Gary Hart: What a Year It Might Be

Gary Hart, Chairman of the Center’s sister organization, Council for a Livable World, wrote a great piece in the Huffington Post yesterday on what 2008 may portend for the nuclear arsenals of the United States and Russia, included below.


Even as the new president and administration struggle to restructure and transform the American economy in 2009, consider this possibility: 2009 could be the year when the two former Cold warriors, America and Russia, decide to make dramatic reductions in nuclear weapons and convene an international conference of all nuclear nations to agree to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons from the face of the earth.

By December 2009, the START I treaty will terminate unless renewed. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty must be reviewed by 2010. And a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty has been in abeyance for years. These are all relics of the Cold War which, thank God, ended 18 years ago, but there are the framework for more dramatic action.

A year ago four prominent Americans proposed elimination of all nuclear weapons. An international organization has been formed to support this ideal. Both involve conservative figures who, during the Cold War, were not known as leading arms reduction advocates. Clearly, a serious groundswell is forming to collectively embrace a goal few of us ever thought possible -- elimination of the most dangerous instruments of war ever devised by man.

Improvement in the US-Russian relationship is imperative in our own interest. We have many more areas of common interests than we have differences. Climate change, energy security, combating terrorism, pandemic protections, and stopping proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are among these common interests. At the center, however, is the issue of reversing the Cold War competition in nuclear weapons and leading other nations to do likewise.

Some will say "it's the economy, stupid," and thus suggest that nothing else can be done until we recover. But that suggests the United States and its new president can only do one thing at a time. This is flawed thinking. Even while building a new 21st century economy, the Obama administration must look for bold initiatives such as Nuclear Zero that demonstrate we live in a new world and new century featuring entirely new realities and the United States intends to play a new and creative leadership role in it.

This would make 2009 one of the happiest new years of all time.

Consensus from 60 Experts on Arms Control Priorities for Obama Admin.

We all know that when President-elect Obama is sworn into office on January 20, 2009, the list of issues vying for his time will be extensive. From the economy to Iraq to energy to loose nukes, he is going to face one of the – if not the – most challenging set of problems any incoming administration has faced in U.S. history. This is already a given. What's not, however, is exactly which priorities will top his agenda from day one.

To that end, the Center just released a report that identifies key recommendations for how the Obama Administration can address what every presidential candidate since 2000 has said is the gravest threat to international security: the spread of nuclear weapons and materials.

The report is the result of six meetings with 60 leading national security experts from backgrounds as diverse as think tanks, foundations, academia, advocacy, and Congress, which were co-chaired by the Center's chairman, Lt. Gen. Robert Gard (USA, ret.) and the chairman, Sen. Gary Hart (ret.), of its sister organization, Council for a Livable World.

The "clear consensus" of the group on the top three nuclear non-proliferation priorities for the incoming administration were to:

• Provide a new direction on nuclear weapons policy, emphasizing "minimum deterrence," extension of START, and negotiations for further reductions with Russia
• Secure all vulnerable fissile material in four years to reduce the risk of nuclear terrorism
• And ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

In addition, the group outlined a second tier set of priorities that included:

• Negotiations with Iran without preconditions
• Re-committing to promises made at the 1995 NPT entension
• Conditioning further deployment of the third missile defense site on proven tests
  
• And restructuring government to deal at a higher level with arms control

Find this clear, direct discussion of concrete and vital arms control priorities in its entirety on the Center's website. Find the executive summary and list of participants here.

Memorandum to Obama and McCain: A New Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Agenda

The past eight years of the Bush administration have been disastrous for arms control and nonproliferation initiatives. The next president, however, can make significant progress in repairing the damage and moving these important issues forward.

As such, I recently prepared a memo to the president-elect, which details four points for a larger arms control and nonproliferation agenda:

• Pursue a Follow-On Agreement to START I
• Build a Bipartisan Consensus Leading to CTBT Ratification
• Urge BWC Universalization, Advance Confidence-Building Measures, and Open Compliance Protocol Negotiations
• Negotiate a Treaty and Other Measures to Ban Space Weapons

Click here to read the full memo to John McCain and Barack Obama.

Nuclear Policy and Posture Review Act of 2007

Sens. Feinstein (D-CA) and Collins (R-ME), joined by cosponsors Durbin (D-IL), Kennedy (D-MA), and Casey (D-PA), yesterday introduced S. 1914, “The Nuclear Policy and Posture Review Act of 2007.”

