Tuesday, July 31, 2007

When START Began

Sixteen years ago today, U.S. President George H.W. Bush and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev signed the first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). The Treaty barred its signatories (initially the U.S. and the USSR, but subsequently Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan) from deploying more than 6,000 “countable” nuclear warheads atop a total of 1,600 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers.

While both the U.S. and Russia are well below these limitations, START I also established an elaborate scheme of inspections, data sharing, advance missile test notifications and satellite surveillance, which later provided the foundation for monitoring compliance with the subsequently negotiated (and otherwise toothless) Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), also known as the Moscow Treaty.

The Bush administration announced in May that it plans to let START I expire when it runs out at the end of 2009 and would instead seek to replace the Treaty with a less formal agreement that contains weaker verification mechanisms. That decision hasn’t gone over very well with the intelligence community or ranking members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Sen. Joseph Biden (D-DE), Chairman of the Committee, even went so far as to say, ''I think it would be the single greatest negative legacy this administration could leave if it leaves us in a situation where there is no future architecture to follow on to START.”

Similar concerns over the expiration of START I run deep in the House. Chairman of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, Rep. Ellen Tauscher, and nearly 30 other Representatives sent a letter to President Bush last week urging him to extend START I until a new agreement is reached. Notably, Tauscher was joined by Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, Ike Skelton, and Chairman of House International Relations Committee, Tom Lantos, among others.

U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and her Russian counterpart did recently issue a brief joint statement on July 3 indicating that both sides would continue to discuss START I, but their joint statement lacked any new information and reflected persistent disagreements between the two countries on the specifics of a follow-on or extension to START I. The statement merely indicated that both sides were discussing the issue, but that differences between both sides remain.

House Appropriations Committee Cuts RRW and European Missile Defense Site

The House Appropriations Committee has zeroed out the $30 million Navy request for the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW), as you can see at item #165 from the Explanation of Project Level Adjustments (PDF page 420) of the Committee Report on the FY 2008 Defense Appropriations Bill (H.R. 3222).


And, as reported earlier today, the Committee also cut $139 million from the $310 million requested for the third missile defense site in Europe, as seen on page 382 (PDF page 488) of the Report.


Click on the images for larger versions.

Analysis of House Appropriations Committee Action on the FY08 Defense Appropriations Bill

The Center’s Chris Hellman released his Analysis of House Appropriations Committee Action on the FY 2008 Defense Appropriations Bill (H.R. 3222) today.

The House Appropriations Committee completed its markup of the Fiscal Year 2008 Defense Appropriations bill on July 25. The bill includes $459.6 billion for the Department of Defense, $3.5 billion below the Bush Administration’s request ($463.1 billion) and $39.7 billion above current levels (excluding supplementals). The full House will begin consideration of the Defense Appropriations bill the week of July 30. The Senate Appropriations Committee has not yet scheduled action on the bill.

Included below are some highlights relating to nuclear weapons and nonproliferation issues.

Conventional Trident Modification Program - Cuts entire Administration request of $174.5 million, but includes $100 million to develop a weapon that could strike distant targets quickly and precisely.

Missile Defense - Provides $8.5 billion for missile defense, $298 million below the request, including a $139 million cut from the $310 million requested for the third missile defense site in Europe.

Cooperative Threat Reduction (Nunn-Lugar) - Provides $398 million, $50 million above the request and $26 million above current funding levels.

Chemical Weapons Destruction - Provides $1.456 billion for the Army’s chemical munitions destruction program, the amount requested by the Administration.


The complete analysis can be found here.

Russian Consul General: CFE Treaty “Hopelessly Outdated”

In case you missed it, Russian consul general in San Francisco, Vladimir Vinokurov, wrote an interesting op-ed on Saturday defending his country’s decision to suspend its participation in the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty).

Referring to the CFE Treaty as “hopelessly outdated,” Vinokurov argues that while Russia has been “strictly abiding by the letter and the spirit” of the treaty for years, its Western partners, by contrast, have shown “a lack of reciprocity.”

