North Korea Nutshell: What Starts in Geneva Ends in Singapore

A few weeks ago, I wrote about a meeting between the U.S. and the North Korean negotiators in Geneva to discuss a resolution to the impasse over the declaration of North Korean nuclear activity. That meeting ended with no announcements on progress other than a vague announcement of “good discussions.” This past week, the two parties met again, this time in Singapore, and it seems that a resolution is finally beginning to take shape.

Experts believe that the U.S. floated the idea that the parties would use a diplomatic device similar to the joint U.S.-China “Shanghai Communiqué” used during the Nixon administration to open up the possibility for diplomatic relations with China. In this instance, the U.S. would issue a document presenting its stance on the issues of uranium enrichment development and Syrian aid by North Korea and then North Korea would in turn issue a document accepting the accusations. It is believed that this process was generally agreed to in Geneva but when it was brought back to Pyongyang, Kim Jong’Ill did not certify to his people to move forward. Since then, catastrophic famine has been reported to continue to worsen in North Korea and the North has had to request a huge increase in food aid from China. It may be for this reason as well as possibly many others that led to this approach finally being accepted in Singapore. And then again, maybe it just has something to do with the fact that both cities look very similar at night. Can you guess which one's which?


Even more importantly than the possible resolution of these other issues was the fact that North Korea agreed to provide a full accounting of its plutonium stocks, including what was used for its nuclear test. With this declaration they would also provide documentation and facilities access so that inspectors can fully verify the declaration. The plutonium program is where North Korea is deriving its source of material for making nuclear weapons. Being able to first verify, and then remove this plutonium reserve will be the key to the entire denuclearization agreement.

Amb. Chris Hill briefed the House Foreign Affairs Committee in a closed-door session after the conclusion of these most recent talks and reports state that certain members of the Committee were skeptical of the possible progress that had been achieved. Secretary Rice responded to this by stating that no full agreement had been reached and that anything provided by North Korea will have to be verifiable. This leaves the ball in North Korea’s court. If they can provide the declaration and documentation as laid out in Singapore, it is very likely that this impasse can be resolved and another round of 6-Party Talks could be convened. But even if this were to occur, it is still unlikely that the primary issue of the plutonium reserves will be resolved under this current President barring some unlikely eventuality.

North Korea Nutshell: Here We Go Again

“Our military will not sit idle until warmongers launch a preemptive strike. Everything will be in ashes, not just a sea of fire, once our advanced preemptive strike begins.”

If nothing else, you can always count on the North Koreans to spice up international diplomacy with some apocalyptic rhetoric. This most recent statement came in response to the South Korea’s top military official commenting that the South would counter-attack against the North’s nuclear sites if the South were to be attacked by nuclear weapons. Normally, these sorts of statements are taken in stride when dealing with North Korea. For example, the North also began threatening to turn Seoul into a “sea of fire” back in 1994 and has used the term many other times when discussing U.S. military installation in the South, with no tangible action in either case. But this time, the statements come at a time when nuclear negotiations are at a standstill and tensions between the two Koreas seem to be increasing by the day.

When South Korea elected their new conservative President, North Korea was strangely silent despite the fact that it was clear that 10 years of engagement policy towards the North was coming to an end. First, there was the announcement that the Unification Ministry, which was fairly controversial as the lead agency behind the “Sunshine” policy towards the North, would be closed. This decision was reversed, but it looks as if most of the decision-making towards North Korea will be given to the Foreign Ministry. Later on, after President Lee officially took power, vitally important fertilizer and farm aid to North Korea was delayed while the new government reassessed whether it would offer this aid while nuclear negotiations remained stalled.

That silence has now been broken with statements such as the one above, as well as several actions that seek to initiate a game of brinkmanship. First, the North kicked out 11 South Korean officials from their joint North-South industrial project in Kaesong. Then, the North fired 3 Soviet-era ship to ship missiles and continued a series of jet flyovers near the DMZ border region. When even this type of dangerous behavior did not lead to South Korea to retreat from their new policy path, the North announced that it was considering ending North-South negotiations and slowing down the process of disabling its nuclear reactor even further.

For anyone who has followed U.S.-North Korean negotiations over the last two decades, these types of activities represent a frustrating kind of “standard operating procedure”. Anytime North Korea feels that it is getting a raw deal or having its honor compromised, it will respond with threats and actions that are supposed to put their opponents on the defensive so that the North can move in and issue further demands for a return to normalcy. Hopefully, some resolution can be found to the current stalemate before the North takes even more drastic steps.

Recently, reports concerning new leaks about the Israeli bombing of a base in Syria have begun to surface. David Ignatius of the Washington Post has apparently spoken to a “senior intelligence official” who confirmed to him the nuclear connection between North Korea and the work going on in Syria at that site. For its part, the Chosun Ilbo reports that the U.S. has obtained a list of nuclear engineers who were “involved in the supple of nuclear technology to Syria, through various intelligence networks.” They claim that Chris Hill showed the list to his North Korea counterpart when they met recently in Geneva. The North Koreans continued to deny any nuclear proliferation to Syria after this meeting.

Although there is still much to be learned about what happened with this incident, I’m still fairly skeptical about reporters that cite unnamed sources. All the governments involved have done a thorough job in keeping information on this event on lock down and there are far too many people with ideological agendas on this issue to simply trust what we find in these reports.

North Korea Nutshell: Geneva or Bust

For months now, the U.S. has urged North Korea to submit a declaration that is both complete and clear. The North Koreans have responded by discounting U.S. claims and the frustration in Washington with the delay is becoming more evident as the weeks pass by. This has led U.S. Ambassador Chris Hill to consider some more creative approaches to break the impasse. Rumors have been circulating that Hill was considering trying to separate the controversial issues of the nuclear declaration out of the main issues involving the bomb-making program itself, thereby allowing progress on this latter issue to continue while discussions continue on the former.

