Nukes of Hazard on... Nukes of Hazard

In the spirit of a little Friday humor, a Daily Show clip from January 16, 2006 on nuclear weapons and the "Axis of Evil"...

... oh, how much has changed.

Physicians for Social Responsibility and The Economist Urge Rejection of U.S.-India Nuclear Deal

Referring to the agreement as “dangerous to international peace and security,” the Nobel Peace Prize-winning American organization, Physicians for Social Responsibility (PSR), together with its Indian counterpart, Indian Doctors for Peace and Development (IDPD), called on the governments of the two countries last week to reject the U.S.-India nuclear deal promoted by its leaders.

Although the deal does not need the approval of the Indian Parliament, the country must first negotiate a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and garner an exception in its guidelines for nuclear trade with the 45-country Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). This could potentially take several months, but, if completed, the recently finalized text of the 123 authorization agreement (with its loopholes big enough to drive a Mack truck through) would then be submitted to Congress for a final vote.

With these two opportunities in mind, the well-respected magazine, The Economist, declared that “rule-bending [for India] puts at risk the anti-nuclear regime that everyone else's safety and security is built on. Governments at the NSG and the IAEA that are unhappy with this need to find the courage of their convictions, and block it.”

The newspaper explains:

America's readiness to make an Indian exception to all the rules risks snapping two of the joists that support the global non-proliferation structure. At the IAEA, India wants the right not just to say which reactors can be inspected, but when. Such unprecedented laxity in India will make it hard to get others—for example, Brazil, which already does some uranium enriching of its own—to accept the tougher inspections that the IAEA wants as standard for all NPT members.

Likewise, the hard-won clarity of the NSG's trade ban has helped maintain support for the NPT, despite the cheating antics of a few. Mere talk of fudging the rules last year encouraged Russia to break them, citing spurious “safety” concerns as an excuse to sell India uranium fuel. China, unhappy at America's coddling of India, is exploring more nuclear co-operation with Pakistan—which in turn threatens to match India, should it step up weapons production or test again.

PSR and IDPD likewise called upon the members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) reject this agreement as contrary to their objectives and also urged the UN Security Council to support NSG guidelines and the improvement of international legal rules for the prevention of nuclear proliferation and the promotion of nuclear disarmament.

NPEC Report: IAEA Falling Behind and Risks Slipping Further

The Nonproliferation Policy Education Center (NPEC) released yesterday an insightful report that paints a disturbing picture of how well the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is doing in keeping tabs on nuclear material and that the situation is actually primed to get worse.

The report, “Falling Behind: International Scrutiny of the Peaceful Atom,” details the effectiveness of the IAEA’s safeguards system and how best to improve it, and is based on two years of research and meetings with officials from the IAEA and several governments, as well as outside experts.

The 34-page report’s key conclusion is that “the IAEA is already falling behind in achieving its (nuclear) material accountancy mission and risks slipping further unless members of the IAEA board independently and in concert take remedial actions in the next two to five years.”

The report notes that “it would be a mistake to wait to see if civilian nuclear energy will expand... The reason why is simple: Even if nuclear power does not expand, the amounts of nuclear weapons usable materials that the IAEA must prevent from being diverted to make bombs is already very large and growing."

It finds that the IAEA has far too little money to safeguard against a seemingly ever growing amount of weapons-grade material. The report notes that while the quantity of highly enriched uranium and plutonium the agency inspects increased by more than six-fold from 1984 to 2004 and that the number of plants containing these materials more than tripled during that time, the IAEA’s safeguards budget has barely doubled. (Oh, and by the way, that six-fold increase is enough to make 12,000 to 21,000 crude nuclear weapons.)

The report also finds that the IAEA’s overly generous views of how much material must be diverted to make a bomb and how long it might take to convert this material into a nuclear weapon exacerbates this safeguards gap. Largely based on estimates over 30 years old, the report finds the IAEA’s figures were set anywhere from 25% to 800% too high. Already losing track of “many nuclear weapons-worth of material every year” at some plants, this means that the IAEA “is unable to provide timely warning of diversions from nuclear fuel-making plants (enrichment, reprocessing, and fuel processing plants utilizing nuclear materials directly useable to make bombs).”

The report offers seven recommendations on exactly what should be done. Included below are seven basic recommendations; the actual report details them at length and includes more specific advice.

1. Resist calls to read the NPT as recognizing the per se right to any and all nuclear technology, no matter how unsafeguardable or uneconomic such technology might be.

