Obama, McCain, and Arms Control in 2009

We know what McCain claimed in his most recent speech on nuclear weapons and nuclear policy, but do any of those positions differ from his previous stances? Where does he stand relative to Obama on issues of arms control?

Find out in the Center's recent side-by-side analysis of the two presumptive presidential nominees' positions on issues of national security, including RRW, START, the CTBT, Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction, and relations with India, Iran, North Korea, and Russia.

Leonor Tomero and John Isaacs, with research assistance from star intern Kimberly Mills, find among other things, that:

• McCain's position on building new nuclear weapons represents a significant departure from his past legislative votes.

• Obama introduced legislation to - among other things - take action on renewing START.
  

• Despite our already tenuous relationship with Russia, McCain wants to ensure that the G-8 "becomes again a club of leading market democracies" that excludes Russia.

Find out more in the full comparison.

Nuclear Arms Control and Nonproliferation Highlights of SIPRI Yearbook 2008

On Monday (June 9), the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) released its annual yearbook on armaments, disarmament, and international security.

Speaking at the launch of the 2008 yearbook, SIPRI director Dr. Bates Gill noted, “We probably have before us one of the most promising opportunities to see real progress in nuclear-related arms control and nonproliferation than we have seen, at least over the past 10 years.”

Gill alluded approvingly to a recent speech on nuclear nonproliferation policy by presumptive Republican nominee John McCain and applauded presumptive Democratic nominee Barack Obama for calling for a world free of nuclear weapons (for a series of CACNP summaries and analyses on McCain’s speech and the specifics of the candidates’ arms control and nonproliferation platforms, see here, here, and here).

In addition, Gill spoke highly of the efforts of Kissinger, Schultz, Perry, and Nunn, who, according to Gill, “are arguing very forcefully of the need of the major world powers, particularly the United States and Russia, to take serious steps in the coming years to hold up their side of the bargain that is enshrined in the NPT.” As I noted in a post yesterday, the impact that these men have made on the global debate about nuclear weapons cannot be overstated.

As far as the nuclear arms control and nonproliferation substance of the yearbook, highlights include:

• As of January 2008, the United States continues to deploy 4,075 strategic and non-strategic warheads, while Russia continues to deploy 5,189 such warheads.
• If all nuclear warheads are counted – operational warheads, spares, those in both active and inactive storage, and intact warheads scheduled for later dismantlement – those states that possess nuclear weapons together possess a total of more than 25, 000 warheads, approximately 24,000 of which are in the possession of the U.S. and Russia.
• As of 2007, global stocks of highly enriched uranium (HEU) totaled approximately 1370 tons (not including 346 tons to be blended down).
• As of 2007, global military stocks of separated plutonium totaled approximately 228–282 tons and civilian stocks totaled 244.9 tons.

And to think that before a December 2007 announcement by the Bush administration approving a cut of 4,500 warheads, the United States possessed approximately 10,000 warheads! Despite all of the Bush administration’s talk about how the threats we face today differ from those we faced during the Cold War, our (and Russia’s) nuclear doctrine remains firmly on a Cold War footing. This is a strategic mindset the next president will have to free America's national security bureaucracy from if he hopes to truly reduce our reliance on nuclear weapons.

Australian Prime Minister Calls for Nuke Commission, Reiterates Position on Nuke Trade with India

During a talk today in Kyoto, Japan, Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd announced the creation of a new International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament. According to Rudd, the goal of the Commission is to forge a global consensus on how to breathe life into the NPT in the lead-up to the 2010 NPT review conference.

“We can’t afford for that (2005 experience) to happen again and for the NPT treaty simply to die the death of a thousand cuts,” the prime minister said. “We’ve got to work on it.” Admitting that such a task would not be easy, Rudd argued, “It’s time for us also as Australians to reconstitute our global disarmament credentials…. There’s no guarantees of success. But you’ve got to give it a huge shove.”

Though Australia has a history of thinking seriously about eliminating nuclear weapons (see the Canberra Commission, which the new Commission is meant to pick up from), the prime minister’s announcement illustrated the impact Schultz, Perry, Kissinger, and Nunn have made on the global debate about nuclear weapons. Rudd explicitly cited the Wall Street Journal op-eds by the “Four Horsemen,” noting that the “men were not peaceniks, but experienced global negotiators.”

Rudd also used the occasion to reiterate his government’s commitment not to export uranium to India so long as it refused to sign the NPT:

Our policy platform on that is clear. We’ve indicated that we believe it’s important to maintain the integrity of the NPT….I understand full well the arguments put by the Government of India….I’ve had presentations on this matter from the Government of the United States about the importance of India's particular circumstances. However, I would remind you of where our policy stands and it comes off the back of the platform of the Australian Labor Party.

