuclear weapons should be used only in response to a nuclear attack and a large majority of Americans say that the United States should have a policy of never using nuclear weapons first. When Americans are asked how many nuclear weapons are necessary for deterrence, the median response is just 500. When asked how many nuclear weapons do you think the U.S. has, the median response is 1000 – much lower than the actual size of the U.S. arsenal (approximately 10,000 total warheads).

3. Eliminating Short-Range Weapons

A large majority of Americans believe the U.S. should agree to eliminate its short-range weapons based in Europe if Russia agrees to eliminate its short-range nuclear weapons based in western Russia. (Russians were not asked this question.)

4. Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)

Overwhelming majorities of Americans as well as Russians think their country should participate in the treaty banning all nuclear weapons testing. Indeed, a clear majority of Americans assume that the United States already does.

5. Controlling Nuclear Weapons-grade Material

Very large majorities of Russians and Americans say that their countries should put a top priority on cooperating with each other to prevent terrorists from acquiring nuclear weapons. Majorities, especially in the United States, favor an agreement among all nuclear powers to share information about the number of nuclear weapons and the amount of weapons-grade nuclear material they have. Americans, however, lean against highly intrusive bilateral monitoring systems, while Russians lean in favor of them. Americans also lean slightly against providing money and technical assistance to aid Russia in securing its nuclear weapons and materials, while Russians are lukewarm about the idea.

6. Getting Control of the Production of Nuclear Fuel

Americans support various proposals for gaining greater international control over the production of nuclear fuel. A majority favors the idea of discouraging countries from building their own facilities through an agreement that would provide them with fuel in return for a promise not to produce it themselves. A modest majority also favors having a UN affiliate control all facilities that process nuclear material, while guaranteeing countries a supply of fuel for nuclear power plants. (Russians were not asked these questions). Both Russians and Americans who are aware of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) tend to view it positively.

7. Ban on Producing Fissile Material

A majority of Americans and Russians favor having a ban on any further production of fissile material suitable for nuclear weapons.

8. Intrusive and Multilateral Verification

Americans and Russians believe that achieving deep cuts in nuclear arsenals would require verification by an international body. A majority of Americans believe that international inspectors charged with verifying compliance with arms control agreements have too many limits on what they can do. Russians lean toward this belief but are largely unsure.

As explained above, majorities, especially in the United States, favor an agreement among all nuclear powers to share information about the number of nuclear weapons and the amount of weapons-grade nuclear material they each have. Both publics prefer this to a bilateral information exchange and monitoring arrangement.

Americans overwhelmingly believe that when the U.S. and Russia agree to a nuclear arms reduction it should be done through a legally binding and verifiable agreement rather than a general understanding that both sides decide how to implement.

9. Elimination of Nuclear Weapons

Large majorities of Russians and Americans favor an agreement among all countries to eliminate all nuclear weapons, assuming that there is a well-established system for verifying compliance. Most approve of this objective, even though they are unaware that their country has already agreed to pursue it under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Indeed, large majorities on both sides feel that the nuclear powers have not been doing a good job of fulfilling this obligation and very large majorities would like their country to do more. Support for eliminating nuclear weapons softens, however, without an international system for verification and an orderly sequence of reductions. Also, trend line data suggest that support for elimination may have declined in light of the current suspicions about Iran’s nuclear program.

Sen. Barack Obama on Nuclear Weapons

Sen. Barack Obama (D-IL) delivered an address on national security at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars on August 1, 2007. In his speech, Obama argues for the need to do more to safeguard nuclear weapons and material and to use diplomacy to prevent countries from obtaining nuclear weapons.

More specifically, he wants to secure all nuclear weapons and material at vulnerable sites within four years and to negotiate a verifiable global ban on the production of new nuclear weapons material. Both goals are ambitious, admirable, and attainable.

Included below are the excerpts related to nuclear weapons issues.

It is time to turn the page. When I am President, we will wage the war that has to be won, with a comprehensive strategy with five elements: getting out of Iraq and on to the right battlefield in Afghanistan and Pakistan; developing the capabilities and partnerships we need to take out the terrorists and the world’s most deadly weapons; engaging the world to dry up support for terror and extremism; restoring our values; and securing a more resilient homeland.

[snip]

We must also do more to safeguard the world’s most dangerous weapons. We know al Qaeda seeks a nuclear weapon. We know they would not hesitate to use one. Yet there is still about 50 tons of highly enriched uranium, some of it poorly secured, at civilian nuclear facilities in over forty countries. There are still about 15,000 to 16,00 nuclear weapons and stockpiles of uranium and plutonium scattered across 11 time zones in the former Soviet Union.

That is why I worked in the Senate with Dick Lugar to pass a law that would help the United States and our allies detect and stop the smuggling of weapons of mass destruction.

And that is why, as President, I will lead a global effort to secure all nuclear weapons and material at vulnerable sites within four years. While we work to secure existing stockpiles, we should also negotiate a verifiable global ban on the production of new nuclear weapons material.

And I won’t hesitate to use the power of American diplomacy to stop countries from obtaining these weapons or sponsoring terror. The lesson of the Bush years is that not talking does not work. Go down the list of countries we’ve ignored and see how successful that strategy has been. We haven’t talked to Iran, and they continue to build their nuclear program. We haven’t talked to Syria, and they continue support for terror. We tried not talking to North Korea, and they now have enough material for 6 to 8 more nuclear weapons.

It’s time to turn the page on the diplomacy of tough talk and no action. It’s time to turn the page on Washington’s conventional wisdom that agreement must be reached before you meet, that talking to other countries is some kind of reward, and that Presidents can only meet with people who will tell them what they want to hear.

President Kennedy said it best: “Let us never negotiate out of fear, but let us never fear to negotiate.” Only by knowing your adversary can you defeat them or drive wedges between them. As President, I will work with our friend and allies, but I won’t outsource our diplomacy in Tehran to the Europeans, or our diplomacy in Pyongyang to the Chinese. I will do the careful preparation needed, and let these countries know where America stands. They will no longer have the excuse of American intransigence. They will have our terms: no support for terror and no nuclear weapons.