2. Distinguish between what actually can be effectively safeguarded, and what can be, at best, monitored.

3. Re-establish material accountancy as the IAEA’s top safeguards mission by pacing the size and growth in the agency’s safeguards budget against the size and growth of number of significant quantities of special material and bulk handling facilities that the agency must account for and inspect

4. Focus greater attention on useful safeguards activities that are necessary, but have yet to be fully developed.

5. Complement the existing UN formula for raising IAEA funding with a user-fee for safeguards paid for by each nuclear operator.

6. Establish default actions against various levels of IAEA safeguards agreement noncompliance.

7. Plan on meeting future safeguards requirements on the assumption that the most popular innovations – integrated safeguards, “proliferation-resistant” fuel-cycles, and international fuel assurances – may not achieve their stated goals or, worse, may undermine them.

NEPC’s full report is available here.

Joe Cirincione: A Brief History of the Atomic Age

Interested in learning the history of the Atomic Age in just over 15 minutes?

Well, you’re in luck.

Click below to watch a fascinating video of Joe Cirincione’s opening remarks from the 2005 Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference that does just that.

The video is an adapted multimedia version of Cirincione’s speech, produced by Dot-Org Digital Media Services.

Alternatively, you can read the text of the presentation here or listen to an audio version here.

James Doyle on National Security and Nuclear Weapons

James Doyle recently wrote an interesting Proliferation Analysis for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace challenging the Bush Administration’s joint statement, “National Security and Nuclear Weapons: Maintaining Deterrence in the 21^st Century.”

Signed by the Secretaries of Defense, State, and Energy, the statement argues that the so-called Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) is the best means for ensuring the future nuclear deterrent and claims there will be several risks if the RRW program isn’t undertaken.

Doyle identifies and addresses in turn four of the Administration’s main points (in italics):

“Every American administration since President Truman’s day has formulated U.S. national security policy in much the same terms, making clear to adversaries and allies alike the essential role that nuclear weapons play in maintaining deterrence."

The argument for maintaining nuclear deterrence as a centerpiece of U.S. national security strategy would be more credible if the global security environment in which America finds herself was largely the same as it was during the 1950s, 60s, 70s, and 80s. It is not. …

[snip]

"The extension of a credible U.S. nuclear deterrent has been critical to allied security and removed the need for many key allies to develop their own nuclear forces."

It is difficult to imagine any NATO country, with the possible exception of Turkey, that would consider [developing] nuclear weapons even if the U.S. nuclear umbrella closed tomorrow. The NATO alliance does not face a credible conventional threat from any state or block of states. Furthermore, NATO nuclear deterrence would be maintained by the nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France.

[snip]

“In 2001, President Bush directed that the United States reduce the number of operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons from about 6,000 to 1,700-2,200 by 2012 – a two-thirds reduction...”

Who are the targets for the several thousand nuclear warheads in the U.S. arsenal today and who do we expect the 2,200 nuclear warheads will be deterring in 2012? When global economic and social realities are considered, deterrence of major aggression among leading nations such as the U.S., Europe, Russia, China, India and Japan seems to be an objective that could be fulfilled with very low numbers of nuclear weapons. …

[snip]

"Delaying progress on RRW will force the United States to maintain a large stockpile of nuclear weapons and sustain it through increasingly costly and risky Life Extension Programs. Delays on RRW also raise the prospect of having to return to underground nuclear testing to certify existing weapons."

It is through assertions like this that the joint statement reveals itself to be a political document masquerading as a finished technical assessment. It implies that there is solid technical evidence and agreement that without the RRW the United States will be assuming “risks” and will be “forced” to maintain a larger stockpile of nuclear weapons.

In fact there is no such consensus at this time. …

Click here to read Doyle’s full analysis.

Communist Opposition in India May Save the World from the U.S.-India Nuclear Deal

The Communist Party of India (Marxist) announced on Thursday that it will withdraw from Prime Minister Singh’s ruling parliamentary coalition if the Prime Minister moves to implement the U.S. nuclear cooperation agreement. (You can read the full text of the party statement here). This development is hugely significant because Prime Minister Singh’s majority in parliament depends on the support of this party.

While smaller Indian Communist parties had already announced plans to withdraw if Singh moves forward with the deal, the CPI(M) announcement is the most significant. CPI(M) controls 43 of the Communists’ 59 votes, and without this party’s support, Singh cannot maintain control of parliament.

The Left demands that Singh not proceed with implementation of the nuclear deal until a special parliamentary committee has studied its impact on India’s nuclear autonomy. The line in the sand drawn by the Left is the negotiation of “India specific” safeguards with the IAEA: If PM Singh moves forward on negotiating these safeguards, the Left has stated that it will withdraw.

However, Singh has taken an equally strong position, reporting to the Indian media that he told the Left earlier this month:

…it is not possible to renegotiate the deal. It is an honourable deal, the Cabinet has approved it, we cannot go back on it. I told them to do whatever they want to do, if they want to withdraw support, so be it.

