Showing posts with label reprocessing. Show all posts
Showing posts with label reprocessing. Show all posts

Tuesday, April 29, 2008

Senators Urge Committee to Cut Funding for Reprocessing

In an April 24 letter, nine senators urged Senate Energy and Water Appropriations Subcommittee Chair Byron Dorgan (D-ND) and Ranking Member Pete Domenici (R-NM) to cut funding for the reprocessing and reuse of spent nuclear fuel.

The letter targets funding for the Department of Energy's efforts to reprocess spent nuclear fuel under the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP).

The non-proliferation-friendly advocates are:

  • Daniel Akaka (D-HI)
  • Sherrod Brown (D-OH)
  • Russ Feingold (D-WI)
  • Tom Harkin (D-IA)
  • Edward Kennedy (D-MA)
  • John Kerry (D-MA)
  • Bernard Sanders (I-VT)
  • Charles Schumer (D-NY)
  • Ron Wyden (D-OR)
These senators, "expressed wide-ranging concerns about the program ranging from cost, to nuclear proliferation risks, to environmental contamination dangers to past failures in this area," according to the Center's Director for Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Leonor Tomero. Their concerns include the programs' $200 billion burden on taxpayers, failures of past attempts to reprocess spent fuel, and the way in which the program undermines U.S. non-proliferation efforts.

Seems reasonable to me.

The letter responds to the administration's request of over $300 million for reprocessing in FY 2009, including $302 for the Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative. (In FY 2008, DOE requested $405 million but received only $179 million.)

For the text of the letter and the Center's press release, click here.

Friday, July 27, 2007

Rep. Markey to Bush: India Nuclear Deal Must Abide by Congress’ Conditions for Nuclear Cooperation

*The third guest post by Max Postman, intern-extraordinaire at the Center

On Wednesday, July 25, the agreement on U.S.-Indian nuclear cooperation formed last week in Washington was approved by the Indian cabinet. The controversial deal, which would allow U.S. transfers of nuclear material and technology to a country that has always remained outside the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and developed nuclear weapons, must now pass muster with the United States Congress. Congress made an exception to U.S. laws to allow cooperation with India through the Hyde Act of 2006, but congressional permission came with several caveats concerning nuclear fuel reprocessing, permanent safeguards, and termination of cooperation in the event of an Indian nuclear test.

The day after the deal’s approval by the Indian cabinet, Rep. Edward Markey (D-MA) and 22 other members of congress sent a letter to President Bush stating that congressional approval of the deal would be “put in doubt” if the agreement does not comply with the conditions for congressional approval laid out in the Hyde Act.

Though the text of the deal has not yet been made public, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns insisted that the agreement reached is “well within the bounds of the Hyde act.” However, press reports that the deal makes no mention of nuclear testing and allows Indian reprocessing suggest that the deal reached may be contrary to the spirit, and possibly the letter, of the non-proliferation provisions of the legislation.

If Members of Congress who have warned of the dangers of the deal, such as Rep. Ed Markey, oppose the implementation agreement provisions, they will have to muster majority support in both houses to block the deal. After the text of the agreement is released publicly, it will be possible to consider the question of Hyde Act compliance in more detail. And consider we shall!

See the full text of Markey’s letter below:

July 25, 2007

The Honorable George W. Bush
President
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

As you continue negotiations with India over nuclear cooperation, we write to underscore the necessity of abiding by the legal boundaries set by Congress for any such cooperation.

As you know, an Agreement for Nuclear Cooperation between the United States and India must be fully consistent with the letter and the spirit of the Henry Hyde U.S.-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006, and the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954 as amended. The Hyde Act and the AEA set the minimal conditions for nuclear trade with India.

We understand from press reports that there are differences between U.S. and Indian negotiators on several key issues which were addressed by the Hyde Act; the negotiations are therefore defined in large part by the necessity to comply with U.S. law. Among the minimal conditions under U.S. law are:

  • No nuclear testing. Current law states that nuclear cooperation shall be terminated, and the U.S. would have the right to demand the return of all material, equipment, and technology, if India again tests a nuclear explosive.
  • Permanent, unconditional safeguards. Current law states that the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards applied to declared Indian materials and facilities must be “in perpetuity in accordance with IAEA standards, principles, and practices.”
  • No fuel assurances if agreement is violated. Current law states that the United States should seek to prevent nuclear transfers to any country with which the U.S. has suspended nuclear cooperation. This would be triggered if India violates the Agreement for Nuclear Cooperation and the United States terminates cooperation, for instance if India tests a nuclear explosive.
  • Reprocessing and Enrichment Prohibitions. Current law prohibits the transfer of sensitive nuclear technology to India, including uranium enrichment, plutonium separation, and heavy water production-related equipment and technology except under certain narrow circumstances. Congress also preserved the requirement for U.S. prior consent for the reprocessing or enrichment of U.S. origin nuclear material. As you correctly stated on February 11, 2004: “Enrichment and reprocessing are not necessary for nations seeking to harness nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.”
  • Cooperation shall not assist weapons program. Current law states that no U.S. cooperation shall directly or indirectly assist India’s nuclear weapons program.