The bill would put the breaks on all funding for the Reliable Replacement Warhead program though Fiscal Year 2010 until the President submits to Congress comprehensive nuclear posture and policy reviews that would be used to assess whether the program is needed.

The text of the bill is not yet available on Thomas, but is available on the Congressional Record, along with Sen. Feinstein’s statement, the beginning of which is provided below.

Mr. President, I rise today with Senator Collins, Senator Durbin, Senator Feingold, Senator Kennedy, and Senator Casey to introduce legislation to authorize a comprehensive review of our nuclear weapons policy and posture.

Before we ramp up funding for the Reliable Replacement Warhead program as the administration has requested, we should have a clear, bipartisan consensus on the role nuclear weapons will play in our national security strategy and the impact they will have on our nuclear nonproliferation efforts.

The Nuclear Policy and Posture Review Act of 2007 does three things.

First, it authorizes the President to conduct a nuclear policy review to consider a range of possible roles of nuclear weapons in U.S. security policy. The administration may reach out to outside experts and conduct public hearings to get a wide range of views. The policy review will provide options and recommendations for a nuclear posture review. This report is due on September 1, 2009.

Second, following the completion of the nuclear policy review, it authorizes the Secretary of Defense to conduct a comprehensive review of the nuclear posture of the U.S. to clarify U.S. nuclear deterrence policy and strategy.

This report is due March 1, 2010.

Finally, it zeros out funding for the Reliable Replacement Warhead program until the policy review and posture review reports have been submitted to Congress.

The full text of S. 1914 is below.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Nuclear Policy and Posture Review Act of 2007''.

SEC. 2. REVISED NUCLEAR POLICY REVIEW AND NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW.

(a) Nuclear Policy Review.--
(1) IN GENERAL.--The President shall conduct a nuclear policy review to consider a range of options on the role of nuclear weapons in United States security policy. The policy review shall be coordinated by the National Security Advisor and shall include the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of Defense, the Director of National Intelligence, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy.
(2) SCOPE OF REVIEW.--The nuclear policy review conducted under paragraph (1) shall--
(A) address the role and value of nuclear weapons in the current global security environment;
(B) set forth short-term and long-term objectives of United States nuclear weapons policy;
(C) consider the contributions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968 (commonly referred to as the ``Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty''), to United States national security, and include recommendations for strengthening the Treaty;
(D) explore the relationship between the nuclear policy of the United States and nonproliferation and arms control objectives and international treaty obligations, including obligations under Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty;
(E) determine the role and effectiveness of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed at Moscow July 31, 1991 (commonly referred to as the ``START I Treaty''), and the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions, done at Moscow May 24, 2002 (commonly referred to as the ``Moscow Treaty''), in achieving the national security and nonproliferation goals of the United States and in implementing United States military strategy, and describe the elements of a recommended successor treaty, including verification provisions; and
(F) provide policy guidance and make recommendations for the nuclear posture review to be conducted under subsection (b).
(3) OUTSIDE INPUT.--The policy review shall include contributions from outside experts and, to the extent possible, shall include public meetings to consider a range of views.

(b) Nuclear Posture Review.--
(1) IN GENERAL.--Following completion of the nuclear policy review under subsection (a), the Secretary of Defense shall conduct a comprehensive review of the nuclear posture of the United States to clarify United States nuclear deterrence policy and strategy. The Secretary shall conduct the review in collaboration with the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of State, the Director of National Intelligence, and the National Security Advisor.
(2) ELEMENTS OF REVIEW.--The nuclear posture review conducted under paragraph (1) shall include the following elements:
(A) The role of nuclear forces in United States military strategy, planning, and programming, including the extent to which conventional forces can assume roles previously assumed by nuclear forces.
(B) The policy requirements and objectives for the United States to maintain a safe, reliable, and credible nuclear deterrence posture, in light of the guidance provided by the nuclear policy review conducted under subsection (a).
(C) The targeting strategy required to implement effectively the guidance provided by the nuclear policy review conducted under subsection (a).
(D) The levels and composition of the nuclear delivery systems that will be required for implementing the United States national and military strategy, including any plans for removing, replacing, or modifying existing systems.
(E) The nuclear weapons complex that will be required for implementing the United States national and military strategy, including any plans to consolidate, modernize, or modify the complex.
(F) The active and inactive nuclear weapons stockpile that will be required for implementing the United States national and military strategy, including any plans for replacing or modifying warheads.
(G) An account of the different nuclear postures considered in the review and the reasoning for the selection of the nuclear posture.