Vinokurov then outlines his case and provides a list of conditions “necessary for restoring the viability of the CFE Treaty,” including:

…the return of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania into the Treaty context; the reduction of the ceilings and holdings of Treaty-limited equipment for NATO countries in order to compensate for the expansion of the NATO alliance; the abolition of "flank" restrictions on Russian territory; working out a common understanding of the term "substantial combat forces" that have appeared in Europe on the NATO side; the coming into force or at least provisional application of the Adapted Treaty no later than July 1, 2008.

But it is an understated yet important point that Vinokurov makes early on that leaves me skeptical of his otherwise seemingly reasonable catalogue of demands.

In mentioning what the suspension of the CFE Treaty means in practical terms, he states:

Russia also will no longer be bound by any limits on conventional armament. But the real holdings of Russian military equipment will depend on the evolution of the situation, particularly on the readiness of the other states party to the CFE Treaty to show adequate restraint from installing missile bases.

In other words, an only slightly veiled threat that Russia might expand its military if other countries (e.g. Poland and the Czech Republic) allow the installation of missile defense bases.

Monday, July 30, 2007

Join the Special Nuclear Weapons Disarmament Air Force

Always wanted to be a dove with the magical power to disarm an entire nation of their nuclear weapons in one foul swoop? You and me both.

The Nobel Foundation has put out an educational game on nuclear weapons proliferation that allows you to send eight “peace doves” to disarm each of the eight countries possessing nuclear weapons. (Presumably, the game was finalized before North Korea tested a nuclear weapon last October making it country number nine.) The catch is that each dove is assigned to a specific country and you need to correctly identify which country the dove should disarm based on information about that country’s nuclear arsenal.

Sounds like a good time, right? Well, give it a shot by clicking here.

USS Indianapolis Remembered

Sixty-two years ago today, the USS Indianapolis, which had just delivered components for the atomic bomb that would be dropped on Hiroshima, was torpedoed by a Japanese submarine.

The heavy cruiser steamed out of San Francisco Bay just after dawn on July 16, 1945 and raced unescorted towards Pearl Harbor, where it briefly stopped on July 19. The ship reached its destination of the island of Tinian on July 26, having set a record in covering some 5,000 miles in only 10 days. The bomb components were promptly unloaded, assembled to form “Little Boy,” and then loaded aboard the Enola Gay, which dropped the bomb on Hiroshima on August 6, killing an estimated 140,000 people and opening the nuclear Pandora’s Box forever.

From Tinian, the USS Indianapolis sailed to the island of Guam and from there was ordered to the Leyte Gulf in the Philippines to prepare for the invasion of Japan. A few minutes past midnight on July 30, two Japanese torpedoes tore into the ship’s side, igniting an explosion that broke the ship in two. An estimated 900 from a crew of 1,196 survived the explosion, only to float helplessly for several days. Exposure, dehydration, and shark attacks would slowly reduce the number of survivors to 317, making the sinking of the USS Indianapolis the worst naval disaster in U.S. history.

National Security Legislative Wrap-up, July 23-27 2007

This week, the House will consider the Fiscal Year 2008 Defense Appropriations bill. The focus will principally be upon the Iraq war, with several Iraq-related amendments and bills expected to be offered on the House floor. At the end of the week, Congress will recess for the month of August.


KEY NATIONAL SECURITY BILLS IN 2007

- DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS BILL:

On July 25, the House Appropriations Committee approved its Fiscal Year 2008 bill totaling $459.3 billion, $39.7 billion more than enacted last year. $141.8 billion for the Iraq and Afghanistan wars will be considered in a separate bill, probably in September. The Committee cut $139 million of $310 million requested to start building missile defense sites in Europe, while approving the remaining$171 million for the continued development of an early warning radar. In all, the Committee approved $8.5 billion for missile defense programs, $298 million below the President's request.

- IMPLEMENTING THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE 9/11 COMMISSION:

The House-Senate conference report was filed on July 25. The report repeals the limitations on the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR, or Nunn-Lugar) program, creates a nonproliferation czar in the White House and establishes a bipartisan congressional commission on nonproliferation issues.

On July 26, the Senate approved the conference report 85 - 8. On July 27, the House approved the report 371 - 40.