The North Koreans have yet to really respond to this proposal until only recently. Several news organizations are now reporting that a special set of bilateral discussions have been arranged for the end of this week in Geneva. Followers of the 6-Party talks will remember that Amb. Hill and his North Korean counterpart have met before in Geneva to resolve the conflicts over the money frozen in the Banco Delta Asia scandal.

Sources that I have heard from on this subject have painted the following scenario for the resolution coming out of the meeting. The U.S. will issue a statement saying that North Korea will be required to provide all details concerning their plutonium production, bomb design and manufacture, work towards a uranium enrichment capability, and anything that may be related to proliferation of nuclear materials to sources outside of North Korea (ie. Syria). However, the issues of past proliferation activities, as well as possible attempts at acquiring a uranium enrichment capability, will be separated from the general declaration to the 6-Party Talks.

Instead, North Korea will issue a statement just to the United States concerning its work towards a uranium enrichment program and any direct connection they have with what went on in Syria, leaving the job of advising the other four countries about this development to the U.S. In this way, North Korea can avoid contradicting previous statements made at the larger 6-Party negotiations while still providing information that will be required for the U.S. to move forward with the process. North Korea has seemed to already indicate their acceptance of this method of progress by admitting to the U.S. that there were North Korean engineers at military facilities in Syria.

It should be noted that it is likely that North Korea will use the term uranium enrichment program in its admission instead of the common U.S. reference of highly enriched uranium. This is important as a highly enriched uranium program intrinsically implies that the North Koreans were looking to develop a second source of bomb-making material. By only referring to the acquisition of materials for low-enriched uranium, North Korea avoids much of the significant embarrassment that has likely prevented it from making this admission up until now.

Up to this point, Amb. Hill has likely been reluctant to make any compromise on the Syria and HEU issues due to the negative reaction this would receive in Congress. Hill will need to maintain significant Congressional support for delisting North Korea from the lists of State Sponsor’s of Terror and the Trading with the Enemy Act. This compromise, modeled somewhat off of Richard Nixon’s famous “Shanghai Communiqué”, allows the North Koreans to finesse their concerns over having to admit that they have lied about their previous activities while still satisfying everyone else’s concern over what exactly North Korea has been up to. The success or failure of this effort in Geneva will, as usual, depend on the degree that North Korea is willing to offer transparency on its activities.

There are several factors that have all likely contributed to the recent decision by North Korea to accept this plan to go to Geneva and I will tick them off below in what I consider to be the order of importance:

• The determination of the Chinese to not have this issue hanging over their heads as they head towards the summer Olympic Games
• New South Korean President, Lee Myung-bak, significantly altering South Korean foreign policy, emphasizing aid to North Korea be linked to denuclearization
• The improvement of ties between the U.S., South Korea and Japan after some serious strains in recent years
• The U.S. finally making progress in providing promised oil shipments to North Korea
• Persistence on the part of the U.S. negotiating team to demand a complete declaration and withhold delisting until this takes place
• The New York Philharmonic (then again, maybe not)

North Korea Nutshell: Bob Woodruff at Yongbyon

Although Woodruff has been to North Korea before, this time he was allowed into the plant at Yongbyon and got to see and videotape the process of disablement himself. As I still remain skeptical about the possible overall outcome of the negotiations, I can't help but be amazed about the contrast of where we are now when compared to just a few years ago. An American journalist in the heart of the North Korean nuclear complex. I had to see it to believe it. Make sure to catch the stylish yellow shoes everyone is wearing inside the plant.

This visit is a part of a week-long series of reports by Woodruff that will culminate tomorrow when the New York Philharmonic will perform inside Pyongyang. The performance will be simulcast live, if you live in New York. Otherwise, you can catch it nationwide Thursday on PBS. Secretary of State Rice will be in Seoul on the 25th for the inauguration of President Lee Myung-bak. Some sources have claimed that Rice will take this opportunity to make a surprise visit to Pyongyang. My personal opinion is that she would not do so unless she was able to present a breakthrough in the negotiations while she was there. She would not likely give Kim Jong-Il that kind of diplomatic victory without getting something serious in return. We'll just have to wait and see.

North Korea Nutshell: Chris Hill in Town

This past Wednesday, Amb. Chris Hill came to Washington to sit before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and provide them with an update on the current status of the 6-Party Talks. Your intrepid Nutshell reporter was there with pen in hand and took down the key elements of what was discussed. I provide to you below the synopsis of my notes from that hearing. Make sure to notice important new information about what Hill what shown about the Russian purchased aluminum tubes and how the U.S. will move forward with full denuclearization (Phase 3). Keep in mind that everything below is an approximation and not direct quotations, including the questions from the Senators. If you want the direct text of Hill's testimony, check it out here.

Chairman, Senator Joe Biden:

Like many, Biden cannot wait to be able to turn the page of this chapter of history with North Korea. He appreciates the respectful and tough-nosed diplomacy practiced in this case. The work done with North Korea in the past (Bush 41, Clinton) was helpful, but nothing has gotten has far as we have currently.

Currently, Biden’s staff is working with Jim Webb’s office in drafting legislation that would allow for an exception to the Glenn Amendment which prevents the Department of Energy from providing any aid to North Korea (passed after the North Korean nuclear test in October ’06). This aid will be vital in funding the final denuclearization process.

Ranking Member, Senator Richard Lugar:

The Nunn-Lugar program should be considered for application in North Korea. The scientists in the country would likely need to be dealt with if the entire indigenous nuclear program were dismantled.

Maintaining the measured pace of action-for-action is the best way to keep progress up without overreaching. Lugar recommends that as progress is made, Secretary Gates visit North Korea to discuss confidence building measures with the heads of their military. It is also important for a new President to not change course with this policy.