(c) Reports Required.--
(1) NUCLEAR POLICY REVIEW.--Not later than September 1, 2009, the President shall submit to Congress a report on the results of the nuclear policy review conducted under subsection (a).
(2) NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW.--Not later than March 1, 2010, the President shall submit to Congress a report on the results of the nuclear posture review conducted under subsection (b).
(3) FORM.--Each report required under this subsection shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.

(d) Sense of Congress on Use of Nuclear Posture Review.--It is the sense of Congress that the nuclear policy review conducted under subsection (a) should be used as the basis for establishing future strategic arms control objectives and negotiating positions of the United States.

(e) Restriction on Funding of Reliable Replacement Warhead Program.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no funds may be appropriated or otherwise made available for the Reliable Replacement Warhead Program for fiscal years 2008, 2009, or 2010 until the reports required under subsection (c) have been submitted to Congress.

When START Began

Sixteen years ago today, U.S. President George H.W. Bush and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev signed the first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). The Treaty barred its signatories (initially the U.S. and the USSR, but subsequently Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan) from deploying more than 6,000 “countable” nuclear warheads atop a total of 1,600 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers.

While both the U.S. and Russia are well below these limitations, START I also established an elaborate scheme of inspections, data sharing, advance missile test notifications and satellite surveillance, which later provided the foundation for monitoring compliance with the subsequently negotiated (and otherwise toothless) Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), also known as the Moscow Treaty.

The Bush administration announced in May that it plans to let START I expire when it runs out at the end of 2009 and would instead seek to replace the Treaty with a less formal agreement that contains weaker verification mechanisms. That decision hasn’t gone over very well with the intelligence community or ranking members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Sen. Joseph Biden (D-DE), Chairman of the Committee, even went so far as to say, ''I think it would be the single greatest negative legacy this administration could leave if it leaves us in a situation where there is no future architecture to follow on to START.”

Similar concerns over the expiration of START I run deep in the House. Chairman of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, Rep. Ellen Tauscher, and nearly 30 other Representatives sent a letter to President Bush last week urging him to extend START I until a new agreement is reached. Notably, Tauscher was joined by Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, Ike Skelton, and Chairman of House International Relations Committee, Tom Lantos, among others.

U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and her Russian counterpart did recently issue a brief joint statement on July 3 indicating that both sides would continue to discuss START I, but their joint statement lacked any new information and reflected persistent disagreements between the two countries on the specifics of a follow-on or extension to START I. The statement merely indicated that both sides were discussing the issue, but that differences between both sides remain.

Tauscher and Nearly 30 Other Reps. Urge Bush to Extend START

Hats off to Rep. Ellen Tauscher, Chairman of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, who announced yesterday that she and nearly 30 other Representatives were sending a letter to President Bush urging him to extend the first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) until a new agreement is reached.

The impressive group of Reps. included chairmen from three key committees, including Chairman Ike Skelton of the House Armed Services Committee, Chairman John Conyers of the House Judiciary Committee, and Chairman Tom Lantos of House International Relations Committee.

As previous reported, the Bush administration announced in May that it plans to let START I expire when it runs out at the end of 2009. The Treaty barred its signatories from deploying more than 6,000 “countable” nuclear warheads atop a total of 1,600 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers.

While both the U.S. and Russia are well below these limitations, START I also established an elaborate scheme of inspections, data sharing, advance missile test notifications and satellite surveillance, which later provided the foundation for monitoring compliance with the toothless Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), also known as the Moscow Treaty.

SORT requires the U.S. and Russia to reduce the number of operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads (on ICBMs, SLBMs, heavy bombers, or otherwise) to 1,700-2,200 by the end of 2012. But because SORT doesn’t require the destruction of the warheads, they could instead be removed from service and stored in reserve stockpiles where the warheads could quickly redeployed at a later time.

Consequently, one problematic result of the Bush administration’s decision to not extend START I is that both the U.S. and Russia will lose one of the most reliable ways of making sure that both countries are meeting the required reductions under SORT. As I mentioned earlier, this decision has upset not only the U.S. intelligence community, but also Sens. Biden and Lugar, the leading senators on the Foreign Relations Committee.

