Consensus from 60 Experts on Arms Control Priorities for Obama Admin.

We all know that when President-elect Obama is sworn into office on January 20, 2009, the list of issues vying for his time will be extensive. From the economy to Iraq to energy to loose nukes, he is going to face one of the – if not the – most challenging set of problems any incoming administration has faced in U.S. history. This is already a given. What's not, however, is exactly which priorities will top his agenda from day one.

To that end, the Center just released a report that identifies key recommendations for how the Obama Administration can address what every presidential candidate since 2000 has said is the gravest threat to international security: the spread of nuclear weapons and materials.

The report is the result of six meetings with 60 leading national security experts from backgrounds as diverse as think tanks, foundations, academia, advocacy, and Congress, which were co-chaired by the Center's chairman, Lt. Gen. Robert Gard (USA, ret.) and the chairman, Sen. Gary Hart (ret.), of its sister organization, Council for a Livable World.

The "clear consensus" of the group on the top three nuclear non-proliferation priorities for the incoming administration were to:

• Provide a new direction on nuclear weapons policy, emphasizing "minimum deterrence," extension of START, and negotiations for further reductions with Russia
• Secure all vulnerable fissile material in four years to reduce the risk of nuclear terrorism
• And ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

In addition, the group outlined a second tier set of priorities that included:

• Negotiations with Iran without preconditions
• Re-committing to promises made at the 1995 NPT entension
• Conditioning further deployment of the third missile defense site on proven tests
  
• And restructuring government to deal at a higher level with arms control

Find this clear, direct discussion of concrete and vital arms control priorities in its entirety on the Center's website. Find the executive summary and list of participants here.

Obama, McCain, and Arms Control in 2009

We know what McCain claimed in his most recent speech on nuclear weapons and nuclear policy, but do any of those positions differ from his previous stances? Where does he stand relative to Obama on issues of arms control?

Find out in the Center's recent side-by-side analysis of the two presumptive presidential nominees' positions on issues of national security, including RRW, START, the CTBT, Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction, and relations with India, Iran, North Korea, and Russia.

Leonor Tomero and John Isaacs, with research assistance from star intern Kimberly Mills, find among other things, that:

• McCain's position on building new nuclear weapons represents a significant departure from his past legislative votes.

• Obama introduced legislation to - among other things - take action on renewing START.
  

• Despite our already tenuous relationship with Russia, McCain wants to ensure that the G-8 "becomes again a club of leading market democracies" that excludes Russia.

Find out more in the full comparison.

Missile Defense Highlights of Bush-Putin Sochi Meeting

On Sunday, President Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin unveiled a joint “U.S.-Russia Strategic Framework Declaration.”

The Declaration addresses a number of issues central to U.S.-Russia relations, including missile defense, the proliferation of WMD, arms control and disarmament, Iran, North Korea, achieving WTO accession for Russia, and climate change. The full text of the Strategic Framework can be found here and the transcript of the President Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin news conference Sunday in Sochi can be found here. In this post I will focus exclusively on the implications of the Sochi meeting for U.S.-Russia missile defense cooperation.

The Strategic Framework declares that “Both sides expressed their interest in creating a system for responding to potential missile threats in which Russia and the United States and Europe will participate as equal partners.” Russia reiterated its opposition to the plan to deploy missile defense assets in Poland and the Czech republic and again floated its proposed alternative (which would allow the United States to (1) use data from Russian early-warning radars in Azerbaijan and Armavir, Russia and (2) station interceptors in Iraq, Turkey, or certain southern European locations). Nevertheless, Russia welcomed “the measures that the U.S. has proposed” and agreed that they would “be important and useful in assuaging Russian concerns.” Finally, the two sides resolved to step up their discussions “on issues concerning MD cooperation both bilaterally and multilaterally.”

Based on Monday's media reports out of Sochi, the immediate post-meeting conventional wisdom appears to be that while Bush and Putin did not reach an agreement on missile defense in Europe, they “left behind a road map for their successors.”

In his press conference with Bush, Putin admitted to having a “certain cautious optimism,” but warned that “the devil is in the details.” Bush went a step further, describing the Declaration as a “significant breakthrough.”

Though the tone of U.S.-Russia relations on missile defense has certainly been marked by less acrimony in recent months, characterizing Sunday’s Declaration as a “significant breakthrough” is wildly off the mark. In terms of the substance of the disagreement between the U.S. and Russia, no real progress was made. Said Putin: “I would like to be very clear on this. Our fundamental attitude to the American plans has not changed.”

In the end, the two sides agreed to continue to discuss various confidence-building measures and proposals (described here, here, and here) which, if agreed to, would “be important and useful in assuaging Russian concerns.” Yet as Putin noted, “the devil is in the details,” and the reality is that the details (1) remain embryonic and (2) could prove to be as controversial as the proposed system itself. In the words of White House Press Secretary Dana Perino:

We’re going to have to do more work after Sochi… No one has said that everything would be finalized and everyone would be satisfied with all the preparations because we haven't even started to work on the technical aspects of the system… We’re still in the early part of these discussions [emphasis mine].

In other missile defense news, during last week’s NATO Summit in Bucharest, it was announced that the United States and the Czech Republic reached an agreement on placing an early warning radar base in the Czech Republic. However, as was noted in this space last month, it is likely to take some time before the base is deployed. What’s more, it remains to be seen how Prague will react to a formal U.S. proposal to allow Russia access to the radar base, which is one of the confidence-building measures currently being discussed by U.S. and Russian officials.

Russian Nuclear Weapons for Belarus?

Blogging on the NATO Summit in Bucharest, the Acronym Institute’s Martin Butcher recently posted this interesting tid-bit on a possible nuclear defense pact that would allow Belarus to host Russian nukes:

Russian Nuclear Weapons for Belarus?

Lithuanian paper Respublika is summarised in English by Ria Novosti on the possibility of a nuclear defence link between Russia and Belarus.

"The media are quoting Belarusian political analysts as saying that Washington is violating the 2004 Budapest memo under which signatories may not impose sanctions against Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan; this violation could provoke Minsk into a renouncement of nuclear neutrality. "Experts are emphasizing that this does not mean that Belarus will go nuclear. But Minsk will receive a legal opportunity to host Russian nuclear weapons on its territory. Now, if the United States toughens its economic sanctions, Belarus will be able not only to use this 'nuclear right,' but also to demand that Russia should extend such a guarantee to all members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization." (Respublika, March 29)."