Amb. Hill:

Historical Catch-Up

The October Agreement (Phase 2) between the parties has allowed for significant progress in denuclearizing North Korea. It led to the North Koreans themselves asking for U.S. technicians to enter their facilities and begin the process of disabling their machinery. Typically there are 5 U.S. personnel who have worked in rotating shifts to keep the work going. This team has completed 8 or the 11 disablement steps laid out for Phase 2, and is currently involved with the North Koreans in step 9, which is removing fuel rods from the nuclear reactor. The removal of these rods has been slowed down for two reasons: the transfer pool for the rods needed to be decontaminated first, and the North Koreans have switched from 3 shifts to 1 shift of workers because they feel that heavy fuel oil aid has been coming too slow.

During the disablement procedures, it was surprising for Hill to hear from the American’s involved that the North Korea scientists never brought up procedures on how certain mechanisms could become reconstituted. As well, the longer the facilities at Yongbyon remain disabled and go without proper upkeep maintenance, the longer and more expensive a feat North Korea would have to undertake in order to rebuild the facility.

The Issue of the Declaration

The one major holdup to the progress in North Korea is the fact that they have not issued a declaration of nuclear facilities that can be deemed as “complete”. This was supposed to have been completed by December 31 but is still outstanding. The declaration would consist of the following 3 parts:

1. Weapons Material/Development- This is the plutonium that makes up the most crucial part of the nuclear weapons program. Negotiations are ongoing and are likely to be successful in getting the North Koreans to provide documentation concerning the reprocessing of spent fuel to get the plutonium. With this documentation and the access that American technicians have inside the facilities at Yongbyon, Amb. Hill is highly confident that we would be able to verify whether the declared amount of North Korean plutonium production is truthful. Here we also want to see what technical progress the North Koreans have made in developing their nuclear weapon. This latter area is troublesome as the North Koreans are hesitant to show us the exact specifications of their bomb designs.
2. Facilities- We are able to identify what facilities they have by “National Technical Means”, ie. intelligence gathering, and they know that we have this capability so coming to an accord on this has not and will not be a problem.
3. Other Aspects of the Nuclear Program- This is the area where 90% of the trouble lies. We need significantly more information concerning their attempt to obtain a uranium enrichment capacity. This information needs to go into what they purchased from the AQ Khan network (confirming this connection through the allusion to Pervez Musharraf’s autobiography which mentions this sale) and what has been done with any other purchases for this program. We have worked closely with the North Koreans in trying to resolve this and they have shown us some of the tubes they high grade aluminum tubes they purchased were for non-nuclear purposes. On the issue of “proliferation” (aka. Syrian bombing), the North has assured us that they have no efforts ongoing and will be pursuing nothing in the future. The U.S. will continue to press for more information concerning this connection and will monitor any possible proliferation risks.

Inducements for North Korea

The October Agreement allows for 950,000 tons of fuel oil or equivalent aid to be given to North Korea. It is expected that about half this amount will actually be given in heavy fuel oil and the other half will come in other assistance such as steel. The burden for providing this aid will be shared equally between South Korea, Russia, China, the U.S. and eventually Japan if the issue of the abductees is addressed to their satisfaction. So far, they have received about the equivalent of about 200,000 tons of fuel oil with about 53,000 more coming in the next few weeks from the United States. Much of the slowness in delivery in aid to North Korea can be attributed to the inherent difficulties in getting a hold on heavy fuel oil in the open market. For example, Russia was unable to produce and process oil for this purpose domestically and had to eventually just purchase it from Singapore. This aid will continue based on progress with Phase 2 actions, namely the final 3 steps for disablement of the reactor and the submission of a complete and verifiable declaration.

The removal of North Korea from the State Sponsor’s of Terror list and the Trading With the Enemy Act will also be linked to Phase 2 commitments.

If List is Offered and Accepted, What Can We offer for full dismantlement (Phase 3)

1. Full diplomatic relations upon denuclearization.

This does not deny the fact that human rights concerns are still valid. However, completing this move will allow a greater dialogue to begin that will address the North Koreans directly on human rights concerns. Currently, pressing them on human rights accomplishes little as the North’s leadership has little to lose from denying the claims.

2. A full peace regime to replace the Korean War Armistice

This would include the Chinese, DPRK, South Korea and the U.S. and negotiations could begin as soon as Phase 3 obligations are agreed upon. The signing of the pact would not be done until final dismantlement is completed.

3. North-East Asia Peace and Security Mechanism

The 6-Party talks have established a useful forum for discussing important issues in this region. Formalizing this structure into something that would meet on a regular basis to hammer out a wide range of issues would be useful.

4. Bringing in international economic institutions/aid (IMF, World Bank)

This would begin the process of helping North Korea rebuild its failed economy and create a new system that would reflect both progress and transparency.

Questions:

Senator Biden:

What happened concerning the North Korean aluminum tubes that you and your colleagues were shown?

We were shown 2 conventional weapons systems that the tubes had been converted for use in. The first system was not functional and it seemed that the tubes were not the right type of material for use in that system. It was an artillery type of system. It seemed to be the same source as the aluminum tubes found in Iraq.

Why is proliferating nuclear know-how important to consider?

Knowing about North Korea’s activities in this area would stabilize the negotiations. It would establish a greater level of transparency in how the North has conducted itself and help build trust towards moving forward. This is not being requested in order to give the U.S. an excuse to walk out on negotiations.

Senator Lugar:

How was President Bush’s letter to Kim Jong-Il received when you delivered it?

The visit to Yongbyon and Pyongyang went well. I requested to deliver the letter to Chairman Kim myself, but after waiting until the very last day I was told to give it to the foreign minister. However, I was able to meet with the 3^rd highest Party official before leaving. The North Korean response was a small, brief verbal message expressing hope for completion of the agreement.

Is the funding provided by the State Dept.’s disarmament fund sufficient to complete Phase 2 and move into Phase 3?

The current available funds are enough to complete the disabling tasks laid out in Phase 2, but will not be adequate to meet the needs of Phase 3. President Bush and Secretary Rice are looking for an exemption from the Glenn Amendment. We do not know what kind of money will be needed for Phase 3 but I will have my staff start putting together numbers for the Committee to look at in preparation for quick movement if it becomes necessary.

How many North Koreans have emigrated to the U.S.?

