Thursday, October 11, 2007

Six-Nation Survey on Nuclear Weapons Yields Mixed Results

The Simons Foundation and Angus Reid Strategies recently released a six-nation survey on citizens' views toward nuclear weapons. The good news is that over 70% of the publics in Britain, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, and the U.S. think that nuclear weapons make the world a more dangerous place. The bad news is that, in spite of this, opinion in these countries differs significantly as to who should possess nuclear weapons, who should develop them, and when they should be used.

Conducted late this summer amidst concerns over nuclear weapon development in Iran and North Korea, issues surrounding the U.S.-India nuclear deal, and the consideration of new nuclear weapons in the U.S., the poll yields some interesting results. Overall, opposition to nuclear weapons was strongest in Germany and Italy and weakest in Israel, with Britain, France, and the U.S. generally falling somewhere in between.

On Their Country's Non-Proliferation Goals
When answering the question, "What should be the goal of your country's national government when it comes to nuclear weapons?" respondents in all countries agree on the whole that the world needs to have less nuclear weapons. However, they disagree strongly as to the degree of change needed. A plurality of respondents in Britain (50.9%), Italy (68.5%), Germany (80.7%), and the U.S. (48.7%) voted for "eliminating nuclear weapons worldwide," while a relative majority in France (44.6%) and Israel (45.8%) voted only to reduce stockpiles.

While stockpiles perhaps should be reduced worldwide, respondents don't necessarily want this to happen in their own countries. Almost forty percent of respondents in Britain, France, and the US selected, "Nuclear weapons place [my country] in a unique position, so it is not in our interest to participate in treaties that would reduce or eliminate our nuclear arsenal." Over 70% of Israeli respondents argue the same.

On the Justified Use of Nuclear Weapons
A greater number of respondents maintain that the use of either their country or NATO (in the cases of Italy and Germany) would be justified in their use of nuclear weapons than the first question (on the goals to reduce or eliminate nukes) might lead you to believe. Less than half of respondents in Britain, France, Israel, and the U.S., believe that "it would never be justified." 45.5% of respondents in Britain, 52.1% in France, 45.1% in the U.S., and a whopping 71.6% in Israel believe that the use of nuclear weapons by their country would be justified either in the context of an actual war or as a deterrent against a possible attack. Germans (76.9%) and Italians (76.9%) responded overwhelmingly that the use of nuclear weapons would never be justified.

On the Survey Itself
While it does provide more comprehensive results per country, one weakness of the Simon Foundation's poll is the limited scope of its "global" nature. For data from additional countries, see Nukes of Hazard's previous post on the Pew Research Center's data collected earlier this year. Even within its limited scope, however, this new poll succeeds in surveying a variety of countries—from those that possess nuclear weapons (Britain, France, and the U.S), to one that under a policy of "strategic ambiguity" has refused to discuss its program (Israel), to participants of NATO's nuclear sharing concept who do not produce their own weapons (Germany and Italy).

And on one final note, on all but two questions, the United States placed embarrassingly high on the percentage of people who were "unsure" of nuclear policies when compared to the other countries surveyed. Regarding a question on individuals' views toward the NPT and nuclear sharing, the survey's analysis finds Americans "particularly unaware." In a world where the United States possesses the influence and potential leadership capacity that it does, this seems especially frightening. If you're reading this, you're likely not in that group--let's work on making these issues a topic of discussion.

Wednesday, October 10, 2007

North Korea: How Far We Have Come

*Guest post from Eli Lewine

One year ago yesterday, the prospect of a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula looked grim. Six Party negotiations had ground to a halt over banking sanctions imposed on North Korea by the United States and the parties had not met in close to a year. The North Koreans, ever the provocateurs, decided to push the envelope by conducting their first nuclear test. Countries across the globe expressed their condemnation of the North’s actions and the UN quickly passed another round of sanctions.

Yet somehow, this event proved to be a catalyst for rethinking the current situation and prompted the renewal of international diplomatic efforts. Within two months, the Six Party negotiations had resumed and all parties restated their commitment to the denuclearization agreement reached in September of 2005.