Friday, July 27, 2007

Interview with Leonor Tomero on U.S.-India Nuclear Deal

Today I had a chance to talk with Leonor Tomero, Director of Nuclear Non-Proliferation at the Center, about the U.S.-India Agreement for Nuclear Cooperation. India and the United States have completed negotiations on the agreement after months of haggling over fine print. Leonor provides a great explanation of the current status of the deal, and what it means for nuclear weapons nonproliferation efforts.



You can get the low-down on Congress' reaction to the U.S.-India deal from intern-extraordinaire at the Center, Max Postman, who wrote on the topic earlier today.

Rep. Markey to Bush: India Nuclear Deal Must Abide by Congress’ Conditions for Nuclear Cooperation

*The third guest post by Max Postman, intern-extraordinaire at the Center

On Wednesday, July 25, the agreement on U.S.-Indian nuclear cooperation formed last week in Washington was approved by the Indian cabinet. The controversial deal, which would allow U.S. transfers of nuclear material and technology to a country that has always remained outside the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and developed nuclear weapons, must now pass muster with the United States Congress. Congress made an exception to U.S. laws to allow cooperation with India through the Hyde Act of 2006, but congressional permission came with several caveats concerning nuclear fuel reprocessing, permanent safeguards, and termination of cooperation in the event of an Indian nuclear test.

The day after the deal’s approval by the Indian cabinet, Rep. Edward Markey (D-MA) and 22 other members of congress sent a letter to President Bush stating that congressional approval of the deal would be “put in doubt” if the agreement does not comply with the conditions for congressional approval laid out in the Hyde Act.

Though the text of the deal has not yet been made public, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns insisted that the agreement reached is “well within the bounds of the Hyde act.” However, press reports that the deal makes no mention of nuclear testing and allows Indian reprocessing suggest that the deal reached may be contrary to the spirit, and possibly the letter, of the non-proliferation provisions of the legislation.

If Members of Congress who have warned of the dangers of the deal, such as Rep. Ed Markey, oppose the implementation agreement provisions, they will have to muster majority support in both houses to block the deal. After the text of the agreement is released publicly, it will be possible to consider the question of Hyde Act compliance in more detail. And consider we shall!

See the full text of Markey’s letter below:

July 25, 2007

The Honorable George W. Bush
President
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

As you continue negotiations with India over nuclear cooperation, we write to underscore the necessity of abiding by the legal boundaries set by Congress for any such cooperation.

As you know, an Agreement for Nuclear Cooperation between the United States and India must be fully consistent with the letter and the spirit of the Henry Hyde U.S.-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006, and the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954 as amended. The Hyde Act and the AEA set the minimal conditions for nuclear trade with India.

We understand from press reports that there are differences between U.S. and Indian negotiators on several key issues which were addressed by the Hyde Act; the negotiations are therefore defined in large part by the necessity to comply with U.S. law. Among the minimal conditions under U.S. law are:

  • No nuclear testing. Current law states that nuclear cooperation shall be terminated, and the U.S. would have the right to demand the return of all material, equipment, and technology, if India again tests a nuclear explosive.
  • Permanent, unconditional safeguards. Current law states that the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards applied to declared Indian materials and facilities must be “in perpetuity in accordance with IAEA standards, principles, and practices.”
  • No fuel assurances if agreement is violated. Current law states that the United States should seek to prevent nuclear transfers to any country with which the U.S. has suspended nuclear cooperation. This would be triggered if India violates the Agreement for Nuclear Cooperation and the United States terminates cooperation, for instance if India tests a nuclear explosive.
  • Reprocessing and Enrichment Prohibitions. Current law prohibits the transfer of sensitive nuclear technology to India, including uranium enrichment, plutonium separation, and heavy water production-related equipment and technology except under certain narrow circumstances. Congress also preserved the requirement for U.S. prior consent for the reprocessing or enrichment of U.S. origin nuclear material. As you correctly stated on February 11, 2004: “Enrichment and reprocessing are not necessary for nations seeking to harness nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.”
  • Cooperation shall not assist weapons program. Current law states that no U.S. cooperation shall directly or indirectly assist India’s nuclear weapons program.