37 have done so since 2004

Senator Casey:

What about the difference between the 50kg plutonium estimate you have given previously and the 30kg reported to have been revealed by the North Koreans?

Being able to verify any declared amount of plutonium is the most important thing to consider here. Having the records necessary to gauge what levels would be appropriate is the key and there is some agreement with the North Koreans on them providing this. We would also not just trust the documents they give us as we would have other physical measures at the facilities themselves that would help us test the validity of the documents.

What lessons have you learned from all of your time negotiating with the North Koreans?

I have learned that diplomacy is not something that can work in all situations but this is one of the situations where it is really the only option that has any chance of success.

The North Koreans themselves seem to have shortages of everything in their country except time. They can always afford to wait and consider their opaqueness during negotiations to be a strength that helps confuse their opponent. These talks have helped bring us much closer to China while also giving Japan an opportunity to stay engaged with their regional partners during a time of some tension. This process has strengthened the sense of community felt throughout the region. The President and Secretary Rice have also been incredible allies in this process and have provided tremendous support now and in the future.

Senator Hagel:

Why has the process of disablement slowed?

The first thing that slowed the process was health and safety concerns with removing the fuel rods from the reactor at Yongbyon. The water pool the rods were to be transferred to was contaminated and needed to be cleaned. After this was completed the North Koreans later reduced the numbers of shifts of workers from 3 down to 1 to show that they were dissatisfied with the pace at which aid has been given. So far we’ve only provided about 20% of the material aid we promised for Phase 2 and the disablement process is far more than 20% completed so they do have a point in this. As said previously, the fuel is hard to get a hold of but we are working on improving this pace. Once the fuel we have coming in the next week or so arrives, the North Koreans will hopefully respond by increasing the shifts again.

Is the North Korean leadership having trouble in finding consensus on the nuclear issue?

I have asked the North Korean negotiators several times to bring a more diverse set of officials to discussions instead of just the Foreign Ministry. This is because we believe that certain bureaucracies such as the nuclear ministry and military don’t understand exactly the inducements we are looking to provide and that many of their remaining fears could be dealt with if they were able to participate.

Senator Kerry:

How long are we going to wait for the declaration?

The declaration in fundamental to being able to move forward and State Dept. official Sung Kim was just in North Korea to push just this point. The North Koreans are reluctant about this list because it will likely require them to admit about many things that are inconsistent with what they have told us in the past. Other than being caught in lies, they are also worried that providing such information will just lead to an infinite number of further questions that probe much deeper into the North Korean government and military than they are comfortable with at this point.

There is no real Plan B for if the U.S. is not able to get a declaration from North Korea. All of the focus is placed on getting the declaration and working to finish denuclearization by the end of 2008.

Do other nations agree that North Korea likely had a uranium enrichment program?

Other nations do seem to agree on this point but they don’t see as a program that currently exists and is ongoing. The plutonium, however, is the key to the importance of the declaration as it’s the main component of their weapons program.

Is the election of new South Korean President Lee likely to be significant?

The current Roh administration has worked well with the United States in making positive movement on denuclearizing North Korea. I do welcome the linking of the North-South dialogue to the nuclear progress. It will be interesting to see how North Korea responds to this considering they have yet to seriously make a statement about the incoming government.

Are the North Koreans sincere in giving up their nuclear program?

Many people in their government seem to disagree with moving in this direction but there are many we encounter that are set on this path.

Senator Murkowski

Is the United States prepared to take the North Koreans off the list of State Sponsors of Terror before they addressed the issue of Japanese citizens abducted and not yet returned?

The United States has a very special alliance with the Japanese and they have many serious issues with North Korea including the threat of missile strikes and these abducted citizens. The latter issue is not just a problem that the government has; it is an issue that is very important to the domestic Japanese society.

Every time I have a meeting with the North Koreans I bring this issue up. I, in fact, keep a listing of all of their names in my pocket in case any of their names is possibly mentioned at one of the sessions. This effort seems to be paying off as the North Koreans have come to realize that this issue is crucial to moving forward with a normalizing of relations and improving their overall regional situation.

Linking the issues, however, is not in the interest of moving forward with the talks. We will definitely consult with Japan before we move to take North Korea off the terror list. It will not come to them as a surprise, and we hope to not do this at the expense of our relationship with Japan.

Senator Nelson

What happened with the North Korean connection to the facility Israel bombed in Syria?

It is important to make sure that North Korea is as transparent as possible in any issues that may involve proliferation. Other than this, we need to know more about the possible purchase of centrifuges from the AQ Khan network.

Senator Biden

What are President-elect Lee’s views on the U.S. relationship?

He sees a policy with the U.S.-ROK relationship in the forefront. But the U.S. must understand that the North-South issue is very unique and that we cannot underestimate the emotional impact of having these peoples forcible separated for so long. However, Lee will likely be more responsive.

How fast will funding be necessary for Phase 3 once the declaration comes?

Probably a month or two, so fairly quickly.

Any steps towards the North-Asia Security Mechanism?

There is a working group as part of the 6-Party talks on just this issue. Currently a Russian ambassador is in Washington to discuss this with government officials.

North Korea Nutshell: South Korea’s New Administration

Nearly two months have passed since the election of South Korea’s new President-elect Lee Myung-Bak. Although he will not officially take office until the end of February, decisions are already being made that will greatly affect both the North Korean nuclear negotiations and the overall U.S.-ROK alliance.

As a member of the conservative Grand National Party (GNP), Lee represents a stark departure from the policies of the last decade. A former Hyundai executive, Lee seeks to streamline the government into a more corporate organizational style and promote economic policies that favor market solutions. He is also pursuing a new and much improved relationship with the United States to remedy the fact that ties between the two nations have become increasingly strained over the past ten years. Already, several groups of Korean experts from the United States have made trips to Seoul to advise the Presidential transition team and Lee has responded by recently sending Cheung Mong-jun to Washington for further deliberations.