President Bush even took the unprecedented step of giving the go-ahead for bilateral negotiations between U.S. Ambassador Christopher Hill and the North Korean negotiator Kim Kye Gwan. In his 2003 campaign against John Kerry, Bush had consistently belittled this approach as a “naive and dangerous” policy that had already proved to be a failure under the Clinton Administration. But now Bush and his team really wanted the diplomatic effort to move forward so he sent Hill to Berlin to discuss how the banking sanctions issue could be resolved. The accord they reached there opened the door to the comprehensive agreement reached in February of this year.

Now we are seeing international inspectors once again inside North Korea determining exactly how their nuclear facilities can be disabled by the end of the year. The North has even agreed to provide a complete accounting of all its facilities, including anything related to a possible uranium enrichment program. Skepticism still remains, and rightly so. But not since the Agreed Framework of 1994 have we been so close to achieving our goal of disarming this dangerous nation.

There are several factors that may have contributed to this turn around in diplomacy. Many point to the fact that one of the major opponents of this track in the Administration, Vice President Dick Cheney, may have lost much of his influence as a result of the Scooter Libby scandal. Others would say that the sanctions on North Korea, combined with severe flooding and crop failures have left their leadership with little choice but to come to an accommodation. The Chinese have also played a much stronger roll in coercing the North Koreans by condemning the nuclear test and reducing their aid to the impoverished nation. Whatever the answer, it is undeniable that significant progress has been made in direction of controlling and disabling the North Korean nuclear program.

The North Korean media commemorated this anniversary by calling the test a “truly great miracle” for their nation. The real miracle, however, has been how far we have come since then.

Stars Aligning Against RRW?

Efforts to build a new generation of nuclear weapons suffered yet another setback with the recent release of a declassified executive summary by JASON, an independent scientific advisory body tasked by Congress to review the technical viability of the Bush administration's plans for new nuclear warheads.

The group concluded that the so-called Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) "needs further development" before it can be certified and enter the U.S. weapons stockpile without underground nuclear testing. In order for this certification to happen, JASON believes "additional experiments and analyses are needed" to explore possible failures of the nuclear warhead and the new manufacturing processes contemplated for building it.

As noted by CDI’s Todd Fine, “Altogether, the summary findings indicate that many of the enhanced security and safety features and new manufacturing processes used to justify the RRW program could actually add significant uncertainty to the performance of the design. As a result, the program in its current form might produce a warhead less reliable than previous approaches.”

This on top of last year’s Department of Energy report that found that the lifetime of the cores of existing nuclear warheads is at least 100 years, roughly double the Department’s original estimate of 45 years, significantly undercutting claims that the new warheads are needed.

What’s more is that RRW’s biggest advocate, Sen. Pete Domenici, announced last week that he’s retiring at the end of his term next year. A long-time chair (though now ranking member) of the Senate Energy and Water Development Appropriations Subcommittee, Domenici made securing funds for RRW one of his top priorities. Even in the event that Domenici’s vacated seat is won by another major cheerleader for the program, such as Rep. Heather Wilson, that candidate would still not have his committee seniority and therefore the same ability to forcefully steer funds towards RRW.

All of this comes as international opposition to RRW continues to mount. As noted by Doug Shaw, most recent evidence of this comes from Malaysian Ambassador Arshad Hussain who was speaking on behalf Non-Aligned Movement signatories and ratifiers of the CTBT last month. Hussain made clear that the group views the development of new nuclear weapons, including RRW, as being “in contravention not only with the undertakings provided by the nuclear weapon States at the time of the conclusion of the CTBT, but also with the Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.”

Will RRW go the way of the dodo and the nuclear bunker buster? Time will tell, but in the meantime, my fingers are crossed.