In truth, NATO would be hard put to object to such a development without the strong taint of hypocrisy. The United States maintains around 350 nuclear weapons in Europe. A good proportion of those are allocated for the use of nominally non-nuclear NATO states in time of war. Germany, The Netherlands, Belgium, Italy and Turkey all train their air forces for nuclear missions under NATO's nuclear sharing programme. The US stores B61 bombs at these nations air bases and could hand the weapons over if NATO was attacked.

This Cold War arrangement has been severely criticised at Non-Proliferation Treaty meetings as fundamentally against the treaty obligations of these countries. This is not the first time that Belarus has been suspected of wanting to enter into a similar arrangement with Russia. NATO needs to end nuclear sharing immediately, and look for ways to eliminate the US arsenal in Europe. Then, and only then, could they address this subject from the high ground.

Upcoming Bush-Putin Meeting Could be Momentous

George W. Bush and Russian President Valdimir Putin are scheduled to meet this Sunday in the Russian city of Sochi to discuss missile defense and a multi-point strategic framework document to guide U.S.-Russian relations in the near and medium term. Sunday’s meeting comes on the heels of this week’s NATO summit in Bucharest, and will be the last scheduled meeting between Bush and Putin as heads of state.

Reports have been circulating during the past few weeks that recent talks between U.S. and Russian officials, including a visit to Moscow by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates last month, have closed the gap between the two countries on missile defense. Washington has reportedly proposed to halt activation of the system until an agreement can be reached with Russia as to what constitutes an “imminent” Iranian threat and has offered to allow Russia access to missile defense sites in the United States and Europe. Nevertheless, the United States and Russia are still far away from an agreement, and it remains to be seen if Sunday’s meeting will include a discussion of these compromise proposals and/or further movement on Russia's suggestions for alternatives to a missile defense system in Europe.

The Bush administration’s proposed plan, which would consist of 10 interceptors in Poland and a radar site in the Czech Republic, has provoked virulent opposition from Russia. In response, Moscow has already suspended compliance with the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. It is also threatening to abrogate the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which could pave the way for the reintroduction of large numbers of ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with intermediate ranges in Europe. Moreover, Russia has suggested that it may target Poland and the Czech Republic and deploy medium-range ballistic missiles in Kalingard on the Polish border.

In sum, Sunday’s meeting is an event that merits paying close attention to.

Why Missile Defense Upsets Russia

Center Scoville Fellow and Nukes of Hazard contributer Kingston Reif published an excellent letter to the editor today in the Washington Post in response to comments about Russian perceptions of the American planned third site in Europe.

Full text provided here:

In the March 13 op-ed "Moscow's Missile Gambit," Robert Joseph and J.D. Crouch II said the United States should proceed with plans to place missile interceptors and their supporting radar systems in Europe regardless of Russian opposition. A fundamental assumption underlying their argument is that Russia's strategic objections to the U.S. proposal have little objective merit.

But Russia's perception that a U.S. missile defense system might compromise its credible minimum deterrent can't be attributed to paranoia or political posturing alone. U.S. interceptors in Poland could be effective in intercepting Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles. Moreover, Russian defense analysts are undoubtedly questioning the purpose of a system that would be in a position to target Russian ICBMs but would not be able to protect a large swath of Europe from an Iranian missile attack.

Russia may see U.S. missile defense efforts in Europe as the threatening tip of the iceberg. The initiative may be directed at Iran, but that is not the only country it could affect in the long run.

Fore more information on missile defense analysis from the Center, click here.

Russia Supplies Nuclear Fuel to Iran

The complex triad of relations between the U.S., Russia, and Iran got a little messier Monday when Russia announced its sale of nuclear fuel to Iran.

The delivery of lowly enriched uranium fuel rods to Iran's Bushehr power plant was not a surprise to the international community. It had been delayed several times in the past, and the Bush administration had a few weeks warning before Monday's announcement. This knowledge, however, does not diminish the extent to which this may affect relations between Iran and Russia, nor the extent to which it will complicate each country's already strained interactions with the U.S.

Development of the power plants at Bushehr and Darkhovin were planned before 1979 and then abandoned. The plan to further develop Bushehr with nuclear fuel from Russia has been delayed multiple times, whether in part because of international pressure not to acquiesce to Iran's nuclear desires, or because of publicly announced financial disputes.

Additional information on all of Iran's key nuclear sites can be found here.

According to the AFP, a representative for Atomstroiexport, the Russian contracting group responsible for the project, the plant will not be up and running before – at a minimum – the end of 2008. Two additional months are needed just to finish delivering the fuel rods, and tests will start six months after the deliveries are complete.

Russia has assured the international community that the fuel will be under the control of the IAEA, and Iran has "guaranteed" that it will only be used for the power plant at Bushehr and not be diverted for other purposes, reports the Times. Though some safeguards have been agreed to, concerns remain over exactly what will happen with the spent fuel.

"We for many years tried to stop [the sale], and for the last year we've known there was not a way to stop it, and that it was coming, and we held our breath on the timing," a senior Bush administration official told the NYT. This is not the moment they would have chosen.

In addition to coming during times of increased tension between Russia and the U.S. over America's planned missile defense site in Europe, the announcement came just weeks after international support for hawkish U.S. policies against Iran decreased in response to the NIE that identified Iran had ended its nuclear weapons program in the fall of 2003. Russia and China, already the most hesitant of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council to agree to tougher sanctions on Iran, are now demonstrating even less willingness to side with U.S. policies.

Bush PR

While American and European officials stated privately that, "Russia's decision to deliver fuel to Bushehr further encourages Iran," the Bush administration has not publicly criticized the Russian sale.

On the contrary, they've attempted to validate the sale and fit it into their own vision for Iran. "If the Iranians accept that uranium for a civilian nuclear power plant, then there's not need for them to learn how to enrich," Bush stated. White House spokesperson Gordon Johndroe framed it as support from Russia for an ending to enrichment on Iranian soil. "There is no doubt that Russia and the rest of the world want to keep Iran from getting a nuclear weapon," he stated.