President-elect Lee has indicated that his administration will take a different path in dealing with North Korea. South Korea’s Ministry of Unification has long been the lead agency in managing relations with North Korea. Many of the frustrations between the United States and South Korea over the issue of what to do about the North have stemmed from the fact that the Unification Ministry has refused to coordinate or even discuss its policy initiatives with the United States. Lee seeks to change that by folding the Unification Ministry into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and thereby make policy towards North Korea more balanced with other international considerations. This new policy direction follows from Lee’s previous decree that North-South economic aid and cooperation will only come after the North has worked to resolve the nuclear issue.

In the coming months, two main issues will serve as the first tests for this newly forged U.S.-ROK alliance. The first will come with the inauguration of President Lee in February. Right from the start, U.S. diplomats will request that Lee suspend as much aid from North Korea as is politically viable and instead link the aid to ongoing progress on denuclearization. Lee has already made statements outlining such a policy, but he also supports investment into joint projects with the North. North Korea is also undergoing a food crisis due to severe flooding and there will be pressure to continue aid for humanitarian purposes. U.S. State Department officials have said that they hope to have the declaration issue dealt with by June and begin work on the implementation plan for full denuclearization.

The other thing on the agenda will be the Korea-United States Free Trade Agreement or KORUS. As with all of these bilateral trade agreements, the purpose here is to lower tariffs and moderate trading policies to allow for a freer flow of goods and services between the two countries without artificially inflated costs. Support in Korea for the agreement has been mixed, with many in the country worried about a great influx of imports in the auto and movie industries. For its part, American reaction to the deal has also been mixed. Members of the auto industry feel that there aren’t enough reductions in barriers to the domestic Korean market, and beef industry remains furious over the fact that Korea has yet to open itself up to a resumption of imports. While there are many factors influencing whether KORUS will be finished this year, such as the question of whether the U.S. Congress can address meaningful legislation this year, the final outcome of this deal has the possibility of jump-starting a new cooperation between the two nations. The deal will likely receive some attention when President Lee makes his first official visit to Washington in April.

The United States is attempting to establish stronger ties with its Asian allies in an attempt to hedge the growing influence of China. South Korea, as one of the region’s largest economies, is a vital part of this strategy not only for their regional influence but also because of their fundamental role in resolving any issues with North Korea. The election of Lee Myung-bak seems to indicate an improvement of the U.S.-ROK relationship in the near future. However, before this renewed alliance becomes a reality, both governments will have to find a way to succeed in the extremely difficulty areas of nuclear nonproliferation and trade globalization. No small feat.

North Korea Nutshell: Missing the Point

The Six-Party Talks remain stalled this week over the issue of whether or not North Korea has offered a “complete declaration” of its nuclear program. The North continues to hold fast to its position that it has already revealed what it promised to the United States despite the fact the Amb. Hill has repeatedly stated that whatever he was shown in the last few months has not been up to par with what the U.S. would consider acceptable.

But while the negotiators continue to haggle over aluminum tubes, an important opportunity is being wasted. Little over a week ago, North Korea referred to having 30kg of separated plutonium in its possession as part of an overall statement concerning the declaration they had prepared in November of last year. As usual, David Albright and the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) picked up on this and issued a quick analysis that can be found here.

Using the data they computed in their previous work on possible North Korean plutonium production, Albright and his team determined that if the 30kg referred only to the amount of plutonium that was gained from reprocessing spent fuel that had been unloaded from the 5 megawatt reactor, then this amount fell within the projected levels. So, while others seem to be unable to concentrate on anything but the uranium program and what was in a blown-up facility in Syria (still important questions), possible progress in getting to the bottom of the most dangerous part of North Korea’s nuclear program isn't being pursued. The ISIS report sums this point up nicely:

Although North Korea’s declaration must be viewed as a partial one, it should be seen as an initial step in a process aimed at achieving a complete declaration. An initial verification process could be initiated by representatives of the Six Party Talks or the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), who would seek clarifications and additions to that declaration. North Korea has stated that it is willing to provide more details about its plutonium stock, including the amount of plutonium separated during each reprocessing campaign and the amount of plutonium used in the October 2006 nuclear test. The verification process would need to establish confidence that North Korea declares all of its plutonium, including the total amount of plutonium produced and its subsequent separation and use.

By focusing on plutonium, the negotiators would zero in on the material in North Korea’s nuclear weapons, which are the primary target of any denuclearization effort. Few believe anymore that North Korea developed a program to produce highly enriched uranium for use in nuclear weapons. Given the relative importance of North Korea’s plutonium stocks, it would be regrettable if progress were stymied over the issue of uranium. Negotiators should keep the uranium issue in perspective—continue seeking information to clarify North Korea’s actions, but not risk fatal damage to the larger denuclearization process over a uranium enrichment program that fewer and fewer believe ever produced highly enriched uranium (HEU).

Confidence in the Six Party Process continues to be lost each passing day. Once the important question of what to do with the spent fuel from the disabled reactor at Yongbyon is answered, there will be very little left to point to as representing continuing cooperation. Taking up the plutonium issue at this juncture, and designing and implementing an initial verification process, would kill two birds with one stone. North Korea would have an avenue by which it could continue to show it is cooperating with the Six Parties and we could begin to get answers to the most important questions we have about the North Korean nuclear program.

This all seems even more vital given the dismal state of planning towards how we are going to verify the North Korean declaration. Andreas Persbo, an outside government expert on verification, painted a grim picture after attending a conference in England last year:

I asked, in one of the plenary sessions, how the six parties intend to verify the forthcoming North Korean declaration and was greeted with silence. Afterwards, one of the insiders said that the reasons why no one can answer how verification should be conducted, is because verification has not been discussed yet. The six parties are truly implementing the agreement by the seat of their pants.

North Korea Nutshell: The Return of the Light Water Reactors

The North Korean nuclear negotiations are heading towards a pretty important impasse. North Korea claims that it has met its end of the October 3^rd deal by making serious progress in disablement and presenting some sort of declaration of its nuclear program to the United States.