Article I. Section 8 of the United States Constitution provides the Congress with the sole authority to regulate foreign commerce. Through the AEA, the Congress has delegated the authority to negotiate international agreements concerning nuclear trade to the Executive, subject to certain restrictions. The Agreement for Nuclear Cooperation is subject to the approval of Congress, and any inconsistencies between the Agreement and the relevant US laws will call congressional approval deeply into doubt.

In addition, our concern over India’s ties to Iran have grown more acute with the formation this spring of a Joint Defense Working Group between the two countries. India’s deepening military-to-military relationship with Iran, even as Iran has continued to develop nuclear technology in defiance of repeated United Nations Security Council sanctions resolutions, places congressional approval of the Agreement for Nuclear Cooperation in jeopardy.

Sincerely,

Edward J. Markey
Howard Berman
Brad Sherman
Ellen Tauscher
Dan Burton
Henry Waxman
Jane Harman
Jeff Fortenberry
Adam Schiff
Rick Larsen
James Langevin
Mark Udall
Barbara Lee
Michael Capuano
James McGovern
Rush Holt
Doris Matsui
Raul Grijalva
Peter Defazio
Chaka Fattah
Rosa DeLauro
Lynn Woolsey
Sam Farr

Thursday, July 26, 2007

Summary of Nonproliferation Provisions in the 9/11 Commission Bill

Below is an excellent summary put out today by David Culp of FCNL.

The House-Senate conference report, House Report 110-259, on H.R. 1, “Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act,” was filed yesterday. The House and, possibly, the Senate are expected to take up the bill tomorrow (July 27). [UPDATE: The Senate adopted the bill 85-8 late on July 26.]

Title 18 of bill contains a number of nonproliferation provisions. It:

  • Repeals the limitations on the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR, or Nunn-Lugar) program and extends the program beyond the former Soviet Union.
  • Authorizes the Proliferation Security Initiative.
  • Authorizes such funds as necessary for the CTR program and the Energy Department’s nonproliferation programs for FY08, subject to the ceilings in the FY08 defense authorization bill. As written, this authorization does not provide any new funds.
  • Creates a nonproliferation czar in the White House with the title Coordinator for the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Terrorism.
  • Establishes the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism, a six-month, bipartisan congressional commission that will report to Congress on nonproliferation issues.

John Isaacs: "Democrats Controlling Congress: A Six-Month Assessment"

The Center's Executive Director, John Isaacs, wrote an article published today in Right Web, in which he provides a comprehensive look at how the Democrats have fared on national security issues six months after taking the helm in Congress.

While the article breaks down progress (or lack thereof) on a slew of national security issues, ranging from Iraq and Iran to National Missile Defense, Isaacs argues that Democrats have had the most success on the nuclear weapons front:

While working for a quick end to the Iraq War has consumed a great deal of Democrats' time, the greatest early national security successes came on nuclear weapons issues, particularly in the House.

Isaacs provides a detailed look at where we stand today on a range of nuclear weapons projects. Below is an abbreviated laundry list of programs he covers:

NEW NUCLEAR WEAPONS (RELIABLE REPLACEMENT WARHEAD): Funding Successfully Cut, Zeroed Out in House
In making its case, the administration ran into a formidable buzz saw: Energy and Water Subcommittee Chairman Rep. Pete Visclosky (D-IN) and former chair of the same subcommittee Rep. David Hobson (R-OH). In previous years, the duo had helped to kill the Reliable Replacement Warhead's predecessor, the nuclear "bunker buster" (the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator).

In hearings this year, the two representatives were scathing in their criticism of the Department of Energy's handling of nuclear programs.

The "scathing" criticism Isaacs refers to has led to major cuts in Congress for the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) program, including the House Appropriations Committee having zeroed out funding for RRW. You can get my take on Senate and House funding for the Reliable Replacement Warhead program here.

PLUTONIUM PITS, NONPROLIFERATION: Success in Senate, Bigger Success in House
The House took a number of other positive steps on nuclear weapons issues. It cut all $24.9 million for a new plant to build plutonium pits and added almost $900 million for nuclear nonproliferation programs, bringing the total to $2 billion...