While there isn't a complete lack of validity in some of these points, Russia's sale is arguably more significant in its encouragement of the development of an Iranian nuclear program than its attempt to decrease Iran's desire for its own enrichment cycle.

Iran PR

This perspective is confirmed by Iran. Gholam Reza Aghazadeh, head of Iran's own atomic energy organization, has announced that the sale does not indicate a cessation of their desire to enrich uranium on their own soil. The country plans to enrich uranium at the Natanz facility for a second power plant at Darkhovin, just as the Russian fuel will be used at Bushehr.

For Iran's own PR offensive, deputy head of the organization Mohammad Saeedi argued that the sale was a first step in deepening relations between Iran and Russia "in all fields in the future."

New Sparks in Missile Defense

Several new issues have arisen regarding the controversial third missile defense site planned for Europe since Nukes of Hazard's last summary post on the subject. Two weeks ago, a senior Russian general announced a potential retaliatory measure to the site. The following week, Rick Lehner, spokesperson for the Missile Defense Agency, critically responded to comments by Representative Ellen Tauscher (D-CA) on their purpose. And this week, Russia claimed that U.S. proposals aimed at cooperation between the two nations did not live up to the plans that had emerged from earlier discussions.

The "tit-for-tat" cautionary predictions made by many opponents to the sites in Poland and the Czech Republic were brought closer to reality on November 14 when Russian and Belarusian officials warned that Russia could respond by supplying short-range Iskander missiles to Belarus. According to Russian news agency Itar-Tass, Colonel-General Vladimir Zaritsky, a senior general for the Russian Ground Troops, stated, "Any action must have a counter-action, including with the U.S. anti-missile elements in the Czech Republic and Poland." As the New York Times notes, however, while the Iskander missiles would then be under Belarusian command, due to their close relationship "both countries' missile forces are seen as working in unison."

Just over a week later, a different controversy arose - this time from within the U.S. - over the site's purpose. William Matthews had a great article in Defense News on the topic. Rep. Ellen Tauscher (D-CA), chairperson of the House Armed Services strategic forces subcommittee, put the U.S. Missile Defense Agency on the defensive after she claimed that the sites were for protection from long-range attacks on the United States from Iran, and not specifically to protect Europe. Rick Lehner, spokesperson for the Missile Defense Agency, claimed the system "is designed specifically to defend most of Europe" and would have only a "redundant capability to defend the U.S."

Tauscher also raised some eyebrows when, as Matthews continues, she characterized long-range missile defense systems as "a science project." To her credit, the two-stage missile interceptor planned for Poland has to date been neither built nor tested. While it is quite similar to interceptors already used in the U.S, even these have a mixed-at-best record in their testing phases, failing 5 out of 12 times – a meager 58.3% success rate. Not exactly confidence inspiring.

(Graphic produced by the BBC)

Finally, an additional issue arose this week when Russian President Vladimir Putin accused the U.S. of submitting written proposals that did not live up to agreements made during the October discussions. The U.S. submitted to Russia new proposals for the missile defense program, in an effort to reduce their opposition to the program. However, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov claimed that they were "a significant rollback from what American representatives [Gates and Rice] said" in October. He stated, "If by joint work they mean pursuing unilateral plans to install missile defense facilities in Eastern Europe, and inviting us only to help them and provide information we have, that's not what we have in mind when we propose…together conducting analyses to determine threats…and neutralize them," AP reports. The Pentagon disputes this claim, but details of the proposal have yet to be made public.

What all of this will mean for the missile defense system remains to be seen, but these issues may be less relevant if the funds don't exist to pursue the project. An earlier post identified that the 2008 Defense Appropriations bill reduced funding for the European Third Site program by $85 million. In addition, while Congressional Quarterly declared "Missile Defense a Winner in Policy Bill" in the 2008 Defense Authorization bill (still held up in conference) because the cuts to overall missile defense were less than expected (only $185 million less than Bush's requested $8.84 billion), it also cuts funding for the third site by $85 million and blocks construction until agreements are reached with Poland and the Czech Republic.

Dangerous Rhetoric: Putin Calls for "Raising the Combat Readiness" of Russian Nuclear Forces

In a public address to the heads of the Russian Armed Forces last Wednesday, President Vladimir Putin stated that, "One of the most important [military modernization] tasks remains raising the combat readiness of the strategic nuclear forces. They should be ready to deliver a quick and adequate reply to any aggressor.”

While some media sources treated the statement as an important development in the Russian military posture, Putin's statement appears to have been more rhetorical than strategic. However, Putin's tendency to flex his country's nuclear weapons capabilities for domestic political purposes does not bode well for future bilateral disarmament measures.

Putin with the heads of the Armed Forces (Photo by the Presidential Press and Information Office)

The Times of London reported that by last week's remarks, Putin "ordered the military to place the country’s strategic nuclear arsenal on a higher state of alert." However, Putin's declared intent to "raise the combat readiness" of the nuclear forces so that they can execute a "quick and adequate" strike is much vaguer than the Times' summary. With one third of the Russian nuclear arsenal already on "hair-trigger alert," it is hard to believe that Putin seriously perceives the Russian nuclear arsenal as having an excessively lengthy launch time.

Putin's statement was a vague and slightly strange declaration for a public address, and should not be seen as an order to the military, or even a specific policy proposal. On the other hand, Putin's choice of rhetoric may have important consequences. In "Television, Voters, and the Development of the Broadcast Party," Sarah Oates (a professor at the University of Glasgow) demonstrated that Vladimir Putin came to power by avoiding specific political stances that could alienate voters, and casting himself instead in vague terms of strength, stability, and authority.

While this sort of posturing is common in any political system, Putin's use of the tactic was, and continues to be, exceptional. For example, before Putin took office in 2000, his legislative party won control of the Russian parliament by making very public use of its three newly appointed leaders: Sergei Shoigu, director of the Russian disaster response agency, Alexander Gurov, the head of the government's task force against organized crime, and Alexander Karelin, a famous Russian Greco-Roman wrestler.

As Oates explains, Putin's Unity party made use of the three men to advertise an image of strength almost devoid of political content.

In fact, the image makers avoided words as much as possible, using pictures of the three men respectively as a soldier, victor in a wrestling match, and policeman. One five-minute free-time spot for the party...is almost text free. The spot shows the men in action in their various roles with stirring music (a different theme tune for each), allowing them each to utter merely a single sentence about strength and worthiness in the final seconds of the ad.