Amb. Chris Hill made it pretty clear, especially with the personal letter from President Bush, that the North Koreans still had not entirely fulfilled their end of the bargain and that a more complete declaration would need to be submitted to China (the chair of the 6-Party Talks) before moving forward. The U.S. and other parties still need more information about North Korean efforts towards a uranium enrichment capability and any possible proliferation issues (ie. Syria). There also still may be an issue with Pyongyang’s reporting of plutonium stocks, as the North Korean Ministry recently issued a statement that listed the production at 30kg. U.S. experts place the likely levels of plutonium closer to 50-70kg. The difference is enough to produce several nuclear weapons.

All is not lost, however, as the disablement of the last of the three nuclear facilities at Yongbyon continues and should likely be finished in the next three months. This timeline for completion is somewhat longer than what the U.S. had expected, but it seems that one of the ways North Korea is expressing its displeasure over delayed aid shipments is by reducing staff levels working on disabling the nuclear reactor.

Every expert I talk to concerning this issue gives me approximately the same quote: The North Koreans are going to make this take as long as they can so they can sell us their nuclear program one screw at a time. Given this view, the North’s latest pronouncements seem like yet another attempt to wring further concessions from the 6-Parties. This view tends to be reinforced by the fact that we are now seeing the reemergence of the issue of Light Water Reactors (LWR) in the negotiations.

The Agreed Framework of 1994 had provided the North Koreans with 2 LWR’s in return for the dismantlement of their older, more proliferation friendly graphite reactors. North Korea places a high value on not being beholden to foreign powers for anything and given their extremely large domestic uranium mines, they see nuclear power as essential to their economic development. The building of these reactors never really progressed beyond the initial stages because of a mixture of North Korea continuing to resist IAEA inspections while provoking it neighbors and a hesitation by Congress to fund the project.

In the last few months we have seen a resumption of the request by the North Koreans. What makes this interesting is that a highly regarded figure on North Korean issues, Robert Gallucci, has come out in favor of providing the LWRs. It is not completely surprising that Gallucci would support this move as he was the lead negotiator for the United States in the ’94 deal that included the LWRs. However, it is interesting that he chose to bring it up while talking to reporters during a recent trip to Seoul.

Gallucci made the trip to South Korea as a member of an elite group of officials that went to advise the newly elected President Lee on steps that could be taken to better strengthen their relationship with the United States. The history of U.S.-North Korean negotiations is full of similar situations where important figures float new diplomatic initiatives during their trips to Asia. Whether this is one of those times or just the personal thoughts of a concerned observer, the LWR issue does have the potential to break the current stalemate.

There are two important things that Gallucci discussed that must be kept in mind when considering the viability of LWRs for North Korea. The first is that these reactors use enriched uranium for fuel, as opposed to graphite reactors which use raw uranium, so that the DPRK would need to purchase its fuel from an outside source, and that this would lead to a far greater level of transparency with the North’s nuclear program. The other thing to remember is that the spent fuel from LWRs is not very suitable for plutonium reprocessing which could be then lead to material for nuclear weapons.

North Korea already has significant knowledge on developing nuclear power and is likely to pursue this avenue in the future even under significant international pressure. If the 6-Party talks are able to succeed in dismantling North Korea’s nuclear weapons program and begins the process of opening them up to more normal relations with the international community (and I understand this is a big if), providing LWRs can help to meet the goals of all concerned parties.

North Korea Nutshell: Wish List for a New Year

As I'll be out of town for the holidays, I won't be able to provide any in-depth weekly review of events in and around North Korea (congrats to Lee Myung-bak as the new SKorea President). But instead of leaving a week with no post, I thought I would complete an important yearly exercise for those of us caught up in the pessimism that abounds in foreign policy. That exercise being to harness the positivity that surrounds the holiday season and attempt to view the next year in the most optimistic light possible. So in that spirit, I’ve put together a list of events that could, and I would argue should, happen in 2008. Most of the events here are linked in one or more ways, but the numerical order is random.

1. North Korea decides to make a complete declaration of all information pertaining to their production and usage of plutonium.

2. North Korea reveals information on its possible covert uranium program. This would include information on aluminum tubes purchased from Russia as well as possible centrifuges or other technology imported from Pakistan through the AQ Khan network.

3. During discussions concerning removal of North Korea from the terror related lists as well as the Trading with the Enemy Act, the United States makes completion of these removals contingent on progress on the Japanese abductee issue.

4. The North Koreans do the calculus and decide that it is more within their interest to move forward on Japanese abductees than risk losing U.S. cooperation.

5. The relationship between the U.S. and Japan avoids a possible pitfall and the Japanese lessen strict sanctions against North Korea and engage more thoroughly in the 6-Party talks.

6. Disablement of the 3 facilities at Yongbyon is completed and all related fuel rods are accounted for. A plan is agreed upon to have these rods shipped to either Russia, South Korea or Japan.

7. The U.S. Congress fully funds all aid requested by Ambassador Chris Hill.

8. Dialogue between North Korea and South Korea continues under the leadership of Lee Myung-bak. However, aid to the North becomes more contingent on progress in the denuclearization efforts.
8.5. A compromise is found over the extremely contentious Joint Fishing Zone on the two Koreas’ western coasts.

9. The 6-Party talks reconvene and agree on a final complete listing of North Korean facilities and certify the completion of disablement at Yongbyon. Upon completing this, a Joint Agreement is drafted and signed concerning the dismantlement of all existing nuclear facilities in return for a long-term comprehensive aid and development package.

10. The 6 parties assembled in these negotiations (Russia, China, U.S., Japan, South Korea, North Korea) agree to form a permanent organization for the purpose of regular meetings to discuss regional security issues. I would call it the North Asia-Pacific Peace and Security Initiative (NAPPSI), but that is just because it has a much snappier ring than “The 6-Party Talks.”