[snip]

While the Senate Appropriations Committee also eliminated the plutonium pit production money and added $200 million for nonproliferation programs, it cut the funding request for the plutonium reprocessing program from $405 million to $243 million.

COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY: Positive Progress, but Still Up in the Air
There has also been a tussle over the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), an agreement signed by President Bill Clinton and rejected by the Senate in 1999. In a bid to rebuild support for the treaty and prepare for its eventual reconsideration, the Senate Armed Services Committee adopted a non-binding provision in its bill that said simply: "The Senate should ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty."

[snip]

Senator Kyl made it clear that he was less than pleased by the provision. In his July 10 speech, he strongly objected to the CTBT provision: " Tucked away near the end of this bill, very much in the fine print, is an unprecedented attempt to preordain the ratification of a treaty—a treaty already overwhelmingly rejected by this body—the CTBT. ... This sense of the Senate should be called just what it is—a sham."

NUCLEAR STRATEGY DEBATE: Democrats Succeed in Starting the Debate
There is one provision in several of the bills that is likely to survive: a requirement that the United States conduct a new assessment of its nuclear weapons policy to reflect changed circumstances in the post-Cold War, post-9/11 world.

IRAN AND MISSILE DEFENSE: Mixed Results
News on Iran and missile defense has been mixed. There are many who fear that Bush, while at a complete loss on coping with the Iraq quagmire, will launch an attack on Iran before he leaves office. In part to respond to U.S. concerns about Iran, a U.S. proposal to build a third National Missile Defense site in Poland and the Czech Republic to guard against an Iranian attack has kicked up a furor in Europe. The House cut $160 million from the administration's $310 million request for the third site while the Senate Armed Services Committee cut $85 million. In both cases, Congress recommended a go-slow approach to the third site.

[snip]

Sen. Jeff Sessions (R-AL), while declining to reinsert the money, successfully offered a sense of the Senate amendment stating that U.S. policy should be "to develop and deploy, as soon as technologically possible, in conjunction with its allies and other nations whenever possible, an effective defense against the threat from Iran." After the amendment was softened from an earlier draft presented to the Senate, it was approved overwhelmingly, 90-5. Senators apparently did not want to appear "soft" on the Iranian threat.

Desperate for New Nuclear Weapons, Bush Administration Issues New Policy Paper

The Bush Administration, seeking to salvage its beleaguered program to build a new generation of nuclear weapons, released a three-page policy paper this week that reads more like a propaganda piece than serious reasoning.

Delivered to Congress by the Secretaries of Energy, Defense, and State, the paper, National Security and Nuclear Weapons: Maintaining Deterrence in the 21st Century, reiterates that the United States plans to maintain its nuclear weapons stockpile well into the future and describes the proposed new nuclear warhead, the so-called Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW), as the best means for ensuring the future nuclear deterrent.

Leonor Tomero, Director for Nuclear Non-Proliferation at the Center, commented: “As Congress has refused to proceed willy-nilly with any grand plan to build new nuclear weapons, the Administration is left grasping at straws to conjure up a compelling justification. I don’t see how the Administration can ignore new scientific conclusions about the reliability of plutonium triggers in existing weapons, making new warheads unnecessary, not to mention the repercussions for U.S. nonproliferation efforts.”

In December 2006, the Department of Energy announced that the lifetime of most current nuclear warheads is at least 100 years, roughly double the Department’s original estimate of 45 years.

Carah Ong, Iran Policy Analyst at the Center, noted: “It is difficult to tell countries like Iran and North Korea to forsake nuclear weapons while issuing three pages of rhetoric on why the United States needs new ones.”

The House and Senate Armed Services Committees inserted a provision in the fiscal year 2008 Defense Authorization bill requiring the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of Energy to conduct a review of the nuclear posture of the United States for the next five to ten years.

The report for the Defense Authorization bill also notes many critics and skeptics of new nuclear weapons, including former Senator Sam Nunn, who said that building them would be “misunderstood by our allies, exploited by our adversaries, complicate our work to prevent the spread and use of nuclear weapons…and make resolution of the Iran and North Korea challenges all the more difficult.”