Though a political ad showing a victorious wrestler might seem ridiculous, Putin's approach to image-making is methodical, organized, and doctrinal. What is worrisome about Putin's recent statement about increased nuclear readiness is not that it will usher in nuclear policy changes, but that this latest example of nuclear grandstanding indicates that Putin is increasingly relying on Russia's nuclear arsenal as a symbolic pillar of his strength and prestige in the same way that he used the wrestler, the policeman, and the soldier.

The more Putin draws on nuclear weapons as an image-maker, the less politically viable nuclear disarmament becomes in Russia. Putin's nuclear saber-rattling should not be confused with policymaking, but his choice of rhetoric may serve to undermine policy options in the future.

U.S. and Russian Publics Strongly Support Steps to Reduce and Eliminate Nuclear Weapons

The University of Maryland’s Center for International and Security Studies (CISSM) and its Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) recently released a new WorldPublicOpinion.org poll of American and Russian attitudes toward recent cooperative nuclear risk reduction proposals.

The key findings of the study are:

1. De-alerting Nuclear Weapons

Large majorities of Americans and Russians favor reducing the number of nuclear weapons on high alert. Robust majorities on both sides would even favor a mutual agreement to take all of their weapons off high alert, if the two countries established a verification system. Few Russians or Americans think their country should have a policy of launching nuclear weapons on warning of a potential attack.

2. Deep Cuts in Nuclear Arsenals

Very large majorities endorse the U.S.-Russian SORT agreement to reduce the number of active nuclear weapons in each arsenal to about 2,000 weapons by the end of 2012. Most think such cuts should be made even sooner. Majorities in both countries also favor cutting the arsenals below the 2,000 levels. Americans and Russians would favor lowering U.S. and Russian arsenals to the level of 400 nuclear weapons if all other nuclear powers also promised not to increase the number of weapons in their arsenals.

Both Russians and Americans believe nuclear weapons are of very limited military utility: A majority of both Americans and Russians say that nuclear weapons should be used only in response to a nuclear attack and a large majority of Americans say that the United States should have a policy of never using nuclear weapons first. When Americans are asked how many nuclear weapons are necessary for deterrence, the median response is just 500. When asked how many nuclear weapons do you think the U.S. has, the median response is 1000 – much lower than the actual size of the U.S. arsenal (approximately 10,000 total warheads).

3. Eliminating Short-Range Weapons

A large majority of Americans believe the U.S. should agree to eliminate its short-range weapons based in Europe if Russia agrees to eliminate its short-range nuclear weapons based in western Russia. (Russians were not asked this question.)

4. Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)

Overwhelming majorities of Americans as well as Russians think their country should participate in the treaty banning all nuclear weapons testing. Indeed, a clear majority of Americans assume that the United States already does.

5. Controlling Nuclear Weapons-grade Material

Very large majorities of Russians and Americans say that their countries should put a top priority on cooperating with each other to prevent terrorists from acquiring nuclear weapons. Majorities, especially in the United States, favor an agreement among all nuclear powers to share information about the number of nuclear weapons and the amount of weapons-grade nuclear material they have. Americans, however, lean against highly intrusive bilateral monitoring systems, while Russians lean in favor of them. Americans also lean slightly against providing money and technical assistance to aid Russia in securing its nuclear weapons and materials, while Russians are lukewarm about the idea.

6. Getting Control of the Production of Nuclear Fuel

Americans support various proposals for gaining greater international control over the production of nuclear fuel. A majority favors the idea of discouraging countries from building their own facilities through an agreement that would provide them with fuel in return for a promise not to produce it themselves. A modest majority also favors having a UN affiliate control all facilities that process nuclear material, while guaranteeing countries a supply of fuel for nuclear power plants. (Russians were not asked these questions). Both Russians and Americans who are aware of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) tend to view it positively.

7. Ban on Producing Fissile Material

A majority of Americans and Russians favor having a ban on any further production of fissile material suitable for nuclear weapons.

8. Intrusive and Multilateral Verification

Americans and Russians believe that achieving deep cuts in nuclear arsenals would require verification by an international body. A majority of Americans believe that international inspectors charged with verifying compliance with arms control agreements have too many limits on what they can do. Russians lean toward this belief but are largely unsure.

As explained above, majorities, especially in the United States, favor an agreement among all nuclear powers to share information about the number of nuclear weapons and the amount of weapons-grade nuclear material they each have. Both publics prefer this to a bilateral information exchange and monitoring arrangement.

Americans overwhelmingly believe that when the U.S. and Russia agree to a nuclear arms reduction it should be done through a legally binding and verifiable agreement rather than a general understanding that both sides decide how to implement.

9. Elimination of Nuclear Weapons

Large majorities of Russians and Americans favor an agreement among all countries to eliminate all nuclear weapons, assuming that there is a well-established system for verifying compliance. Most approve of this objective, even though they are unaware that their country has already agreed to pursue it under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Indeed, large majorities on both sides feel that the nuclear powers have not been doing a good job of fulfilling this obligation and very large majorities would like their country to do more. Support for eliminating nuclear weapons softens, however, without an international system for verification and an orderly sequence of reductions. Also, trend line data suggest that support for elimination may have declined in light of the current suspicions about Iran’s nuclear program.

Nukes! Huh! What Are They Good For?

The Arms Control Association (ACA) released an excellent report last week that concludes “ambitious nuclear weapons reductions by the United States would help lessen distrust with Russia and aid global efforts to curb the spread of nuclear arms.” Entitled What Are Nuclear Weapons For? Recommendations for Restructuring U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces, the report was authored by Stanford physicist Sidney Drell and Ambassador James Goodby.

Drell and Goodby suggest a total U.S. force structure of 1,000 nuclear warheads in 2012, with 500 nuclear warheads being operationally deployed and an additional 500 held in a responsive force. This contrasts sharply with current U.S. plan for a stockpile between 5,000 to 6,000 nuclear warheads at that time. Significantly, however, the authors note that “A world without nuclear weapons should be the ultimate goal.”