Article I. Section 8 of the United States Constitution provides the Congress with the sole authority to regulate foreign commerce. Through the AEA, the Congress has delegated the authority to negotiate international agreements concerning nuclear trade to the Executive, subject to certain restrictions. The Agreement for Nuclear Cooperation is subject to the approval of Congress, and any inconsistencies between the Agreement and the relevant US laws will call congressional approval deeply into doubt.

In addition, our concern over India’s ties to Iran have grown more acute with the formation this spring of a Joint Defense Working Group between the two countries. India’s deepening military-to-military relationship with Iran, even as Iran has continued to develop nuclear technology in defiance of repeated United Nations Security Council sanctions resolutions, places congressional approval of the Agreement for Nuclear Cooperation in jeopardy.

Sincerely,

Edward J. Markey
Howard Berman
Brad Sherman
Ellen Tauscher
Dan Burton
Henry Waxman
Jane Harman
Jeff Fortenberry
Adam Schiff
Rick Larsen
James Langevin
Mark Udall
Barbara Lee
Michael Capuano
James McGovern
Rush Holt
Doris Matsui
Raul Grijalva
Peter Defazio
Chaka Fattah
Rosa DeLauro
Lynn Woolsey
Sam Farr

Tuesday, July 24, 2007

Nuclear Weapons a Non-Issue at Democratic Presidential Debate

Not a big night for nuclear weapons or nonproliferation issues at last night’s CNN/YouTube Democratic presidential debate. Actually, it wasn’t much of a night for international issues generally, with Darfur, the Iraq war, possibly meeting the leaders of unfriendly countries, and global warming being the only non-domestic questions asked (save a discussion on Mike Gravel’s comments on the Vietnam War).

Below is the question regarding possibly meeting with leaders of countries unfriendly to the U.S. and the responses given by Obama, Clinton, and Edwards – the only three candidates asked to respond. Long story short, Obama would meet the leaders of unfriendly countries; Clinton might meet with them after a vigorous diplomatic effort; and Edwards would meet with them after a similar diplomatic effort.

QUESTION: In 1982, Anwar Sadat traveled to Israel, a trip that resulted in a peace agreement that has lasted ever since.

In the spirit of that type of bold leadership, would you be willing to meet separately, without precondition, during the first year of your administration, in Washington or anywhere else, with the leaders of Iran, Syria, Venezuela, Cuba and North Korea, in order to bridge the gap that divides our countries?

OBAMA: I would. And the reason is this, that the notion that somehow not talking to countries is punishment to them -- which has been the guiding diplomatic principle of this administration -- is ridiculous.

Now, Ronald Reagan and Democratic presidents like JFK constantly spoke to Soviet Union at a time when Ronald Reagan called them an evil empire. And the reason is because they understood that we may not trust them and they may pose an extraordinary danger to this country, but we had the obligation to find areas where we can potentially move forward.

And I think that it is a disgrace that we have not spoken to them. We've been talking about Iraq -- one of the first things that I would do in terms of moving a diplomatic effort in the region forward is to send a signal that we need to talk to Iran and Syria because they're going to have responsibilities if Iraq collapses.

They have been acting irresponsibly up until this point. But if we tell them that we are not going to be a permanent occupying force, we are in a position to say that they are going to have to carry some weight, in terms of stabilizing the region.

CLINTON: Well, I will not promise to meet with the leaders of these countries during my first year. I will promise a very vigorous diplomatic effort because I think it is not that you promise a meeting at that high a level before you know what the intentions are.

I don't want to be used for propaganda purposes. I don't want to make a situation even worse. But I certainly agree that we need to get back to diplomacy, which has been turned into a bad word by this administration.

And I will purse very vigorous diplomacy.

And I will use a lot of high-level presidential envoys to test the waters, to feel the way. But certainly, we're not going to just have our president meet with Fidel Castro and Hugo Chavez and, you know, the president of North Korea, Iran and Syria until we know better what the way forward would be.

COOPER: Senator Edwards, would you meet with Hugo Chavez, Fidel Castro, Kim Jong Il?