Personally, I would add: “Working to reduce the U.S. nuclear arsenal while maintaining a credible deterrent requires serious analysis and an open-minded approach, not a three-page reiteration of your ideological agenda.”

In past years, Congress squashed the Administration’s attempts to develop first “mini-nukes” and then the nuclear bunker buster.

My apologies to those that read the Center’s press release beforehand.

Leonor Tomero: Missed Opportunities in Nuclear Material Security

Leonor Tomero, Director for Nuclear Non-Proliferation at the Center, recently penned an interesting post in which she argues that “Several recent reports underscore the need to account for and secure nuclear material as our best chance to reduce the risk of theft or diversion of fissile material, and the resulting risk of nuclear terrorism.”

In particular, Tomero’s post delves deep into several recent Government Accounting Office (GAO) reports and argues that they "reflect a questionable approach of focusing resources and energy on technologies that are not yet ripe deployed at locations that are not truly choke-points against the threat of nuclear or radiological terrorism."

(You might remember these GAO reports from a recent post of mine that discusses how there are multiple indications that the threat and likelihood of an attack by al Qaeda, possibly nuclear or radiological, is growing.)

You can read the post here.

Wednesday, July 25, 2007

Tauscher and Nearly 30 Other Reps. Urge Bush to Extend START

Hats off to Rep. Ellen Tauscher, Chairman of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, who announced yesterday that she and nearly 30 other Representatives were sending a letter to President Bush urging him to extend the first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) until a new agreement is reached.

The impressive group of Reps. included chairmen from three key committees, including Chairman Ike Skelton of the House Armed Services Committee, Chairman John Conyers of the House Judiciary Committee, and Chairman Tom Lantos of House International Relations Committee.

As previous reported, the Bush administration announced in May that it plans to let START I expire when it runs out at the end of 2009. The Treaty barred its signatories from deploying more than 6,000 “countable” nuclear warheads atop a total of 1,600 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers.

While both the U.S. and Russia are well below these limitations, START I also established an elaborate scheme of inspections, data sharing, advance missile test notifications and satellite surveillance, which later provided the foundation for monitoring compliance with the toothless Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), also known as the Moscow Treaty.

SORT requires the U.S. and Russia to reduce the number of operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads (on ICBMs, SLBMs, heavy bombers, or otherwise) to 1,700-2,200 by the end of 2012. But because SORT doesn’t require the destruction of the warheads, they could instead be removed from service and stored in reserve stockpiles where the warheads could quickly redeployed at a later time.

Consequently, one problematic result of the Bush administration’s decision to not extend START I is that both the U.S. and Russia will lose one of the most reliable ways of making sure that both countries are meeting the required reductions under SORT. As I mentioned earlier, this decision has upset not only the U.S. intelligence community, but also Sens. Biden and Lugar, the leading senators on the Foreign Relations Committee.

Below is the full text of the letter Tauscher et. al sent to the President.

July 24, 2007

The Honorable George W. Bush
President of the United States of America
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, DC


Dear Mr. President:

We write to urge you to work with the Russian Federation to extend the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) after it expires in December 2009.

We were pleased that, in a joint statement issued July 3, 2007, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov reiterated the intention of the United States and Russia "to carry out strategic offensive reductions to the lowest possible level consistent with their national security requirements and alliance commitments." We are also pleased that both acknowledged the need for "a post-START arrangement to provide continuity and predictability regarding strategic offensive forces."

We are concerned however that both governments have not agreed to extend START in its current form and have just begun working on a post-START agreement. Without a legally binding follow-on agreement that includes a commitment to verifiable reductions in both countries' nuclear arsenals below the levels contained in SORT (Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions), the United States and Russia risk creating greater strategic uncertainty and further eroding the international nonproliferation regime. The continuing risk that nuclear weapons could fall into the hands of terrorists coupled with the possibility that additional nations will consider developing nuclear weapons should compel the United States and Russia do everything within their power to reduce the global nuclear danger.