Getting down to the nitty-gritty, Drell and Goodby propose the following individual components for the “500 + 500 in 2012” force:

Operationally Deployed Force

· Three Trident submarines on station at sea, each loaded with 24 missiles and 96 warheads (a mix of low-yield W76s and high-yield W88s). Reducing the D5 missiles from their full complement of eight warheads to four per missile will substantially increase their maximum operating areas.

· 100 Minuteman III ICBMs in hardened silos, each with a single W87.

· 20–25 B2 and B52H bombers configured for gravity bombs or air-launched cruise missiles.

Responsive Force

· Three Trident submarines, each loaded with 96 warheads, in transit or being replenished in port for their next missions as part of a Ready Responsive Force for a rapidly building crisis, plus two or three unarmed boats in overhaul.

· 50–100 additional Minuteman III missiles taken off alert and without warheads, and 20–25 bombers, unarmed, in maintenance and training, all of which would comprise a Strategic Responsive Force, for a more slowly building confrontation.

The authors explain that this force is composed of existing warheads and delivery systems, requires no new nuclear weapons, and retains the current diversity of systems as a hedge against common failure modes. In fact, they contend that with the cooperation of the other nuclear-armed nations, nuclear deterrence might be maintained entirely with a responsive force of no more than 500 warheads from the initial operationally deployed force.

Drell and Goodby also argue that there’s no need for designing new nuclear weapons against potential new threats, believing instead that current weapons will be sufficient. They maintain that keeping thousands of nuclear warheads serves no useful purpose, contending “yesterday’s [nuclear] doctrines are no longer appropriate for today’s realities.”

The full report is available here.

Putin's Modernization Plan "Grandiose" to Those Who Don't Know Difference between Missiles and Warheads

Vladimir Putin's remarks on military modernization, aired over Russian radio on October 18th, are causing quite a stir. Last Friday, the Times of London quoted the Russian president as follows:

We will develop missile technology including completely new strategic [nuclear] complexes, completely new. Work is continuing successfully. We have plans that are not only big but grandiose, and they are fully realistic. Our armed forces will be more compact but more effective and better ensure Russia defence.

The paper stated that Putin's remarks "signaled the start of a new nuclear arms race," and they received coverage in a variety of news sources. However, a journalistic error made by a large number of papers made the Russian President's modernization declaration seem more inflammatory than it actually was.

Missiles (left) must be distinguished from warheads (right)

In reporting Putin's remarks, news sources including Reuters, Agence France-Presse, AFX, and The Telegraph failed to draw a distinction between the delivery systems for nuclear warheads (i.e. missiles, submarines, and bombers) and the nuclear warheads themselves. This unnecessary ambiguity may have made Putin's remarks--which largely reiterated old news about Russian military modernization--seem like a "signal of a new nuclear arms race."

While the Times omitted sections of Putin's remarks in the quotation above, his exact statement on nuclear modernization (according to the official transcript) was that "We will develop missile technology, including entirely new strategic systems, not just the Topol system with multiple warheads, but also completely new systems."

Putin was clearly referring to the development of new missiles, not new warheads. He explicitly states this initially ("we will develop missile technology"), then specifies the remark in a way that proved confusing for some mainstream media sources. Putin stated that Russia will develop "entirely new strategic systems," (sometimes translated as "strategic complexes"), a fairly vague phrase. However, the meaning is made clear in the subsequent clause, when he contrasts these "completely new systems" with Russia's recent modification of the existing Topol missile system. Putin is talking about new missile systems, not new warheads. This is made still clearer by looking at the broader context of the remark: The subsequent paragraphs discuss comparable modernization plans for submarines and bombers, the other two legs of the "triad" of nuclear delivery systems.

However, the preeminent global news services Agence France-Presse and AFX separately described Putin as announcing the development of "a 'completely new' atomic weapon," the UK's Telegraph reported that Putin had "announced plans to build a new generation of nuclear weapons," and Reuters cited the Russian president as having said that "Russia was working on new types of nuclear weapons as part of a "grandiose" plan to boost the country's defenses."

"Nuclear weapon" is not an acceptable synonym for "missile," even when the missiles in question are designed to carry nuclear warheads. Anyone who read the transcript of Putin's remarks would know that the Russian President was referring to missiles, not warheads, but readers of the AFP, AFX, Reuters, or Telegraph stories would have to draw their own conclusion. And the distinction is important, even to laypersons: "New warheads" suggests a quantitative increase in deployed nuclear weapons, when in fact Russia is slated to decrease its number of deployed nuclear weapons as per the (admittedly flawed) Moscow Treaty.

Had Putin announced the development of a new generation of nuclear warheads, it would be a shocking development in the increasingly tense U.S.-Russian relationship. But Putin was not talking about warheads, he was talking about missiles, and as the Russian Strategic Forces blog observed, Russian plans to develop new missiles are old news:

A closer look [at Putin's remarks on military modernization], however, shows that there was nothing really new there. Russia has been modernizing every single leg of its strategic triad already, so it is somewhat difficult to come up with something on top of that that would be "grandiose" enough to justify the rhetoric.

There are many elements of Russian-U.S. nuclear relations that warrant concern (most notably the imminent expiration of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) but Putin reciting military modernization plans over Russian radio is not among them.

Putin's Tongue-in-Cheek Proposal to Expand the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty

Over the last six months, Russia has repeatedly indicated that it is considering withdrawing from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), an arms control agreement signed in 1987 whereby the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to destroy all ground-launched cruise and ballistic missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 km.

A component of a Pershing Missile destroyed in 1988 under the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (photo from the Army's "Pershing Photo Archive")

Last Saturday, during high-level talks in Moscow, Putin offered a new angle on the withdrawal threat:

We need other international participants to assume the same obligations which have been assumed by the Russian Federation and the US. If we are unable to attain such a goal ... it will be difficult for us to keep within the framework of the treaty in a situation where other countries do develop such weapons systems, and among those are countries in our near vicinity.

Though Putin was not explicit, Russian neighbors with ballistic missile programs include Iran, Pakistan, India, and China. At first glance, Putin's demand seems compelling: Fairness would seem to dictate a broadening of the treaty's membership, and Central Asia could certainly benefit from more arms control. However, Putin's proposal is so impractical as to be practically tongue-in-cheek. As the Times of London observed in an editorial,

Mr. Putin's declaration that the INF treaty should become a global agreement was a clever stalling tactic because he knows that it would take years, if ever, to achieve such a deal.