Below is the full text of the letter Tauscher et. al sent to the President.

July 24, 2007

The Honorable George W. Bush
President of the United States of America
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, DC

Dear Mr. President:

We write to urge you to work with the Russian Federation to extend the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) after it expires in December 2009.

We were pleased that, in a joint statement issued July 3, 2007, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov reiterated the intention of the United States and Russia "to carry out strategic offensive reductions to the lowest possible level consistent with their national security requirements and alliance commitments." We are also pleased that both acknowledged the need for "a post-START arrangement to provide continuity and predictability regarding strategic offensive forces."

We are concerned however that both governments have not agreed to extend START in its current form and have just begun working on a post-START agreement. Without a legally binding follow-on agreement that includes a commitment to verifiable reductions in both countries' nuclear arsenals below the levels contained in SORT (Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions), the United States and Russia risk creating greater strategic uncertainty and further eroding the international nonproliferation regime. The continuing risk that nuclear weapons could fall into the hands of terrorists coupled with the possibility that additional nations will consider developing nuclear weapons should compel the United States and Russia do everything within their power to reduce the global nuclear danger.

The START treaty, signed on July 31, 1991, imposed new limits on long range nuclear forces, and both Russia and the United States achieved those reductions by the required date of December 5, 2001. Under START, both countries reduced their deployed strategic nuclear forces from approximately 10,000 warheads each to no more than 6,000 apiece. The accord also limits each side to 1,600 delivery vehicles-ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and heavy bombers.

Yet the arms limits imposed by START are not the treaty's only enduring legacy. START also included a comprehensive verification regime, including formal data exchanges, notifications, and on-site inspections. The transparency required by the START verification regime has bred confidence in both Russia and the U.S. enabling cooperation on a range of nuclear arms issues. Moreover, verification directly supports U.S. national security interests by giving insight into Russia's arsenal of nuclear weapons. While changes to these verification measures may be appropriate, their core elements must be extended.

As your nominee for Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General James Cartwright, said in an interview last summer, "The attributes that you would seek [in a START extension] are transparency, the ability to generate warning time, and confidence in what the intentions are of a counterpart." General Cartwright also noted that if the verification measures could not be modified, they should remain in force, rather than be allowed to expire. We agree.

The START treaty requires the United States and Russia to begin discussions regarding the future of the treaty no later than one year prior to December 2009. Given this requirement, we are interested in better understanding the administration’s approach and request that you keep us fully informed regarding your plans and objectives. We also ask that the intelligence community provide the Congress with an assessment of our ability to monitor Russian nuclear forces in the absence of START.

We ask that you carefully consider extending START in its current form in order to enable your and President Putin's successors to negotiate a new legally binding agreement that achieves greater, verifiable reductions in each nation's nuclear forces.

Finally, we ask that you consult with Congress on your approach and on the framework that you develop.

Reducing the global nuclear danger is a legacy we all would like to achieve for the sake of our children and future generations. We stand ready to work with you to achieve this goal.

Co-Signers

The following Members of Congress signed the letter authored by Rep. Ellen Tauscher:
Chairman Ike Skelton, Chairman John Conyers, Chairman Tom Lantos, Reps. John Spratt, Adam Smith, Yvette Clarke, Tom Allen, Barbara Lee, James McGovern, Dianne Watson, Ed Markey, Jesse Jackson, Sam Farr, Doris Matsui, Darlene Hooley, Tammy Baldwin, Betty McCollum, David Loebsack, Howard Berman, Raul Grijalva, Henry Waxman, Zoe Lofgren, Mike Honda, Maurice Hinchey, Joe Crowley, Lynn Woolsey, Rob Andrews, Ralph Hall, and David Wu.

Intel community, Sens. Lugar and Biden back elements of START I

The U.S. intelligence community appears to be less than thrilled with the Bush administration’s plan to replace the first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) with a less formal agreement that contains weaker verification mechanisms. A recent article by McClatchy Newspapers indicates that disagreements between the intelligence community and the Bush administration are holding up talks with Russia on a subsequent agreement.

The Bush administration views START I as an outdated relic of the Cold War that unduly hamstrings the U.S.’s ability to respond to new threats and charges that strict verification is now unnecessary. The intelligence community, on the other hand, views the treaty -- or at least its on-site and other verification mechanisms -- as a valuable way of peering into Russia’s nuclear arsenal at a time when its resources are otherwise stretched thin.

