Showing posts with label Pakistan. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Pakistan. Show all posts

Wednesday, January 9, 2008

Peter Galbraith: US needs to get tough with Pakistan

Senior Diplomatic Fellow at the Center, Peter Galbraith, recently wrote an interesting op-ed in the Boston Globe, arguing that Pakistan “should be treated like the national security problem it has become.” He suggests that the U.S. should insist that Pakistan’s elected leaders have total control over all of the country’s national security programs, make clear that the U.S. does not believe A.Q. Khan acted alone, insist that Khan and his records are made available to the IAEA, and sponsor a Security Council resolution appointing a UN investigator to look into the assassination of Benazir Bhutto.

President Bush recently described Pakistan's president, Pervez Musharraf, as an "absolutely reliable ally" in the war on extremists and a man of his word. In fact, Pakistan's record under Musharraf is one of broken promises while tolerating acts harmful to US interests. The assassination of Benazir Bhutto, weeks after a US-brokered deal for her return to Pakistan, underscores the bankruptcy of the current approach. Instead of treating Pakistan like the ally it isn't, the country should be treated like the national security problem it has become. Moreover, Bush should be careful with his language. The United States needs to be tough with Pakistan, not gullible.

[snip]

The United States should get tough with Pakistan. Bush should insist that Pakistan become a real ally in the war on terrorism. In recent years, the Inter-Services Intelligence and Pakistan's nuclear establishment have been pursuing their own anti-American agenda, in violation of Pakistan's supposed official policy. The intelligence agency has supported the Taliban and continues to maintain contact with Islamic radicals, including possibly Al Qaeda. A.Q. Khan, head of Pakistan's nuclear program, sold nuclear weapons technology and materials to America's worst enemies: North Korea, Iran, and Libya. It is not remotely plausible that Musharraf did not know or acquiesce in these activities.

The United States should insist that Pakistan's elected leaders have full control over all of Pakistan's national security programs, including the nuclear file and the Inter-Services Intelligence. The agency should be restructured, or better, abolished. It is a bastion of anti-Western and antidemocratic sentiment. And, Bush should make clear that he does not believe that Khan acted on his own. At a minimum, the United States should insist that Pakistan make Khan, and his records, available to the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The United States could signal its new approach by sponsoring a Security Council resolution appointing a UN investigator to look into the murder of Bhutto. When a suicide bomber blew up former Lebanese prime minister Rafik Hariri in 2005, the Bush administration helped lead the effort to pass such a resolution. The Bhutto killing raises similar questions, including as to why there was no Pakistani security or police protecting her.

Instead of praising Musharraf as a man of his word, Bush should tell him that he will no longer tolerate unkept promises or be satisfied with obvious lies.

Friday, December 28, 2007

Joe Cirincione: A Nuclear-Armed Pakistan Teeters on the Edge

With all of the commentary and analysis on Bhutto’s assassination, surprisingly little has focused on Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. And so comes one of the few pieces on the topic from Joe Cirincione on yesterday’s Huffington Post:

The assassination of Benazir Bhutto and the intensification of the political crisis in Pakistan at the end of the year brings into sharp relief our most immediate nuclear threat. It comes not from Iraq or Iran, but Pakistan. With an unstable military ruler, enough material for 50 to 100 nuclear bombs, strong Islamic fundamentalist influences in the country and armed, Islamic fundamentalist groups--including Al Qaeda--operating with its territory, Pakistan is the most dangerous country on earth. The nuclear weapons and material are believed secure for now, but increased instability could split the military or distract the units guarding the weapon materials, providing an opening for a raid by an organized radical group.

For all the focus on Iraq and Iran over the past six years, it is in Pakistan that Osama bin Ladin may have his best chance of getting the nuclear weapon we know he wants.

Wednesday, September 26, 2007

Matthew Bunn: More to be Done to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism

Matthew Bunn, an Advisory Board Member at the Center, wrote a terrific op-ed in today’s Washington Post in which he argues that, “We urgently need a high-priority global campaign to make sure every nuclear weapon and every significant cache of potential bomb material is locked down.

The piece promotes the findings of "Securing the Bomb 2007," an annual report on the security of nuclear weapons and materials around the world, which Bunn helped write. The good news of the report “is that much progress has been made toward upgrading security for nuclear stockpiles. The bad news is that the essential ingredients of nuclear weapons exist in hundreds of buildings in more than 40 countries, and terrorists are actively trying to get a nuclear bomb or the materials to make one.”

Bunn states:

While [nuclear terrorism] is a global threat, Russia, Pakistan and research reactors using fuel made from highly enriched uranium pose the most urgent dangers of nuclear theft. Russia has the world's largest stockpiles of nuclear weapons and the materials to make them, scattered in numerous buildings and bunkers. Security measures have improved dramatically since the early 1990s, but serious weaknesses remain, and threats are posed by outside attackers as well as pervasive insider theft.

Pakistan has a relatively small nuclear stockpile, believed to be heavily guarded -- but the country faces threats from al-Qaeda, other jihadist groups and nuclear insiders with a demonstrated willingness to sell sensitive technology.

Roughly 140 research reactors fueled by highly enriched uranium exist in dozens of countries -- some of them on university campuses -- and many have only modest security measures in place.

Click here to read the complete op-ed and here to download the full report.