It is not clear whether the Left is ready to make good on its threat or are just be grand-standing – the deal could collapse entirely or it may just be delayed. Either way, the Left has now drawn its line in the sand, and the next move is Singh’s.

For an examination of Singh’s options and the possible consequences, see the flow chart below.

Few New Insights from Sunday’s Democratic Presidential Debate

Sunday’s Democratic Presidential Debate at Drake University in Iowa was, more or less, a recap of recent barbs traded by Sens. Obama and Clinton, but did offer some new insights into the positions of other candidates.

As a quick breakdown of who said what…

Sen. Clinton reemphasized her opposition to meeting with leaders of adversarial countries without preconditions and to publicly discussing the potential use of nuclear weapons in Pakistan.

Sen. Dodd concurred, pointing out that Pakistani President Musharraf is “the only person that separates us from a jihadist government in Pakistan with nuclear weapons.”

Sen. Biden opined that the U.S. needs a Pakistan policy, not a Musharraf policy, while Gov. Richardson quipped that he’s already met the dictators in question.

And Sen. Obama, for his part, said that there’s not much difference between his critics and said that it’s “common sense” that “if we have Osama bin Laden in our sights and we've exhausted all other options, we should take him out before he plans to kill another 3,000 Americans.”

Moderator George Stephanopoulos then pointed out that Sen. Clinton had previously said that she would take the nuclear option off the table regarding Iran and asked her about the difference between her and Obama’s comments. Clinton responded by saying that she was referring to a specific effort by the Bush-Cheney administration to drum up support for military action against Iran, including nuclear bunker busters, and repeated the importance of not talking about hypotheticals.

Obama retorted that he didn’t see a difference between the two sets of comments, adding, “No military expert would advise that we use nuclear weapons to deal with [al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan].”

Former Sen. Edwards agreed with Clinton to “not talk about hypotheticals in nuclear weapons” but stated that he would not only stop nuclear bunker busters, but would also “lead an international effort over time to eliminate nuclear weapons from the planet.”

Richardson wrapped up the point by saying that he, too, would not discuss hyptheticals involving nuclear weapons, and would declare a policy of no first use, would build international support for nuclear nonproliferation, and would pursue a “treaty on fissionable material,” presumably the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty.

Provided below are the excerpted highlights of the debate as they regard to nuclear weapons and nonproliferation. The full transcript can be found here.

STEPHANOPOULOS: But, Senator Clinton, you did tell the Quad City Times that Senator Obama's views on meeting with foreign dictators are naive and irresponsible. Doesn't that imply that he's not ready for the office?

CLINTON: Well, George, we had a specific disagreement, because I do not think that a president should give away the bargaining chip of a personal meeting with any leader, unless you know what you're going to get out of that.

It takes a lot of planning to move an agenda forward, particularly with our adversaries. I think the next president will face some of the most difficult international dangerous threats and challenges that any president has faced in a very long time.

We're going to have to mend fences with our allies. We're going to have to deal with global warming. We're going to have to get back on the track of trying to prevent nuclear proliferation -- and so much else.

So I think that, when you've got that big an agenda facing you, you should not telegraph to our adversaries that you're willing to meet with them without preconditions during the first year in office.

STEPHANOPOULOS: Senator Dodd, you've called Senator Obama's views confusing and confused, dangerous and irresponsible. Do you think he's ready to be president?

DODD: Well, again, I'd certainly underscore the point that Senator Clinton has made here. The point I'd make on that, when I disagreed with my colleague from Illinois, was about the issue of whether or not a speech, a prepared speech, which suggested here a hypothetical situation and a hypothetical solution here -- that raised serious issues within Pakistan.

As I pointed out before, the only person that separates us from a jihadist government in Pakistan with nuclear weapons is President Musharraf. And, therefore, I thought it was irresponsible to engage in that kind of a suggestion here. That's dangerous. Words mean something in campaigns.

[snip]

STEPHANOPOULOS: Senator Biden, it seems like your colleagues here don't want to reach the judgment that you've made. Why isn't Senator Obama ready?

BIDEN: Look, I think he's a wonderful guy, to start off, number one. It was about Pakistan we were talking about. The fact of the matter is, Pakistan is the most dangerous, potentially the most dangerous country in the world. A significant minority of jihadists with nuclear weapons. We have -- and I disagree with all three of my friends -- we have a Pakistan -- we have no Pakistan policy; we have a Musharraf policy. That's a bad policy. The policy should be based upon a long-term relationship with Pakistan and stability.