As I described earlier, START I barred its signatories (initially the U.S. and the USSR, but subsequently Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan) from deploying more than 6,000 “countable” nuclear warheads atop a total of 1,600 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers. It also established an elaborate scheme of inspections, data sharing, advance missile test notifications and satellite surveillance. The treaty is set to run out at the end of 2009 unless the governments agree to extend or amend it.

Although the U.S. and Russia are well-below the limitations agreed upon in START I, the treaty also provided the foundation for monitoring compliance with the subsequently negotiated (and otherwise toothless) Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (aka the Moscow Treaty). Significantly, if START I is not extended or replaced, both countries will lose one of the most reliable ways of making sure that both countries have in fact reduced the number of operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads (on ICBMs, SLBMs, heavy bombers, or otherwise) to 1,700-2,200 by the end of 2012. This is especially notable as SORT doesn’t require the destruction of the warheads, meaning they could instead be removed from service and stored in reserve stockpiles where the warheads could quickly redeployed at a later time.

Judging from his opening statement at yesterday’s hearing on U.S.-Russian relations, the intelligence community has an ally in Sen. Richard Lugar (R-IN):

[T]he United States and Russia must extend the START I treaty’s verification and transparency elements, which will expire in 2009; and they should work to add verification measures to the Moscow Treaty. Unfortunately, some bureaucrats on both sides are balking at such efforts in favor of less formal language that is not legally binding. I am concerned that transparency and verification will suffer if legally-binding regimes are permitted to dissolve. The predictability and confidence provided by treaty verification reduces the chances of misinterpretation, miscalculation, and error.

Sen. Lugar correctly concludes the point by saying, “The current Russian-American relationship is complicated enough without introducing more elements of uncertainty into the nuclear relationship.”

Sen. Joseph Biden (D-DE) used even stronger language: ''I think it would be the single greatest negative legacy this administration could leave if it leaves us in a situation where there is no future architecture to follow on to START.”

Bold statement.

Bush to let START I expire in 2009

In a not so surprising but nevertheless disappointing move, a senior Bush administration official announced last week that the United States will let the first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) expire when it runs out at the end of 2009. Apparently, the administration instead plans on replacing it with a less formal agreement that doesn’t have the strict verification requirements and weapons limits that START I does.

The move is just the latest example of President Bush’s nose-thumbing towards arms control as a method of limiting the potential development and proliferation of nuclear weapons. Congress has notably shown little interest in the treaty and has instead opted to defer to the next president, with the hope that that person will act upon arriving in the White House in January 2009.

Signed in July 1991 by the United States and the USSR (subsequently including Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan upon the collapse of the Soviet Union five months later), START I is the most ambitious arms control treaty in history.

The treaty barred its signatories from deploying more than 6,000 “countable” nuclear warheads atop a total of 1,600 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers.

By the end of its implementation deadline in late 2001, the treaty had resulted in the elimination of approximately 80% of all strategic nuclear weapons then in existence.

While both the United States and Russia are still well-below the limitations agreed upon in START I, repudiating the treaty sends mixed signals to both Russia and the world that while the U.S. is seeking to halt the development and spread of nuclear weapons by other countries, it is not willing to continue with a treaty that limits its own arsenal, or make further reductions in its stockpile.

At a time when the United States is seeing a resurgent Russia increasingly comfortable flexing its muscle on the international scene, now is not the time to pour more gas on the fire and revert to our old Cold War ways. This is especially true given that Russia is already alarmed over the expansion of NATO to its boundaries and the deployment of a missile defense system at its doorstep, over which it has been increasingly vocal in its criticism. And matching their rhetoric with action, the country recently issued a moratorium on the application of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty and also only yesterday tested a new inter-continental ballistic missile that Russian officials claim can defeat current or future missile defense systems.

President Bush needs to get serious about arms control and either extend START I or begin new negotiations towards another legally binding treaty that makes further cuts in strategic forces. If not, extension of the treaty should be an early priority of the successor Administration. Likewise, the Senate should hold Foreign Relations hearings on the treaty with the goal of not only pressuring Bush, but also to raise awareness of the issue to the presidential candidates, whom he might be passing the START baton to in less than two years time. The clock is ticking.