North Korea Nutshell: Cooperation

The theme of the week in the North Korea news scene is cooperation, or rather the lack thereof. This tends to be a rather common factor when dealing with North Korea as their foreign policy can be best described as erratic. Not to say that there aren’t some cold calculations done whenever the North decides to reverse course on something that was thought to have been already decided, but the frequency with which this happens tends to leave most people in the policy community with a certain amount of pessimism towards progress.

Anyway, last week started off well with the famed New York Philharmonic announcing that they had completed negotiations to add a stop in North Korea to their Asian tour. The two day visit will include a performance of both national anthems and some Gershwin and will conclude with members of the Philharmonic offering master classes to North Korean students. In 1959, the orchestra made a similar visit to the Soviet Union and in that case the orchestra helped to begin a process of closer cultural understanding during a time of intense strain between the two opposed nations. It can only be hoped that this visit will similarly help North Korea with beginning the process of becoming more open to the international community.

Things started heading south (pardon the pun) on Tuesday with the North Korean media decrying the actions of the American government as “criminal.” The U.S. had recently deployed some jets and other military related items in South Korea and the North quickly accused the United States of attempting to disrupt the nuclear talks and move the two countries closer to war.

Following this, news began to come out that one of the major holdups in the release of North Korea’s nuclear declaration was a refusal on their part to admit anything related to a suspected uranium enrichment program. Arms Control Today had an insightful piece on this revelation, and their sources revealed that the North was claiming that special aluminum tubes they had purchased from Russia were for non-nuclear purposes. They also denied ever purchasing centrifuges from the A.Q. Khan network, a fact contradicted by the account of exactly such a sale occurring in the autobiography of Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf. U.S. Ambassador Chris Hill has stated to Congress and the press many times that he will not accept any declaration that does not clearly outline exactly what has gone on involving these purchases. As the end of the year deadline looms ever closer, this point, along with the information pertaining to plutonium production, will serve to either make or break this current diplomatic effort.

Not wanting to be left out of the process, Congress decided that this would be a good time to weigh in on North Korean diplomacy. On Tuesday, a small group of Senators led by Sam Brownback submitted legislation requiring a wide range of activities North Korea must complete before the U.S. Senate would agree to remove them from the terror list. Given that almost none of the provisions in the legislation represent points from any of the agreements reached at the international 6-Party talks, the chance of North Korea agreeing to such demands is somewhere between slim and none. So far, this legislation has received little support, but it’s a sure sign that there will be at least some of a fight after North Korea meets its obligations and the time comes for the Senate to move on the delisting.

In what could be called a rather interesting coincidence, the Congressional Research Service issued a report on Tuesday claiming links between the regime in Pyongyang and Hezbollah and the Tamil Tigers. The report points to French and Israeli sources that state that they have evidence of both training and material support to Hezbollah beginning in the 1980s. It also mentions Japanese sources that claim similar actions with regard to the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka. If the findings in this report are validated and begin to gain traction in the policy debate, there could be dire consequences given how unlikely it would be the U.S. could justify removing North Korea from the terror blacklist.

And just to prove that North Korea deserves its “Most Eccentric Nation” status, three largely positive events also taken place last week. First, after defense talks between North and South Korean ministers ended successfully, the first freight cars began running between the cities of Munsan in the South and Bongdong in the North. The 10-mile rail line will improve material transports to and from the joint North-South Gaeseong Industrial Complex, a project that involves South Korean investment in heavy industry using North Korean labor. This project represents the first of many transportation projects in the North that likely could never have happened without the softening of their policy of economic isolationism.

Kim Jong'Il also took the time to officially respond to President Bush's letter sent last week. In his reply, Kim essentially reconfirmed that North Korea would meet all necessary obligations as long as the United States kept its promises. While many would not look at this statement and not read much positivity into it, the fact that it once again affirms the North's position of meeting its obligations and moving forward with denuclearization progress should give observers comfort that the process is still on track.

Lastly, following a closed Senate Foreign Relations Committee briefing with Amb. Hill, East Asia Subcommittee Chair Barbara Boxer stated that the Senate would approve funds, including the $106 million already requested, to “support the process” surrounding the 6-Party negotiations. Some observers had worried that this funding may be stalled over concerns of a North Korean connection to a Syrian facility bombed a few months past. But these comments, coming after a briefing on the very latest developments on this and other subjects involving the negotiations, seem to say that negotiations can move forward in the short term without the fear of U.S. Senate putting up financial speed bumps.

North Korea Nutshell: The Good, The Bad, and the Expected

The last week in news involving North Korea has been full of both worry and cautious optimism. As the careful reader will remember, the next round of the 6-party talks in Beijing was supposed to begin this week, with the topic of the day being North Korea’s draft list of nuclear materials and facilities. The list never came and the talks were postponed accordingly. While some see this as a looming crisis, others point to the fact that when dealing with a subject as important as denuclearization, some flexibility in time tables is required.

North Korea is still under the deadlines imposed by the October 3rd agreement to disable its nuclear facilities at Yongbyon and present its declaration. U.S. Ambassador Chris Hill has now promised several times that the list is on its way and each time no list arrived. Compounding this problem are technical issues, which may prevent the nuclear reactor disablement from finishing before the clock strikes midnight on December 31st. During his recent visit to North Korea, Hill found that the on-site team at the reactor at Yongbyon had to handle some issues with removing the 8,000 spent fuel rods from the reactor and that because of this, the time line for disablement activities to be completed would likely extend beyond the end of the year as well.

But this begs the question, what was the purpose of the end of the year deadline? By setting a date, the other 5 nations were putting pressure on North Korea to begin disablement immediately and open discussions as to what a declaration would look like. This pressure succeeded as shortly after the agreement was reached initial experts were allowed into Yongbyon and significant progress has been made. The delay seems to not be a purposeful effort by North Korea but just a matter of safely handling dangerous and decrepit equipment.