The Rudd government’s position on this issue represents a significant and positive reversal from the government of former Prime Minister John Howard. Howard had stated that Australia would supply uranium to India once (1) New Delhi negotiated a safeguards agreement with the IAEA, (2) the NSG rule prohibiting nuclear trade with India was changed, and (3) the U.S. Congress approved the U.S.-India 123 agreement.

In contrast, Rudd appears to have put the integrity of the nuclear nonproliferation regime ahead of the prospect of financial gain (though it is important to point out that the Rudd government maintains that it would give “thoughtful and serious consideration to joining a consensus” at the NSG to allow India to conduct civilian nuclear trade with other nuclear suppliers).

National Security Legislative Wrap-up

Congress completed work on the Fiscal Year 2009 Budget Resolution this past week, but postponed action on the Supplemental Appropriations Bill to pay for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The House is expected to act on the Supplemental this week, and perhaps the Senate too. The Senate is also expected to consider the Fiscal Year Defense Authorization bill, but not for another week or two. The House Appropriations Committee is moving close to writing the Fiscal Year 2009 appropriations bills.


FISCAL YEAR 2008 SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATION BILL

The Supplemental bill now moves back to the House for approval, rejection or modification of the Senate-passed measure, likely early in June, before going to the President for signature or a veto. One possible outcome is that the House will now pass the war funding, the GI education bill, and not much else, and the Senate will agree to the House-passed version. However, Senate Democrats are pushing to include in the bill other provisions, including a 13-week extension of unemployment insurance benefits. Reminder: there will be no House-Senate conference on this bill.


FISCAL YEAR 2009 BUDGET RESOLUTION

A House-Senate conference to resolve differences between the two versions of the Fiscal Year 2009 Budget Resolution was concluded on May 20. The conference report provided $1.1 trillion in Fiscal Year 2009 discretionary spending, which is $21 billion above the $991.6 billion requested by the Administration. The total budget including mandatory spending (Social Security, Medicare), is $3 trillion. The recommended funding for defense discretionary funding is $537.8 billion in budget authority and $568.7 billion in outlays -- not including money to pay for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The conference report also provided $38.3 billion for International Affairs budget authority and $38.4 billion in outlays. Although this funding level is $1.5 billion below the Administration's request, it is $4 billion above the FY08 enacted level of $34.3 billion.

On June 4, the Senate adopted the Budget Resolution conference report by a vote of 48 to 45. Senators John Warner (R-VA) and Peter Domenici (R-NM) withheld their "no" votes as both Senators Edward Kennedy (D-MA) and Robert Byrd (D-WV) were absent.

On June 5, the House voted 214 to 210 to adopt the conference report.


FISCAL YEAR 2009 DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS BILL

The House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee has scheduled its mark-up or writing of this bill for July 16. The full House Appropriations Committee mark-up is scheduled for July 23.


FISCAL YEAR 2009 ENERGY AND WATER APPROPRIATIONS BILL

The House Energy and Water Appropriations Subcommittee has scheduled its mark-up or writing of this bill for June 17. The full House Appropriations Committee mark-up is scheduled for June 24.

Congressional Schedule for DoD and DoE Bills (updated)

Provided below is an updated schedule of Congressional action on key Department of Defense (DoD) and Department of Energy (DoE) bills, as prepared by David Culp of FCNL. Click to enlarge.

Growing Economic Ties Better Deterrence

The Center's Kingston Reif had an excellent letter to the editor published last week in the Washington Times. Check it out below.

James T. Hackett's column on India's strategic posture suffers from two major problems ("India's missile power lifts off," Commentary, May 22).

First, emphasizing the threat to India posed by China obscures the fact that China is set to overtake the United States as India's largest bilateral trade partner. Moreover, China and India recently announced that New Delhi plans to host a second round of joint military exercises with Beijing this year.

Though India understandably is taking the necessary precautions to prepare itself for any contingency, growing economic and military ties will do more than ballistic missiles to reduce the likelihood of war between India and China.

Second, while effective Indian missile defenses could in theory limit the damage caused by a missile attack against India, they would not bolster deterrence because India already has the ability to target China and Pakistan with its ballistic missiles.

Though the benefits of Indian missile defenses would be minimal at best, the costs could be grave. Indian missile defenses could cause China and Pakistan to reassess the viability of their credible minimum deterrents, thereby exacerbating an already existing arms race in the region.