The problem with Putin's proposal--which the Russian president is surely aware of--is that Russia and the United States were able to sign an Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty only because they had substantial arsenals of longer-range Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM). When INF was signed, the United States had 1000 ICBM launchers with 2,300 warheads, and the Soviet Union had 1,418 ICBM launchers with 6,872 warheads (figures courtesy of the Natural Resources Defense Council). Now, besides China, none of Russia's Asian neighbors have ICBMs: "intermediate-range" missiles are actually the longest range missiles in their arsenals.

But destroying intermediate-range missiles when a state has an arsenal of longer range missiles--as the US and Russia did via the INF treaty--is strategically incomparable to destroying those same missiles when they are the longest-range weapons in a state's arsenal.

Putin's laments about being at an unfair disadvantage relative to his neighbors are thus disingenuous--Russia did not, and could not, have signed INF until it had ICBMs, and it does not make sense to expect other countries to act differently. And while Russia may be targeted by its neighbors' intermediate range missiles, as Jacob Quamme of the Center for Defense Information explained, Russia is more than capable of deterring those states, even though it has no missiles with intermediate ranges.

Russian ICBMs do require minimum distances in order to be effective; however, Russia's growing fleet of road-mobile Topol-M missiles, rail-mobile systems and submarine-launched ballistic missiles can be positioned so as to put required targets within range relatively easily. Alternatively, air-launched cruise missiles are not restricted under the INF Treaty and could be used effectively in a hypothetical conflict.

As such, Russia is put at no practical disadvantage by the Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles of its neighbors, nor is it "unfair" for those countries to remain outside the treaty that Russia signed, given the substantial Russian arsenal of ICBMs.

Halting the proliferation of ballistic missiles globally is a security necessity, but a Russian withdrawal from INF would be as counterproductive as it would be unjustified. President Bush should avoid being side-tracked by this red herring of an arms control proposal, and work to ameliorate the U.S.-Russian tensions that are the real cause of Putin's interest in INF withdrawl.

The "Cool War"?

Elements of Cold War tensions between the United States and Russia seemed to resurface during missile defense talks last week. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Defense Secretary Robert Gates traveled to Russia in an effort to address Russian concerns regarding the U.S. plans to build a missile defense system in the Eastern Europe.

Yet Rice's talk of "promises," "the common good," "commitment," and the issues that "unite" the two countries apparently did little to calm Russia's concerns, especially when preceded by statements that the plan to build receptors in Poland and place radar in the Czech Republic was non-negotiable. According to Reuters, Rice commented, "we have been very clear that we need the Czech and Polish sites."

Though the Bush administration claims that the sites are necessary to intercept Iranian missiles, Russia fears that such a system could make ineffective its own ability to launch ICBMs and deter a nuclear attack. Putin opened the talks with sarcastic remarks at what was supposed to be a photo-op, rebuking the administration for its plans and touching on the topic of U.S. imperialism in world affairs, and again threatened to withdraw from the Conventional Forces in Europe pact and the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty.

As much as Bush might want to argue that countries "are either with us or against us," the world is much more complex than such a dichotomous description allows. While that may have been appropriate for the bipolar Cold War world, our relationship with Russia is, though less immediately threatening, in a number of ways more complex. Russia may be an adversary on some issues, including its friendliness with Iran, we nevertheless need its cooperation on this and other issues.

The level of tension between our two countries has the power to drastically impact our other foreign policy goals. The tension exhibited at last week's meeting in response will prove a formidable challenge to negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program, as well as other non-proliferation issues such as negotiating a successor agreement to START in 2009.

Matthew Bunn: More to be Done to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism

Matthew Bunn, an Advisory Board Member at the Center, wrote a terrific op-ed in today’s Washington Post in which he argues that, “We urgently need a high-priority global campaign to make sure every nuclear weapon and every significant cache of potential bomb material is locked down.”

The piece promotes the findings of "Securing the Bomb 2007," an annual report on the security of nuclear weapons and materials around the world, which Bunn helped write. The good news of the report “is that much progress has been made toward upgrading security for nuclear stockpiles. The bad news is that the essential ingredients of nuclear weapons exist in hundreds of buildings in more than 40 countries, and terrorists are actively trying to get a nuclear bomb or the materials to make one.”

Bunn states:

While [nuclear terrorism] is a global threat, Russia, Pakistan and research reactors using fuel made from highly enriched uranium pose the most urgent dangers of nuclear theft. Russia has the world's largest stockpiles of nuclear weapons and the materials to make them, scattered in numerous buildings and bunkers. Security measures have improved dramatically since the early 1990s, but serious weaknesses remain, and threats are posed by outside attackers as well as pervasive insider theft.

Pakistan has a relatively small nuclear stockpile, believed to be heavily guarded -- but the country faces threats from al-Qaeda, other jihadist groups and nuclear insiders with a demonstrated willingness to sell sensitive technology.

Roughly 140 research reactors fueled by highly enriched uranium exist in dozens of countries -- some of them on university campuses -- and many have only modest security measures in place.

Click here to read the complete op-ed and here to download the full report.

Russian Bomber Flights: The Real Cost of Missile Defense?

Last week, British fighters flew to intercept eight Russian bombers approaching British air space in what the Times of London called "the biggest aerial confrontation between the two countries since the end of the Cold War." Aerial starring matches like this were standard during the Cold War, but had been relatively unknown since then. In August, Putin resumed the practice of regular patrols over international waters by nuclear-capable Tu-95 bombers, leading to several incidents like this one involving Britain, the United States, Norway, and Canada.



State Department spokesman Sean McCormack downplayed the importance of the Russian flights, referring to the bombers as "old aircraft taken out of mothballs" and characterizing this development as "an internal decision...That is a decision for them to take; it's interesting." McCormack implies that the causes of this policy are entirely endogenous to Russia (e.g. Putin's desire to flex military muscle at home or demonstrate his power to the world). It is also possible, however, that the roots of this decision are exogenous to Russia, which is to say, this is a response to the behavior of another state.

