Congressional Briefings on North Korean Aid to Syrian Nuclear Facility

If you've been reading the news today, you've seen that Congress has been briefed by high ranking intelligence officials on the facility in Syria that was bombed by the Israeli's in September of last year. It seems that they have clear information on the nuclear nature of this facility. For the quickest top analysis on this new development, I will direct readers to the people over at the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS). These are the people who originally found the facility using satellite data and broke the story along with the Washington Post. Below are two relevant paragraphs from their release.

Today, the United States is releasing new information which provides dramatic confirmation that the Syrian site attacked by Israel on September 6, 2007 was a nuclear reactor. The information, including images taken inside the reactor building before it was attacked, also indicates that North Korea helped to build the reactor, which resembles closely the one at the Yongbyon nuclear center in North Korea. ISIS first identified the site in a series of reports beginning October 24, 2007 and continuing on the 25th and 26th., which showed the razing of the site following Israel’s attack. Commercial satellite imagery of the site is available in these reports and subsequent ones.

The release of this information is likely to prompt a fresh wave of questions about North Korea’s commitment to verifiably dismantle its nuclear arsenal and halt its proliferation activities. This new information confirms the need to be concerned about Syrian and North Korean actions, including their nuclear cooperation which dates back many years. However, it should not be seen as a casus belli against Syria or a reason to scuttle the progress being made at the Six Party Talks in disabling and dismantling North Korea’s nuclear arsenal.

For more information on questions regarding fueling the reactor and why progress should continue with North Korea negotiations, see the document found here.

Question for Readers

During last Thursday's housing hearing on missile defense (a summary can be found here), witness Philip E. Coyle III. made the following claim:

Different missile defense systems prompt the use of different sorts of decoys or countermeasures by the offense. For example, the laser being developed for missile defense, the Airborne Laser, is to be a high power laser carried in a jumbo 747 aircraft. But if the enemy paints their missiles with an ordinary white paint, a white paint that is 90% reflective to the laser, then 90% of the laser energy bounces off. To compensate for this the Airborne Laser would need to be ten times more powerful and would need an aircraft bigger than a Boeing 747.

Missile Defense Agency (MDA) spokesman Richard Lehner rejected the charge:

Regarding the paint, not true....That the U.S. would spend more than 4 billion on a weapon system that could be defeated by a coat of paint might make a good sitcom but has no basis in fact.

Anyone care to weigh in on this? Who is correct?

Highlights of Second House Hearing on Missile Defense

Last Thursday (April 16), the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs held a hearing entitled, “What are the Prospects, What are the Costs?: Oversight of Missile Defense (Part 2)” (A summary of Part 1 can be found here). In his opening statement, committee Chairman John Tierney (D-MA) described the purpose of the hearing as an effort to “tackle head-on the questions of what are the prospects of our current missile defense efforts and at what are the costs.”

The witness list for the hearing included Dr. Lisbeth Gronlund (Senior Scientist and Co-Director of the Global Security Program at the Union of Concerned Scientists), Dr. Richard Garwin (Fellow Emeritus at IBM Corporation’s Thomas J. Watson Research Center), Jeff Kueter (President of the George C. Marshall Institute in Washington, DC), and Philip E. Coyle, III. (Assistant Secretary of Defense and Director of Operational Test and Evaluation in the Department of Defense from 1994-2001). Their testimony’s can be found here, here, here, and here, respectively.

Wide-ranging in its scope and depth, the hearing covered many issues that will be familiar to observers of the missile defense debate: the nature of the threat, how to define operational criteria for success, the issues and challenges posed by decoys and countermeasures, the performance of GMD flight intercept tests, the (in)accuracy of MDA and DoD statements about GMD effectiveness and capability, the monetary costs of missile defense, and the costs of missile defense for U.S. strategic interests and international security.

Here I want to focus primarily on the portions of the hearing that dealt with the costs of missile defense (in particular the GMD element) for U.S. strategic interests and international security. Other than Kueter, who spent most of the hearing diligently parroting MDA and DoD talking points, all of the witnesses agreed that missile defense is likely to have many dangerous consequences.

First, as Dr. Gronlund observed in her submitted testimony, “It is dangerous if military and political leaders believe the GMD system is effective.” Specifically, such a belief could make U.S. decision makers “less motivated to pursue diplomatic means to address the North Korean [and Iranian] missile program.” Coyle also emphasized the pitfalls of an overreliance on technology at the expense of diplomacy. Noting the gains made by Ambassador Christopher Hill in achieving diplomatic success with North Korea, Coyle maintained that diplomacy “is the most cost-effective missile defense system.”