KINGSTON REIF

Scoville Fellow

Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation

Washington, DC

McCain's Nuclear Weapons Speech: Cheers, Jeers, and Questions

Sen. John McCain's speech last week certainly falls short of calling for a world free of nuclear weapons, but the good news is that his presidency shouldn't look exactly like Bush III.

The Center's Leonor Tomero released today an excellent summary of his much talked about Denver speech on nuclear security. While some find his statements largely in line with Bush's, Tomero finds a number of high points: a willingness to begin to address the threat of nuclear weapons, a commitment to internationalism and diplomacy, and a recognition of the necessity of U.S. non-proliferation leadership.

Her summary, cheers, and jeers follow.

In his speech about nuclear weapons issues delivered on May 27, 2008, Senator John McCain raised important issues for the next Administration. His remarks signaled a welcome shift from the Bush Administration's repudiation of important tools that can effectively reduce the dangers posed by nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, tools which served us well during the Cold War and which remain important for the continued viability of the non-proliferation framework.

Senator McCain's remarks signal a significant change from the Bush Administration in certain important areas, including a renewed commitment to pursuing further legally-binding and verifiable reductions in the number of U.S. and Russia nuclear weapons; opening a discussion on the ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT); strengthening efforts to secure vulnerable bomb-grade material; pursuing negotiations for a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT); and increasing funding for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Questions remain about specific policies, including whether Senator McCain will continue the successful engagement with North Korea to achieve a verifiable dismantlement of its nuclear weapons program, and whether he will be willing to negotiate directly with Iran. Another concern is his support of an ineffective and provocative missile defense which rankles the Russians and does nothing to reduce the more likely risk of a hostile country or terrorist group detonating a nuclear weapon in the United States or from a U.S. harbor.

CHEERS: POSITIVE ELEMENTS

• McCain recognized the threat and the urgent need to address the danger of nuclear weapons.

• McCain proposed "broad-minded internationalism, and determined diplomacy" to re-engage in international cooperation, a shift from the Bush Administration's aversion to multilateralism and international cooperation.

• McCain gave a clear commitment to reducing significantly the size of the U.S. nuclear weapons arsenal by negotiating further legally-binding and verifiable reductions with Russia.

• McCain acknowledged the special leadership role that the United States and Russia play.

• McCain affirmed his commitment to a moratorium on nuclear weapon testing, in place since 1992, and expressed his preference for opening a discussion on the ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

• McCain expressed support for strengthening the non-proliferation regime by increasing funding for the International Atomic Energy Agency.

• McCain endorsed increased funding for Cooperative Threat Reduction ("Nunn-Lugar") programs.

• McCain urged that the United States "should move quickly with other nations to negotiate a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty to end production of the most dangerous nuclear materials."

QUESTIONS AND UNCERTAINTIES

• McCain was vague with respect to the number of nuclear weapons that the United States should maintain.

• McCain was ambiguous about whether he would support new nuclear weapons.

• While McCain noted the danger of North Korea's nuclear weapons program and Iran's nuclear program, he does not specify how he would address these challenges.

JEERS: POSITIONS THAT COULD UNDERMINE NON-PROLIFERATION

• McCain proposed to continue to threaten the use of nuclear weapons to deter the use of chemical and biological weapons.

• McCain's support for missile defense may exacerbate a nuclear arms race while failing to provide an effective defense for the United States.

• McCain's support for a U.S.-India nuclear cooperation deal undermines nuclear non-proliferation.

• McCain support for resuming reprocessing in the United States undermines efforts to keep other countries from developing these technologies even while he affirmed his desire to limit the spread of reprocessing and uranium enrichment technology.

• McCain undercut his proposals to pursue nuclear weapons reduction negotiations with Russia by proposing to expel Russia from the G-8, the group of eight industrialized countries that meet periodically to cooperate on economic issues.

For additional resources on the increasingly likely Obama-McCain match-up for November, check out the great resources of (our sister organization) Council for a Livable World, especially a great article by Executive Director John Isaacs, Friends Committee on National Legislation, and the Council on Foreign Relations.

National Security Legislative Wrap-up

Congress returns from recess this week from the Memorial Day recess. Pending action on national security issues is possible, including House consideration of the Senate-passed Supplemental Appropriations bill to pay for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. On May 22, the Senate approved funding for the war, rejected Iraq-related provisions, and added, with a veto-proof majority, the G.I. bill and a number of domestic funding provisions. Rather than a House-Senate conference to resolve differences between the House version of the bill and the Senate version, the House will either accept, reject, or modify what the Senate passed on May 22.