The decision to resume bomber flights may be closely related to Putin's fears about missile defense. Putin is concerned with the intrusion of NATO military capability into the Warsaw Pact area (i.e. the planned placement of missile defense interceptors in Poland). NATO expansion eastward is contrary to the deal that was struck between Russia and the United States on German reunification: Russia consented to a unified Germany joining NATO in exchange for a promise that NATO would not expand beyond Germany's eastern border. Thus, even the expansion of a missile defense system of dubious effectiveness is seen as a threat, and if the system were expanded it could diminish or even eliminate Russia's ability to launch a nuclear strike using ICBMs.

The commander of Russia's Strategic Air Force said in March that he sees bombers as the antidote to American missile defense:

"Missile shield elements, which are located in silos, are very vulnerable and have weak defenses," Lieutenant-General Igor Khvorov said. "Therefore, all aircraft deployed by [Russian] strategic aviation can either apply electronic counter-measures against them or physically destroy them."

The resumption of bomber flights will have minimal implications on Russian military power, but with this decision Putin is publicly flexing a tool that happens to be extremely well suited to counteracting missile defense systems. Other counter-missile defense capabilities have been expanded in strategically significant ways: In May, Russia announced that it would begin equipping its Topol-M missiles with multiple independently targetable nuclear warheads. General Nikolai Solovstov explained to Pravda that this addition would "help penetrate missile defenses more effectively."

At the beginning of the Cold War, Western analysts understood Soviet domination of Eastern Europe as an act of aggression, a prelude to a possible invasion of Western Europe. In retrospect, many historians believe that Stalin had absolutely no intent of launching such an invasion, but was in fact acting defensively, seeking to create a buffer zone against a possibly resurgent Germany. The failure of the West to understand Russian actions as a reaction made those actions appear more aggressive then they actually were, which raised tensions significantly. If we fail to understand the possible connection between the Russian resumption of bomber flights and Putin's fears about missile defense, we run the risk of making the same mistake again, over half a century later.

When START Began

Sixteen years ago today, U.S. President George H.W. Bush and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev signed the first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). The Treaty barred its signatories (initially the U.S. and the USSR, but subsequently Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan) from deploying more than 6,000 “countable” nuclear warheads atop a total of 1,600 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers.

While both the U.S. and Russia are well below these limitations, START I also established an elaborate scheme of inspections, data sharing, advance missile test notifications and satellite surveillance, which later provided the foundation for monitoring compliance with the subsequently negotiated (and otherwise toothless) Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), also known as the Moscow Treaty.

The Bush administration announced in May that it plans to let START I expire when it runs out at the end of 2009 and would instead seek to replace the Treaty with a less formal agreement that contains weaker verification mechanisms. That decision hasn’t gone over very well with the intelligence community or ranking members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Sen. Joseph Biden (D-DE), Chairman of the Committee, even went so far as to say, ''I think it would be the single greatest negative legacy this administration could leave if it leaves us in a situation where there is no future architecture to follow on to START.”

Similar concerns over the expiration of START I run deep in the House. Chairman of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, Rep. Ellen Tauscher, and nearly 30 other Representatives sent a letter to President Bush last week urging him to extend START I until a new agreement is reached. Notably, Tauscher was joined by Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, Ike Skelton, and Chairman of House International Relations Committee, Tom Lantos, among others.

U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and her Russian counterpart did recently issue a brief joint statement on July 3 indicating that both sides would continue to discuss START I, but their joint statement lacked any new information and reflected persistent disagreements between the two countries on the specifics of a follow-on or extension to START I. The statement merely indicated that both sides were discussing the issue, but that differences between both sides remain.

Russian Consul General: CFE Treaty “Hopelessly Outdated”

In case you missed it, Russian consul general in San Francisco, Vladimir Vinokurov, wrote an interesting op-ed on Saturday defending his country’s decision to suspend its participation in the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty).

Referring to the CFE Treaty as “hopelessly outdated,” Vinokurov argues that while Russia has been “strictly abiding by the letter and the spirit” of the treaty for years, its Western partners, by contrast, have shown “a lack of reciprocity.”

Vinokurov then outlines his case and provides a list of conditions “necessary for restoring the viability of the CFE Treaty,” including:

…the return of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania into the Treaty context; the reduction of the ceilings and holdings of Treaty-limited equipment for NATO countries in order to compensate for the expansion of the NATO alliance; the abolition of "flank" restrictions on Russian territory; working out a common understanding of the term "substantial combat forces" that have appeared in Europe on the NATO side; the coming into force or at least provisional application of the Adapted Treaty no later than July 1, 2008.

But it is an understated yet important point that Vinokurov makes early on that leaves me skeptical of his otherwise seemingly reasonable catalogue of demands.

In mentioning what the suspension of the CFE Treaty means in practical terms, he states:

Russia also will no longer be bound by any limits on conventional armament. But the real holdings of Russian military equipment will depend on the evolution of the situation, particularly on the readiness of the other states party to the CFE Treaty to show adequate restraint from installing missile bases.

In other words, an only slightly veiled threat that Russia might expand its military if other countries (e.g. Poland and the Czech Republic) allow the installation of missile defense bases.

Tauscher and Nearly 30 Other Reps. Urge Bush to Extend START

Hats off to Rep. Ellen Tauscher, Chairman of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, who announced yesterday that she and nearly 30 other Representatives were sending a letter to President Bush urging him to extend the first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) until a new agreement is reached.

The impressive group of Reps. included chairmen from three key committees, including Chairman Ike Skelton of the House Armed Services Committee, Chairman John Conyers of the House Judiciary Committee, and Chairman Tom Lantos of House International Relations Committee.

As previous reported, the Bush administration announced in May that it plans to let START I expire when it runs out at the end of 2009. The Treaty barred its signatories from deploying more than 6,000 “countable” nuclear warheads atop a total of 1,600 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers.

While both the U.S. and Russia are well below these limitations, START I also established an elaborate scheme of inspections, data sharing, advance missile test notifications and satellite surveillance, which later provided the foundation for monitoring compliance with the toothless Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), also known as the Moscow Treaty.

SORT requires the U.S. and Russia to reduce the number of operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads (on ICBMs, SLBMs, heavy bombers, or otherwise) to 1,700-2,200 by the end of 2012. But because SORT doesn’t require the destruction of the warheads, they could instead be removed from service and stored in reserve stockpiles where the warheads could quickly redeployed at a later time.