Second, Dr. Gronlund was keen to point out that so long as Russia and China fear that U.S. interceptors could threaten their deterrent capability, “worst-case analyses by political and military leaders, as well as a desire to have a visible response for both domestic and international audiences, may prompt both China and Russia to build or retain larger nuclear forces than they otherwise would, and may lead Russia to retain its missiles on high alert.”

Advocates of U.S. missile defense plans claim that the system would be directed against developing states such as North Korea and Iran, and would be powerless against a massive Russian or Chinese missile attack. Yet Russia and China’s perception that a U.S. missile defense system might compromise their ability to retaliate can’t be attributed to paranoia or political posturing alone. The U.S. is planning to increase the number of GBIs and Aegis interceptors that are capable of defending against ICBMs. Before long, Russia and China could face some 200 U.S. anti-missile interceptors, and in Russia’s case, some of these missiles would be stationed in Poland, very close to Moscow’s European-based ICBM installations. Russian defense analysts are undoubtedly questioning the purpose of a system that would (1) be in a position to target Russian ICBMs but would not be able to protect a large swath of Europe from an Iranian missile attack, (2) entail interceptors that, despite MDA claims to the contrary, would be fast enough to catch Russian ICBMs launched west of the Ural Mountains toward the U.S., and (3) eventually require far more interceptors than the 10 interceptors the Bush administration is initially planning to deploy to Poland, since, according to the way in which the Bush administration defines the nature of the Iranian threat, Tehran would have the knowledge, capacity, and incentive to build more than 10 ICBMs.

Third, according to Dr. Gawin:

A state wishing to deliver nuclear weapons to injure the United States homeland would far more likely use short-range ballistic missiles or cruise missiles launched from a ship to attack U.S. coastal cities with nuclear weapons than use an ICBM for that purpose.

Currently, the U.S. has no defense against an attack delivered via such means. At the March 5 hearing, homeland security expert Stephen Flynn also emphasized the opportunity costs of spending ridiculous amounts on ballistic missile defense, noting that the U.S. is far more likely to be attacked by weapons of mass destruction (WMD) transferred via non-missile means (such as through our ports with containers containing nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons) than by ICBMs.

Commenting on the incoherence of the Bush administration’s priorities in this regard, Coyle testified that:

By spending such colossal sums on ballistic missile defense, it is as if we have defined how our adversaries will attack us. We have declared that our adversaries will use ballistic missiles first and foremost – not cruise missiles, not cargo shipments, not terrorism – even though our ballistic missile defenses are not effective against realistic ballistic missile threats. And we are choosing to ignore the international consequences of that choice, as well as the budgetary and technical consequences.

National Security Legislative Wrap-Up

Confusion reigns over the remainder of the Fiscal Year 2008 Supplemental Appropriations Bill to fund the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Last year, Congress approved a first portion of funding: $86 billion. The timing, the composition and the procedures for the new bill are all up in the air.

Some major questions about the bill:

- While the new supplemental was supposed to be about $108 billion, will Congress add another $70 billion to fund the wars into Fiscal Year 2009 in order to avoid new votes on war funding in the fall just before the election and early next year while the President is setting up the new Administration?

- Will the bill include many non-defense add-ons? As this bill is one of the few expected to be enacted into law during calendar 2008, there are hopes to attach an economic stimulus package, as well as funding for shortfalls in 2010 census funding shortfall, fighting wildfires, Head Start and creating a summer jobs program.

- Will the bill move directly to the House or Senate floors for consideration or will the Appropriations Committees take up the bill first?

- Will the bill include provisions setting a deadline for bringing U.S. troops home from Iraq, mandates for training and equipping troops, longer rest time between deployments, blocking a long-term commitment to the Iraqi government, requiring U.S. reconstruction assistance to be designated as loans to Iraq and increasing education benefits for veterans?

- Will the measure be considered as one bill or be split into two or three parts so anti-war Members of Congress can vote for provisions they like while opposing funding for the war in Iraq.

Stay tuned.

Highlights of Dem Prez Debate in Philadelphia

Wednesday night’s Democratic presidential debate in Philadelphia included a brief discussion of foreign policy issues, but was largely a rehash of previous positions.

Following an extensive spat over Obama’s “bitter” comment, Clinton’s exaggerated Bosnia experience, and comments made by Rev. Jeremiah Wright, the candidates finally got down to the key foreign policy issues of Iraq and Iran.

Regarding the latter, Obama highlighted the need to “keep nuclear weapons out of the hands of the Iranians” through direct talks and a “carrots and sticks” approach, noting that he would not take any options “off the table” in this respect. He stated that an Iranian attack on Israel would be “unacceptable” and that the U.S. “would take appropriate action.”