The issue of the declaration seems to be another matter entirely. The U.S. is demanding that the North reveal all of its plutonium reserves, its connections with Pakistan concerning uranium enrichment activities, and clear up some of the questions on their connection to Syria. All of these are extremely sensitive issues and it will likely take a fair amount of back and forth discussions, including significant pressure from the other 5 parties, to come up with a document that will at least marginally satisfy everyone. Unless a breakthrough happens in the next week or so and 6-party talks are quickly arranged as a Christmas present to negotiators, we will likely see an announcement by Hill that discussions on the list are “ongoing” and that taking into consideration the North’s positive stance towards disablement the parties will allow the final list presentation to come in early 2008.

However, a slim chance for this deadline to be made remains, courtesy of some adept diplomacy. While making his visit to North Korea, Amb. Hill dropped off a letter personally signed by Bush. The letter, which addressed Kim Jong’il personally, urged the North Korean leader to fully carryout his denuclearization obligations and cited how normalization between the two nations could follow. Although these were already the stated position outlined in previous agreements between the nations, an attempt at personal correspondence between the two leaders is a fundamental shift from where Bush stood earlier in his administration. North Korea has long sought the prestige brought on by such high level contact, so it will be interesting to see if they respond well to this groundbreaking overture.

Back on the subject of the North’s impending declaration, ArmsControlWonk has a fantastic guest post from James Acton of Kings College London. In it, he goes through the nitty-gritty technical details of how inspectors would go about verifying the amount of plutonium North Korea should have on hand. As well, he explains that if inspectors were given a reasonable amount of records and access, they could get fairly close to the exactly the amount of Pu the North should have on hand (which estimates currently place between 50-70kg or nearly 10 bombs worth). I won’t get into more details here, but if you have a nose for the exact science of what is going on with one of the most contentious elements of the declaration I highly recommend you give the post a read.

Finally, while the United States is embroiled in election fever as the primaries move ever closer, the South Koreans themselves had a huge development leading into their December 19th Presidential election. Lee Myung-bak, candidate for the conservative Grand Nation Party (GNP), was cleared of a financial scandal that could have severely damaged his candidacy. When this scandal initially broke it lead some in the GNP to question Lee's candidacy and a fellow conservative, Lee Hoi-chang, announced an independent run that threatened to split the conservative vote and give the Liberal party a chance it likely would not have had otherwise. But the clearing of Lee's name, as well as his decision to announce that he will be donating all of his financial assets (except his $5million home), to charity, leave little room for his opponents to overtake his 20 point polling lead.

Introducing the "North Korea Nutshell"

North Korea remains one of the most important challenges in nonproliferation today. As such, Nukes of Hazard is unveiling a brief weekly recap of events in and around North Korea called the “North Korea Nutshell,” courtesy of Eli Lewine. Given the large amount of material that could be covered, we invite readers to add anything that we might have missed and, of course, encourage you to chime in and leave comments as well.

Earlier this month, North Korea began working with international experts to disable its nuclear reactor and reprocessing plant at Yongbyon. The agreement reached on October 3^rd called for this process to be completed by the end of the year. The “disablement” of these facilities effectively means that it would take significant financial and technical resources as well as the period of over a year to reinstate them, were the situation to regress.

The plan, as laid out in the September of 2005 agreement, is that the initial disablement would be followed by the dismantlement of these facilities following the delivery of heavy fuel oil and progress towards the normalization of relations between North Korea and the other members of the six-party talks (United States, South Korea, China, Russia, and Japan).

U.S. Ambassador Chris Hill is currently making stops throughout Asia to confer with the six-party states before the next session of the talks which are tentatively scheduled for December 6-8. Part of his travels will include making his second trip to North Korea to personally view progress on the disablement work at Yongbyon. The negotiating session after this visit will likely be the last round of talks before the end of the year deadline for the disablement.

Of singular importance during these meetings will be the mandated declaration of nuclear materials and facilities by North Korea. There has been much debate over how complete this declaration will be, with many experts believing that the North will leave off the list some or all of its reprocessed plutonium. In Congressional testimony at the end of October, Hill said that a draft list was going to be circulated in the weeks prior to this round of talks, so it seems that this problem has been anticipated and steps are being taken to ensure that the list presented at this round is as complete as possible. We’ll have to wait and see until next week.

While all of this is going on, the North and South Koreans have been hard at work at improving relations between the two countries. This week, each country has sent its Defense Ministers to meet in Pyongyang to lay the groundwork for plans discussed at previous North-South summits held earlier this fall.

As of today, the negotiations are reported to be moving slowly as both parties are having difficulty agreeing over how to set boundaries for a joint fishing area on the western border. This area is a great point of contention between the two nations and has twice escalated into naval skirmishes in 1999 and 2002. The delay is likely to prevent the two officials from discussing necessary security logistics for a railroad project linking the two countries that was proposed earlier this month in a meeting of Korean Prime Ministers in Seoul.

Despite these delays, officials from both sides are scheduled to continue to exchange visits, with the next such visit coming from the head of North Korean intelligence. However, it will be interesting to see how this policy evolves under a new South Korean President, with elections taking place in mid-December.

Another new development this week came with a report by South Korea’s Chosun Ilbo newspaper that an American diplomat had been “permanently” residing in the North Korean capital. While it is likely that this individual is serving a mostly technical purpose, helping to facilitate communications between the U.S. experts in North Korea and Washington, the fact that a diplomatic official of the U.S. government is spending a substantial period of time in the North Korean capital is certainly another sign of improving U.S.-North Korean relations.

Finally, for those interested in insight into the future of the North Korean regime, reports have come out claiming that a 66 year-old Kim Jong’il may have finally tapped one of his sons as his successor. Kim Jong’chul, 27, was appointed this year as Vice-Chief of the Korean Workers’ Party’s Organization and Guidance Department. The post is highly influential in the North Korean government and was the same post that Kim Jong’il himself took at the same age of 27, five years before he was tapped to succeed Kim Il’sung. Whether the succession will remain in the family remains to be seen, but this move clearly shows the favor towards to Kim Jong’chul given that his 2 other brothers have yet to receive such important government posts.

Suffice to say, much has changed since our German friends brought us this video a little over one year ago.