Tuesday, October 9, 2007

National Security Legislative Wrap-up, October 1-5 2007

Last week, Congress passed and sent to conference the Fiscal Year 2008 Defense Authorization bill and the Fiscal Year 2008 Defense Appropriations bill. Both measures now go to conference with the House to agree on a common bill. The House adopted some measures related to Iraq that did little to stop the war, including the Abercrombie (D-HI) - Tanner (D-TN) bill to require the Secretary of Defense to submit a report on redeployment planning for Iraq. This week, the House is in session while the Senate is in recess for the Columbus Day holiday. The House is slated to consider H.R. 400, a bill introduced by Rep. Abercrombie (D-HI) to crack down on war profiteering.

KEY NATIONAL SECURITY BILLS IN 2007

- DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BILL:

On October 1, the Senate approved the bill by a 92 - 3 vote. The bill now goes to conference committee with the House.

- DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS BILL:

On October 3, the Senate completed consideration of the bill, approving it by voice vote. A Feingold (D-WI) amendment to remove most troops from Iraq by June 30, 2008 was rejected 28 - 60. A Kyl (R-AZ) amendment to restore $10 million for the Space Test Bed program was withdrawn under fire. The bill now goes to conference committee with the House.

The portion of the request to pay for the Iraq and Afghanistan wars -- which now totals about $190 billion -- is not likely to be considered until later this year or even early next year. Both Senate Appropriations Committee Chairman Robert Byrd (D-WV) and House Appropriations Committee Chairman David Obey (D-WI) have promised to attach language to this Supplemental Appropriations Bill to bring American troops home from Iraq.

Monday, October 8, 2007

Senator Kyl Attempts to Sell Space-Based Missile Defense as Satellite Protection

Last week, Senator Jon Kyl (R-AZ) attempted to amend the Senate Defense Appropriations bill to re-insert funding for the "space-based test bed" -- preliminary research into the development of three or more prototype weaponized satellites designed to intercept ballistic missiles launched from the ground. Kyl's case for funding the project was that it was a step towards the development of active defenses for American satellites against anti-satellite weapons, and that it was not necessarily a missile defense project. However, an examination of the budget request for the test bed casts serious doubt on Kyl's argument, indicating that the test bed is quite simply a missile defense program.

Kyl with President Bush at the National Prayer Breakfast in 2002

The space-based test bed is seen by critics as a dangerous step into a space arms race and a far-fetched, extraterrestrial extension of the already troubled National Missile Defense program. As such, funding for the program has been eliminated by all four budget committees (Armed Services and Appropriations Committees in both the House and Senate). Kyl attempted to re-insert funding for the program by amendment on the floor of the Senate. Jeffrey Lewis posted a transcript of the debate on the Senate floor between Kyl and Senator Bill Nelson (D-FL) over Kyl's attempt to fund the project.

The exchange illustrated the complex relationship between missile defense and satellite defense. In pushing for the funding of the "space-based test bed" of weaponized satellites, Kyl attempted to distance the pilot program from the increasingly unpopular national missile defense system, and re-categorize it as a satellite defense system. This maneuver was made somewhat difficult by the fact that Kyl was lobbying to re-insert the space based test bed into its original position -- in the budget for missile defense. As Senator Nelson observed, "the proposed space test bed in a missile defense program is a missile defense program, not a space asset protection program."

Kyl replied:
The space-based test bed is one of the places in which we could develop proof of concept that could be effective both for our satellites and, yes, also for an attack by a hostile missile because that is where this program started, it is in the missile defense budget...It is theoretically possible that a concept would be developed to protect against a hostile missile attack with some kind of a space-based program.
The space-based test bed is not just in the Missile Defense Agency's (MDA) budget because "that is where the program started," it is in their budget because it is a missile defense project. Moreover, it is more than "theoretically possible" that the space-based test bed would be used for missile defense. Senator Kyl's assertions aside, the best guide to the purpose of the space-based test bed (and the $10 million that Kyl and the MDA propose spending on it in FY2008) is the Missile Defense Agency's budget justification, available here (p. 19).