[snip]

RICHARDSON: You know, it's interesting. You talk about the dispute between the two senators over dictators that -- should we; should we not meet?

I've met them already, most of them. All my life I've been a diplomat, trying to bring people together. …

[snip]

OBAMA: … George, I don't actually see that much difference or people criticizing me on the substance of my positions. I think that there's been some political maneuvering taking place over the last couple of weeks.

I do think that there's a substantive difference between myself and Senator Clinton when it comes to meeting with our adversaries. I think that strong countries and strong presidents meet and talk with our adversaries. We shouldn't be afraid to do so.

We've tried the other way. It didn't work.

I think that, if we have Osama bin Laden in our sights and we've exhausted all other options, we should take him out before he plans to kill another 3,000 Americans. I think that's common sense.

[snip]

STEPHANOPOULOS: Senator Clinton, one of the areas that -- one of the things that Senator Obama just talked about is that he thinks that some of your differences aren't as great as people have said.

Your campaign criticized Senator Obama after he made a comment ruling out the use of nuclear weapons against Al Qaida, yet, here's what you said last year when asked about Bush administration reports that they might use tactical nuclear weapons in Iran. Take a look.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

CLINTON: No option should be off the table, but I would certainly take nuclear weapons off the table. And this administration has been very willing to talk about using nuclear weapons in a way we haven't seen since the dawn of the nuclear age. I think that's a terrible mistake.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

STEPHANOPOULOS: So Senator Obama rules out using them against Al Qaida. You rule out using them against Iran. What's the principal difference there?

CLINTON: Well, George, you've got to put it into context. I was asked specifically about what was, very clearly, an effort by the Bush-Cheney administration to drum up support for military action against Iran.

Combine that with their continuing effort to try to get what are called bunker-buster bombs, nuclear bombs that could penetrate into the earth to go after deeply buried nuclear sites.

And I thought it was very important. This was not a hypothetical, this was a brushback against this administration which has been reckless and provocative -- to America's damage, in my opinion.

So I think there's a big difference, and I think it's a difference that really goes to the heart of whether we should be using hypotheticals. I mean, one thing that I agree with is we shouldn't use hypotheticals. You know, words do matter.

And this campaign, just like every other things that happens in the United States, is looked at and followed with very great interest. And, you know, Pakistan is on a knife's edge. It is easily, unfortunately, a target for the jihadists. And, therefore, you've got to be very careful about what it is you say with respect to Pakistan.

STEPHANOPOULOS: Do you accept that distinction?

OBAMA: There was no difference. It is not hypothetical that Al Qaida has established base camps in the hills between Afghanistan and Pakistan. That was acknowledged in the national intelligence estimates. And every foreign policy understands that.

No military expert would advise that we use nuclear weapons to deal with them, but we do have to deal with that problem.

[snip]

STEPHANOPOULOS: The one I just asked, was there a difference between Senator Clinton and Senator Obama on this issue.

EDWARDS: I personally think, and I would as president, not talk about hypotheticals in nuclear weapons. I think that's not a healthy thing to do. I think what it does for the president of the United States is it effectively limits your options. And I do not want to limit my options, and I don't want to talk about hypothetical use of nuclear weapons.

I would add to that that I think what the president of the United States should actually do, beyond stopping bunker-buster nuclear weapons, which this administration's moving forward with, is what America should do and what I would do as president, is to actually lead an international effort over time to eliminate nuclear weapons from the planet. That's the way to make the planet more secure.

[snip]

RICHARDSON: You know, when a president talks about foreign policy, a president has to be clear.

And this talk about hypotheticals, I think, is what's gotten us in trouble. Here's what I would do on nuclear weapons: I wouldn't, as an American president, use nuclear weapons first. However, you can never take the military option off the table.

The key is that in our foreign policy today, this administration has used the military option preemption. It should be diplomacy first, negotiation, build international support for our goals, find ways that America can get allies in our fight against terrorism, against nuclear proliferation.

We should have a treaty on fissionable material, loose nuclear weapons -- that's even more dangerous today than nuclear weapons.

George Perkovich on the “Proliferation Trilogy: North Korea, Iran, and India”

The always insightful George Perkovich, Vice President for Studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, recently had an interesting interview with Bernard Gwertzman on the “Proliferation Trilogy: North Korea, Iran, and India.”

Gwertzman asks, “There are three major issues on questions of nuclear proliferation right now: the agreement reached in February for North Korea to give up its nuclear program in return for, essentially, help from the outside world; secondly is the continuing defiance by Iran to the Security Council which has been trying to get it to suspend its enrichment activities; thirdly is the U.S.-India agreement on peaceful uses of nuclear energy. On these issues which is the most important right now?”

Click here for Perkovich’s full answers.