EDWARDS: Yes, and I think actually Senator Clinton's right though. Before that meeting takes place, we need to do the work, the diplomacy, to make sure that that meeting's not going to be used for propaganda purposes, will not be used to just beat down the United States of America in the world community.

But I think this is just a piece of a bigger question, which is, what do we actually do? What should the president of the United States do to restore America's moral leadership in the world. It's not enough just to lead with bad leaders. In addition to that, the world needs to hear from the president of the United States about who we are, what it is we represent. … That, in fact, we believe in equality, we believe in diversity, that they are at the heart and soul of what the United States of America is.

The candidates did, however, also briefly discuss nuclear energy, which is relevant to the discussion on reprocessing, an issue that has serious nonproliferation concerns. Below are excerpted responses by Edwards, Obama, and Clinton – again, the only three candidates asked to respond. (Full responses are available here.) Long story short, Edwards expressed concern over nuclear energy; Obama cautiously embraced it; and Clinton was noncommittal.

EDWARDS: I do not favor nuclear power. We haven't built a nuclear power plant in decades in this country. There is a reason for that. The reason is it is extremely costly. It takes an enormous amount of time to get one planned, developed and built. And we still don't have a safe way to dispose of the nuclear waste. It is a huge problem for America over the long term.

OBAMA: I actually think that we should explore nuclear power as part of the energy mix. There are no silver bullets to this issue. We have to develop solar. I have proposed drastically increasing fuel efficiency standards on cars, an aggressive cap on the amount of greenhouse gases that can be emitted.

CLINTON: I'm agnostic about nuclear power. John is right, that until we figure out what we're going to do with the waste and the cost, it's very hard to see nuclear as a part of our future. But that's where American technology comes in. Let's figure out what we're going to do about the waste and the cost if we think nuclear should be a part of the solution.

But perhaps the best moment of the evening came when each candidate was asked to look at the candidate to his or her left and tell the audience one thing he or she likes and dislikes about that particular candidate. Dennis Kucinich, the last in the row of candidates, responded, “You notice what CNN did. They didn't put anybody to the left of me. Think about it.”

Friday, May 25, 2007

Kyle Atwell interviews Leonor Tomero on Nuclear Reprocessing

Check out my interview on plutonium reprocessing with Leonor Tomero, a nonproliferation analyst with the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation:



Reprocessing is the process in which weapons-usable materials are extracted from spent nuclear waste produced by nuclear reactors.

Leonor provides a great summary of the administration's push for the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP), which would reintroduce reprocessing into US nuclear waste management.

The United States halted reprocessing 30 years ago due to:

* high costs: Reprocessing and recycling the recovered plutonium would add about $2 billion per year to the cost of US nuclear-generated electricity

* environmental and safety risks: In 2005 Britain's only reprocessing plant in Sellafield had a major leak accident, spilling 83,000 liters of hazardous materials. The plant remains shutdown today

* the serious threat reprocessing poses for nonproliferation efforts: Both India and North Korea have used materials from plutonium reprocessing to build nuclear weapons

The problems are as real today as they were thirty years ago when the US initially stopped reprocessing. Fortunately Congress is wary of reprocessing as well, at least for now--as Jeff discusses here, the House Energy and Appropriations Subcommittee opted to trim funds for GNEP from $405 million to $120 million on Wednesday. While this funding allocation is not final, it is a good start to the legislative process.

Thursday, May 24, 2007

Victory in House Energy and Water Appropriations Subcommittee

The arms control community scored a major victory when the House Energy and Water Appropriations Subcommittee eliminated yesterday all $88.8 million of proposed funding for the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) and all $24.9 million for a new plant to build plutonium pits.

The funding is a part of a $31.6 billion Energy and Water Spending Bill for fiscal year 2008, and is $1.13 more than the Bush administration’s budget request and $1.3 billion more than fiscal year 2007 spending levels.

Although its advocates claim that the Reliable Replacement Warhead program would help create a smaller, cheaper and more modern nuclear arsenal, in reality the program is entirely unnecessary and would significantly undermine U.S. and international nuclear nonproliferation efforts.

Better yet, the subcommittee likewise trimmed funds for the administration’s Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) plutonium reprocessing program that extracts nuclear weapons-usable material from nuclear waste from $405 million to $120 million.

Reprocessing increases the risk that dangerous material will fall into the hands of terrorists by removing many of the necessary barriers that prevent terrorist from acquiring bomb-grade material.

To top it off, the subcommittee also added $878 million for nuclear nonproliferation programs, a 74 percent increase to the administration's original request.

There will most likely be efforts in the full committee and on the House floor to at least partially restore funding for the RRW. Stay tuned.