Consequently, one problematic result of the Bush administration’s decision to not extend START I is that both the U.S. and Russia will lose one of the most reliable ways of making sure that both countries are meeting the required reductions under SORT. As I mentioned earlier, this decision has upset not only the U.S. intelligence community, but also Sens. Biden and Lugar, the leading senators on the Foreign Relations Committee.

Below is the full text of the letter Tauscher et. al sent to the President.

July 24, 2007

The Honorable George W. Bush
President of the United States of America
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, DC

Dear Mr. President:

We write to urge you to work with the Russian Federation to extend the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) after it expires in December 2009.

We were pleased that, in a joint statement issued July 3, 2007, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov reiterated the intention of the United States and Russia "to carry out strategic offensive reductions to the lowest possible level consistent with their national security requirements and alliance commitments." We are also pleased that both acknowledged the need for "a post-START arrangement to provide continuity and predictability regarding strategic offensive forces."

We are concerned however that both governments have not agreed to extend START in its current form and have just begun working on a post-START agreement. Without a legally binding follow-on agreement that includes a commitment to verifiable reductions in both countries' nuclear arsenals below the levels contained in SORT (Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions), the United States and Russia risk creating greater strategic uncertainty and further eroding the international nonproliferation regime. The continuing risk that nuclear weapons could fall into the hands of terrorists coupled with the possibility that additional nations will consider developing nuclear weapons should compel the United States and Russia do everything within their power to reduce the global nuclear danger.

The START treaty, signed on July 31, 1991, imposed new limits on long range nuclear forces, and both Russia and the United States achieved those reductions by the required date of December 5, 2001. Under START, both countries reduced their deployed strategic nuclear forces from approximately 10,000 warheads each to no more than 6,000 apiece. The accord also limits each side to 1,600 delivery vehicles-ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and heavy bombers.

Yet the arms limits imposed by START are not the treaty's only enduring legacy. START also included a comprehensive verification regime, including formal data exchanges, notifications, and on-site inspections. The transparency required by the START verification regime has bred confidence in both Russia and the U.S. enabling cooperation on a range of nuclear arms issues. Moreover, verification directly supports U.S. national security interests by giving insight into Russia's arsenal of nuclear weapons. While changes to these verification measures may be appropriate, their core elements must be extended.

As your nominee for Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General James Cartwright, said in an interview last summer, "The attributes that you would seek [in a START extension] are transparency, the ability to generate warning time, and confidence in what the intentions are of a counterpart." General Cartwright also noted that if the verification measures could not be modified, they should remain in force, rather than be allowed to expire. We agree.

The START treaty requires the United States and Russia to begin discussions regarding the future of the treaty no later than one year prior to December 2009. Given this requirement, we are interested in better understanding the administration’s approach and request that you keep us fully informed regarding your plans and objectives. We also ask that the intelligence community provide the Congress with an assessment of our ability to monitor Russian nuclear forces in the absence of START.

We ask that you carefully consider extending START in its current form in order to enable your and President Putin's successors to negotiate a new legally binding agreement that achieves greater, verifiable reductions in each nation's nuclear forces.

Finally, we ask that you consult with Congress on your approach and on the framework that you develop.

Reducing the global nuclear danger is a legacy we all would like to achieve for the sake of our children and future generations. We stand ready to work with you to achieve this goal.

Co-Signers

The following Members of Congress signed the letter authored by Rep. Ellen Tauscher:
Chairman Ike Skelton, Chairman John Conyers, Chairman Tom Lantos, Reps. John Spratt, Adam Smith, Yvette Clarke, Tom Allen, Barbara Lee, James McGovern, Dianne Watson, Ed Markey, Jesse Jackson, Sam Farr, Doris Matsui, Darlene Hooley, Tammy Baldwin, Betty McCollum, David Loebsack, Howard Berman, Raul Grijalva, Henry Waxman, Zoe Lofgren, Mike Honda, Maurice Hinchey, Joe Crowley, Lynn Woolsey, Rob Andrews, Ralph Hall, and David Wu.

Analysis of U.S.-Russian Statements on Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Energy

The Center’s Leonor Tomero released her Analysis of US-Russian Statements on Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Energy on Friday.

Tomero begins:

Last week, Russian President Vladimir Putin visited President George W. Bush at Kennebunkport, Maine, to emphasize areas of agreement and cooperation between the United States and Russia. Presidents Bush and Putin indicated their intent to move toward signing a US-Russian bilateral agreement for cooperation on nuclear energy, and to cooperate on a new framework to provide nuclear energy assistance to other countries. During Putin’s visit, the United States and Russia also stated their intent to continue discussing nuclear weapons reductions.

Included below are her summaries of the areas of agreement between the two countries. Tomero’s full analysis also includes sections on timing, nonproliferation, and Congressional issues.

Nuclear Weapons Reductions

US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and her counterpart Minister for Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov issued a brief joint statement on July 3, 2007 indicating that both sides would continue to discuss how to address the expiration of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), but their joint statement lacked any new information and reflected persistent disagreements between the two countries on the specifics of a follow-on or extension to START. The statement merely indicated that both sides were discussing the issue, but differences between both sides remain.

US-Russian Bilateral Agreement on Nuclear Energy (123 Agreement)

The United States and Russia are moving toward signing a 123 agreement (implementation agreement) to codify and facilitate US-Russia bilateral cooperation on nuclear energy.

Nuclear energy initiative to provide nuclear fuel services to other countries

Presidents Bush and Putin also stated their intent to cooperate on facilitating the expansion of nuclear energy “in particular to developing countries, provided the common goal of prevention of nuclear weapons is achieved” by creating “a viable alternative [for these countries] to the acquisition of sensitive fuel cycle technologies.” These efforts “build on, reinforce, and complement a range of existing activities,” such as the US Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) and the Russian international fuel center. They include a wide range of assistance including: providing reactors; providing infrastructure, and facilitating regulatory support and contract negotiations; developing measures related to the management of spent fuel and radioactive waste; supporting the International Atomic Energy Agency; and providing reliable nuclear fuel supply.

Cooperative Threat Reduction Program

The discussion during the Summit mentioned briefly, but did not focus on, threat reduction issues.

The complete analysis of the US-Russian statements by Tomero can be found here.