Clinton stated her desire to create an “umbrella of deterrence” that went beyond Israel to include other countries in the region, suggesting that the U.S. create a “security agreement vis-a-vis Iran” with these countries. She also advocated low-level diplomatic engagement with Iran, deterring other countries in the region from acquiring their own nuclear weapons, and rallying the world to impose sanctions on Iran and engage the country diplomatically to prevent this acquisition. Clinton also stated, however, that “an attack on Israel would trigger massive retaliation.”

Provided below is the full exchange between Obama and Clinton. Key points are bolded. The full transcript can be found here.

MR. STEPHANOPOULOS: Senator Obama, let's stay in the region. Iran continues to pursue a nuclear option. Those weapons, if they got them, would probably pose the greatest threat to Israel. During the Cold War, it was the United States policy to extend deterrence to our NATO allies. An attack on Great Britain would be treated as if it were an attack on the United States. Should it be U.S. policy now to treat an Iranian attack on Israel as if it were an attack on the United States?

SEN. OBAMA: Well, our first step should be to keep nuclear weapons out of the hands of the Iranians, and that has to be one of our top priorities. And I will make it one of our top priorities when I'm president of the United States.

I have said I will do whatever is required to prevent the Iranians from obtaining nuclear weapons. I believe that that includes direct talks with the Iranians where we are laying out very clearly for them, here are the issues that we find unacceptable, not only development of nuclear weapons but also funding terrorist organizations like Hamas and Hezbollah, as well as their anti-Israel rhetoric and threats towards Israel. I believe that we can offer them carrots and sticks, but we've got to directly engage and make absolutely clear to them what our posture is.

Now, my belief is that they should also know that I will take no options off the table when it comes to preventing them from using nuclear weapons or obtaining nuclear weapons, and that would include any threats directed at Israel or any of our allies in the region.

MR. STEPHANOPOULOS: So you would extend our deterrent to Israel?

SENATOR OBAMA: As I've said before, I think it is very important that Iran understands that an attack on Israel is an attack on our strongest ally in the region, one that we -- one whose security we consider paramount, and that -- that would be an act of aggression that we -- that I would -- that I would consider an attack that is unacceptable, and the United States would take appropriate action.

MR. STEPHANOPOULOS: Senator Clinton, would you?

SENATOR CLINTON: Well, in fact, George, I think that we should be looking to create an umbrella of deterrence that goes much further than just Israel. Of course I would make it clear to the Iranians that an attack on Israel would incur massive retaliation from the United States, but I would do the same with other countries in the region.

You know, we are at a very dangerous point with Iran. The Bush policy has failed. Iran has not been deterred. They continue to try to not only obtain the fissile material for nuclear weapons but they are intent upon and using their efforts to intimidate the region and to have their way when it comes to the support of terrorism in Lebanon and elsewhere.

And I think that this is an opportunity, with skillful diplomacy, for the United States to go to the region and enlist the region in a security agreement vis-a-vis Iran. It would give us three tools we don't now have.

Number one, we've got to begin diplomatic engagement with Iran, and we want the region and the world to understand how serious we are about it. And I would begin those discussions at a low level. I certainly would not meet with Ahmadinejad, because even again today he made light of 9/11 and said he's not even sure it happened and that people actually died. He's not someone who would have an opportunity to meet with me in the White House. But I would have a diplomatic process that would engage him.

And secondly, we've got to deter other countries from feeling that they have to acquire nuclear weapons. You can't go to the Saudis or the Kuwaitis or UAE and others who have a legitimate concern about Iran and say: Well, don't acquire these weapons to defend yourself unless you're also willing to say we will provide a deterrent backup and we will let the Iranians know that, yes, an attack on Israel would trigger massive retaliation, but so would an attack on those countries that are willing to go under this security umbrella and forswear their own nuclear ambitions.

And finally we cannot permit Iran to become a nuclear weapons power. And this administration has failed in our efforts to convince the rest of the world that that is a danger, not only to us and not just to Israel but to the region and beyond.

Therefore we have got to have this process that reaches out, beyond even who we would put under the security umbrella, to get the rest of the world on our side to try to impose the kind of sanctions and diplomatic efforts that might prevent this from occurring.

Zia Mian on "Think[ing] outside the Bomb"

I attended the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation's Think Outside the Bomb conference this past weekend in Washington, D.C. and had the chance to hear keynote speaker and panelist Zia Mian, Princeton physicist and director of the Project on Peace and Security in South Asia.

With Mian's not-so-subtle nudges for those in attendance to question the "bigger picture" (including the capitalist and nation-state systems themselves) and framework through which we view nuclear issues, I felt like I was thrown back into my undergraduate days with my own professors who did the same.