The START treaty, signed on July 31, 1991, imposed new limits on long range nuclear forces, and both Russia and the United States achieved those reductions by the required date of December 5, 2001. Under START, both countries reduced their deployed strategic nuclear forces from approximately 10,000 warheads each to no more than 6,000 apiece. The accord also limits each side to 1,600 delivery vehicles-ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and heavy bombers.

Yet the arms limits imposed by START are not the treaty's only enduring legacy. START also included a comprehensive verification regime, including formal data exchanges, notifications, and on-site inspections. The transparency required by the START verification regime has bred confidence in both Russia and the U.S. enabling cooperation on a range of nuclear arms issues. Moreover, verification directly supports U.S. national security interests by giving insight into Russia's arsenal of nuclear weapons. While changes to these verification measures may be appropriate, their core elements must be extended.

As your nominee for Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General James Cartwright, said in an interview last summer, "The attributes that you would seek [in a START extension] are transparency, the ability to generate warning time, and confidence in what the intentions are of a counterpart." General Cartwright also noted that if the verification measures could not be modified, they should remain in force, rather than be allowed to expire. We agree.

The START treaty requires the United States and Russia to begin discussions regarding the future of the treaty no later than one year prior to December 2009. Given this requirement, we are interested in better understanding the administration’s approach and request that you keep us fully informed regarding your plans and objectives. We also ask that the intelligence community provide the Congress with an assessment of our ability to monitor Russian nuclear forces in the absence of START.

We ask that you carefully consider extending START in its current form in order to enable your and President Putin's successors to negotiate a new legally binding agreement that achieves greater, verifiable reductions in each nation's nuclear forces.

Finally, we ask that you consult with Congress on your approach and on the framework that you develop.

Reducing the global nuclear danger is a legacy we all would like to achieve for the sake of our children and future generations. We stand ready to work with you to achieve this goal.

Co-Signers

The following Members of Congress signed the letter authored by Rep. Ellen Tauscher:
Chairman Ike Skelton, Chairman John Conyers, Chairman Tom Lantos, Reps. John Spratt, Adam Smith, Yvette Clarke, Tom Allen, Barbara Lee, James McGovern, Dianne Watson, Ed Markey, Jesse Jackson, Sam Farr, Doris Matsui, Darlene Hooley, Tammy Baldwin, Betty McCollum, David Loebsack, Howard Berman, Raul Grijalva, Henry Waxman, Zoe Lofgren, Mike Honda, Maurice Hinchey, Joe Crowley, Lynn Woolsey, Rob Andrews, Ralph Hall, and David Wu.

Tuesday, July 24, 2007

Nuclear Weapons a Non-Issue at Democratic Presidential Debate

Not a big night for nuclear weapons or nonproliferation issues at last night’s CNN/YouTube Democratic presidential debate. Actually, it wasn’t much of a night for international issues generally, with Darfur, the Iraq war, possibly meeting the leaders of unfriendly countries, and global warming being the only non-domestic questions asked (save a discussion on Mike Gravel’s comments on the Vietnam War).

Below is the question regarding possibly meeting with leaders of countries unfriendly to the U.S. and the responses given by Obama, Clinton, and Edwards – the only three candidates asked to respond. Long story short, Obama would meet the leaders of unfriendly countries; Clinton might meet with them after a vigorous diplomatic effort; and Edwards would meet with them after a similar diplomatic effort.

QUESTION: In 1982, Anwar Sadat traveled to Israel, a trip that resulted in a peace agreement that has lasted ever since.

In the spirit of that type of bold leadership, would you be willing to meet separately, without precondition, during the first year of your administration, in Washington or anywhere else, with the leaders of Iran, Syria, Venezuela, Cuba and North Korea, in order to bridge the gap that divides our countries?

OBAMA: I would. And the reason is this, that the notion that somehow not talking to countries is punishment to them -- which has been the guiding diplomatic principle of this administration -- is ridiculous.

Now, Ronald Reagan and Democratic presidents like JFK constantly spoke to Soviet Union at a time when Ronald Reagan called them an evil empire. And the reason is because they understood that we may not trust them and they may pose an extraordinary danger to this country, but we had the obligation to find areas where we can potentially move forward.