While Kyl attempts to distance the test bed from missile defense, the first item in the planned program for the space-based test bed in FY'08 is to "Initiate formal steps for potential integration [of the test bed] into the BMDS [Ballistic Missile Defense System] architecture." Which is to say, money spent on the space-based test bed is money spent in pursuit of space-based missile defense. Moreover, the budget justification doesn't say a single word about using the test bed as a way to develop technology to defend satellites, which flies in the face of Kyl's argument in support of the system.

Fortunately, Kyl's attempt to re-insert funding for the test bed failed: This congress does not want to fund space-based missile defense, and as Senator Nelson accurately argued, the test bed is a missile defense program, while satellite defense research is funded through other areas of the budget.

But while Congress' stand against space-based weapons is admirable, their control over covert weapons systems has its limits. Sam Black at the Center for Defense Information observed last year:

While the budget for this program [i.e. the space-based test bed] shrank, the annual budgets for classified MDA programs grew tremendously. If unclassified program budgets are shrinking while timetables remain stable, this could be a sign that the Space Test Bed is receiving funds from classified accounts, and so has even less accountability than it did previously.

Insofar as Black's speculation is accurate, it testifies to the limits of congressional power and the importance of electing a president in 2008 who is willing to pursue space security through international law, rather than extraterrestrial weapons.

Saturday, October 6, 2007

Daalder and Holum: U.S. Should Aim for World Free of Nuclear Weapons

Should the United States aim to achieve a world free of all nuclear weapons?

The answer, as laid out in a terrific op-ed by Ivo Daalder and John Holum in the Boston Globe, is a resounding yes.

Nearly 20 years after the Cold War ended, the time has come to make a concerted effort to verifiably rid the world of all nuclear weapons. The United States must start by recognizing that the threats it confronts have changed and so, consequently, has the role and purpose of our nuclear weapons.


[snip]


Tomorrow's nuclear threats are different. They are that unstable regimes or, worse, nihilistic terrorists get their hands on a bomb and use it. This threat is becoming more real as nuclear technology and materials spread around the world. The first order of business must be to ensure that all the nuclear weapons and materials in Russia and elsewhere are safe and secure. While recognizing the threat of loose nukes and materials, this administration has done far too little to make sure this happens. The next administration must do better.


The second order of business, though, is to reduce the salience of nuclear weapons in order to ease the road to their elimination. The only reason the United States should maintain nuclear weapons is because others have them. There cannot be another purpose. We don't need them to deter a non-nuclear attack on ourselves or our allies; our conventional forces can deal with those contingencies. We certainly don't need them to attack some far-away or deeply buried targets, because there isn't a target whose destruction is worth breaking the 62-year-old taboo against using a single nuclear weapon.


Given this limited role for nuclear weapons, there is much that the United States can do to lift the dark nuclear shadow over the world. It can sharply reduce its nuclear stockpile to 1,000 weapons or less, if Russia agrees to go down to the same level. It can eliminate tactical nuclear weapons to underscore that it understands that a nuclear weapon is a nuclear weapon, no matter its size, yield, range, or mode of delivery. It can agree never to produce highly enriched uranium and plutonium for weapons purposes, and accept the need for intrusive verification if other states agree to end such production as well. It can commit never again to test a nuclear device, and ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.


If the United States were to do all these things, it would make clear, to our citizens and the world, that it is serious about tackling the nuclear danger. It would reestablish the nation as the leader of the global nuclear nonproliferation movement. Above all, it would make the world a much safer place.

Friday, October 5, 2007

Victory for Non-Proliferation and Diplomacy

*Guest post from Katie Mounts

President Bush's "Axis of Evil" may soon be one less. In no small victory for diplomacy and non-proliferation, recent six party talks yielded a nuclear deal with North Korea.

Under the deal, North Korea agrees to disable all activities at its main nuclear complex in Pyongyang and to report on all of its current nuclear programs by the end of this year. NSC spokesperson Gordon Johndroe stated, "These second-phase actions effectively end the DPRK's production of plutonium – a major step towards the goal of achieving the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula," reported the New York Times.