A few of Mian's - somewhat provocative (and all para-phrased) - comments I wanted to share:

• Third world countries emerged from colonization into a world with nuclear weapons. It's hard for them and for the current generation of young adults (and those younger) to conceive of a world where these weapons do not exist.

• The idea of the bomb is a "generational mindset" among youth today. Example: In many Pakistani books that teach children how read, the picture associated with the letter "A" is a mushroom cloud.

• The "logic of the bomb" predates the use of the bomb itself. It was set in place by WWII through the emergence of strategic bombing, the deliberate use of technology for the mass destruction of cities and killing of civilians, with the involvement of governments and corporations.

• We have a new trend of nuclear abolitionists (think Kissinger) in the United States. The hard part now may be in convincing the rest of the world that they should give up nuclear weapons just as many of them are beginning to acquire them. [In a world in which conventional warfare with the U.S. must be seen as asymmetrical warfare, given U.S. levels of military expenditures, nuclear weapons are a way for other countries to "compete."]

During the Q&A, Mian answered questions on the abolition movement:

It's a mistake to be an "anti-nuclear movement." He always thought it was silly to be a movement against a thing and ineffective to build those movements on fear. It's important for movements to present themselves first on the basis of the values they represent. He referenced the Kantian idea of peace defined by a quality of justice, not by the absence of war or violence.

If anti-nuclear peace movements focus solely on the idea of getting rid of nuclear bombs, the "logic of the bomb" still remains. These ideas need to be connected through a narrative that addresses what nuclear weapons mean to a nation beyond national security.

Whether you agree or disagree, some thoughts to ponder if you have some pondering time.

National Security Legislative Wrap-up

The mark-up or writing of the second portion of the Fiscal Year 2008 Supplemental Appropriations bill, totaling about $108 billion, is still floating in the air. The House Appropriations Committee mark-up could be this week, next week or later. The Senate Appropriations Committee has set a tentative date for mark-up of the same bill on April 23.

At this point, the bill could become a "Christmas tree" on which to hang many amendments: setting a deadline for bringing U.S. troops home from Iraq, mandates for training and equipping troops, longer rest time between deployments, blocking a long-term commitment to the Iraqi government, requiring U.S. reconstruction assistance to be considered loans to Iraq and increasing education benefits for veterans. The bill also may be separated into two bills -- one to pay for the war in Afghanistan and second to pay for the war in Iraq.

North Korea Nutshell: What Starts in Geneva Ends in Singapore

A few weeks ago, I wrote about a meeting between the U.S. and the North Korean negotiators in Geneva to discuss a resolution to the impasse over the declaration of North Korean nuclear activity. That meeting ended with no announcements on progress other than a vague announcement of “good discussions.” This past week, the two parties met again, this time in Singapore, and it seems that a resolution is finally beginning to take shape.

Experts believe that the U.S. floated the idea that the parties would use a diplomatic device similar to the joint U.S.-China “Shanghai Communiqué” used during the Nixon administration to open up the possibility for diplomatic relations with China. In this instance, the U.S. would issue a document presenting its stance on the issues of uranium enrichment development and Syrian aid by North Korea and then North Korea would in turn issue a document accepting the accusations. It is believed that this process was generally agreed to in Geneva but when it was brought back to Pyongyang, Kim Jong’Ill did not certify to his people to move forward. Since then, catastrophic famine has been reported to continue to worsen in North Korea and the North has had to request a huge increase in food aid from China. It may be for this reason as well as possibly many others that led to this approach finally being accepted in Singapore. And then again, maybe it just has something to do with the fact that both cities look very similar at night. Can you guess which one's which?


Even more importantly than the possible resolution of these other issues was the fact that North Korea agreed to provide a full accounting of its plutonium stocks, including what was used for its nuclear test. With this declaration they would also provide documentation and facilities access so that inspectors can fully verify the declaration. The plutonium program is where North Korea is deriving its source of material for making nuclear weapons. Being able to first verify, and then remove this plutonium reserve will be the key to the entire denuclearization agreement.

Amb. Chris Hill briefed the House Foreign Affairs Committee in a closed-door session after the conclusion of these most recent talks and reports state that certain members of the Committee were skeptical of the possible progress that had been achieved. Secretary Rice responded to this by stating that no full agreement had been reached and that anything provided by North Korea will have to be verifiable. This leaves the ball in North Korea’s court. If they can provide the declaration and documentation as laid out in Singapore, it is very likely that this impasse can be resolved and another round of 6-Party Talks could be convened. But even if this were to occur, it is still unlikely that the primary issue of the plutonium reserves will be resolved under this current President barring some unlikely eventuality.