Beyond the more immediate success in North Korea, this agreement is a victory for advocates of diplomacy in the face of nuclear disagreements, most notably the case of Iran. Bush's newfound commitment to diplomacy through Christopher Hill has resulted in what provocative language and threats of military action have not in Iran: the first major steps toward transparency and denuclearization.

The New York Times printed an excellent editorial yesterday, entitled "Score One for Diplomacy." Some of the high points are included below.

If North Korea lives up to its promise to begin disabling key parts of its nuclear program within weeks, and to finish the job by year’s end, the world will be a safer place. To get this deal, the Bush administration, after dragging its feet for four years, displayed an admirable and all too rare mixture of diplomatic creativity, flexibility, patience and follow-through. To keep it moving forward, it will need even more.

Like all diplomatic deals worth their salt, both sides had to give up a lot. North Korea’s paranoid leadership has agreed to a degree of transparency few would have predicted. A team of American experts is expected to travel to North Korea next week to begin the disabling, at America’s expense, of its nuclear reactor, plutonium separation plant and other parts of its Yongbyon nuclear complex.

[snip]

With both sides playing against type, there is bound to be very tough moments ahead. This week’s agreement is already months behind schedule, and Pyongyang will likely delay, obfuscate and demand a lot more.

[snip]

The next phase — getting rid of North Korea’s fissile material and any weapons — will be even tougher to negotiate. Pyongyang will inevitably make more expensive and difficult demands… It’s worth the effort.

We also hope that with a solid foreign policy success now in reach, Mr. Bush will learn the lesson of the North Korea deal and tell his diplomats to turn the same creativity, flexibility and follow-through toward trying to end Iran’s nuclear program.

Thursday, October 4, 2007

Speaker Pelosi on RRW

Below is a constituent response letter from House Speaker Nancy Pelosi regarding the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) program. (HT to Stephen Young). Like the letter from Sen. Dorgan I highlighted earlier, Pelosi expresses her opposition to RRW, noting that it contradicts U.S. efforts to stop proliferation and likewise undermines our credibility on the issue.

Dear [Constituent]:

Thank you for contacting me to express your opposition to President Bush's plan for the development of a nuclear weapon called the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW). I appreciate hearing from you on this issue.

The RRW is a newly designed nuclear weapon that claims to require less maintenance than other nuclear warheads. Proponents also believe that the RRW would be easier to manufacture and safer to monitor and test.

In the President's Budge t request for Fiscal Year (FY) 2008, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) requested over $645 million for FY 2008 through FY 2012 to for the RRW. In addition, the Navy made a separate request of $30 million for FY 2008 and $50 million for FY 2009 for this weapon's development.

HR 1585, the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2008, cut the Navy's request for RRW funds from $30 million to $5 million and similar NNSA funds from $88.8 million to $68.8 million. These reductions were recommended by a congressional commission on U.S. Strategic Posture and Nuclear Weapons Strategy. On May 17, 2007, this legislation was passed in the House by a vote of 397-27.

Even more significantly, all funds requested by the NNSA for RRW in the Energy and Water Development Appropriations Bill (HR 2641) were eliminated in an Energy and Water Development Subcommittee markup meeting. Committee Chairman Peter Visclosky expressed the subcommittee's belief that a more comprehensive nuclear strategy was needed before a new nuclear weapon was developed. On July 17, 2007, HR 2641 was passed by the House by a vote of 312-112.

One of the gravest threats to the security of the United States is the spread of weapons of mass destruction. The United States today is struggling to prevent other countries from gaining access to nuclear weapons, and is searching for ways to encourage the North Koreans and Iranians to abandon their nuclear programs. The development of the RRW contradicts our efforts to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons and associated technologies. As a signatory of the agreement our mission is to move toward general and complete disarmament of atomic weapons. By developing new nuclear weapons while urging other countries not to develop a nuclear capability, I believe we undermine our credibility on the proliferation issue.

For more information on this and other issues affecting our country, I invite you to visit my website at www.house.gov/pelosi. Thank you again for taking the time to express your views on this important subject. I hope you will continue to communicate with me on matters of concern to you.

Sincerely,


Nancy Pelosi
Member of Congress