And I think that it is a disgrace that we have not spoken to them. We've been talking about Iraq -- one of the first things that I would do in terms of moving a diplomatic effort in the region forward is to send a signal that we need to talk to Iran and Syria because they're going to have responsibilities if Iraq collapses.

They have been acting irresponsibly up until this point. But if we tell them that we are not going to be a permanent occupying force, we are in a position to say that they are going to have to carry some weight, in terms of stabilizing the region.

CLINTON: Well, I will not promise to meet with the leaders of these countries during my first year. I will promise a very vigorous diplomatic effort because I think it is not that you promise a meeting at that high a level before you know what the intentions are.

I don't want to be used for propaganda purposes. I don't want to make a situation even worse. But I certainly agree that we need to get back to diplomacy, which has been turned into a bad word by this administration.

And I will purse very vigorous diplomacy.

And I will use a lot of high-level presidential envoys to test the waters, to feel the way. But certainly, we're not going to just have our president meet with Fidel Castro and Hugo Chavez and, you know, the president of North Korea, Iran and Syria until we know better what the way forward would be.

COOPER: Senator Edwards, would you meet with Hugo Chavez, Fidel Castro, Kim Jong Il?

EDWARDS: Yes, and I think actually Senator Clinton's right though. Before that meeting takes place, we need to do the work, the diplomacy, to make sure that that meeting's not going to be used for propaganda purposes, will not be used to just beat down the United States of America in the world community.

But I think this is just a piece of a bigger question, which is, what do we actually do? What should the president of the United States do to restore America's moral leadership in the world. It's not enough just to lead with bad leaders. In addition to that, the world needs to hear from the president of the United States about who we are, what it is we represent. … That, in fact, we believe in equality, we believe in diversity, that they are at the heart and soul of what the United States of America is.

The candidates did, however, also briefly discuss nuclear energy, which is relevant to the discussion on reprocessing, an issue that has serious nonproliferation concerns. Below are excerpted responses by Edwards, Obama, and Clinton – again, the only three candidates asked to respond. (Full responses are available here.) Long story short, Edwards expressed concern over nuclear energy; Obama cautiously embraced it; and Clinton was noncommittal.

EDWARDS: I do not favor nuclear power. We haven't built a nuclear power plant in decades in this country. There is a reason for that. The reason is it is extremely costly. It takes an enormous amount of time to get one planned, developed and built. And we still don't have a safe way to dispose of the nuclear waste. It is a huge problem for America over the long term.

OBAMA: I actually think that we should explore nuclear power as part of the energy mix. There are no silver bullets to this issue. We have to develop solar. I have proposed drastically increasing fuel efficiency standards on cars, an aggressive cap on the amount of greenhouse gases that can be emitted.

CLINTON: I'm agnostic about nuclear power. John is right, that until we figure out what we're going to do with the waste and the cost, it's very hard to see nuclear as a part of our future. But that's where American technology comes in. Let's figure out what we're going to do about the waste and the cost if we think nuclear should be a part of the solution.

But perhaps the best moment of the evening came when each candidate was asked to look at the candidate to his or her left and tell the audience one thing he or she likes and dislikes about that particular candidate. Dennis Kucinich, the last in the row of candidates, responded, “You notice what CNN did. They didn't put anybody to the left of me. Think about it.”

House Armed Services Subcommittee Debates Role of Nuclear Weapons in World

Lawmakers on the Energy and Water Development Committees in both the House and Senate have demanded a debate on the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security, citing a lack of long-term strategy or even discussion on the topic. They demonstrated their dissatisfaction with the status quo by axing all funding for the Reliable Replacement Warhead program in the House, and cutting some funding for the program in the Senate.

Last week, Rep. Ellen Tauscher (D-CA) delivered. As Chairwoman of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Tauscher called in experts to debate, as she phrased it,

… the United States' nuclear weapons policy and discuss our options regarding the future size and composition of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. Led by this subcommittee, the House Armed Services Committee has called for a vigorous and open debate on the future direction of the United States' strategic posture and a fresh examination of our nuclear weapons policy in particular.
Here was the round-one lineup:

* Dr. William Perry, Secretary of Defense under Bill Clinton
* Dr. Sidney Drell, professor and deputy director emeritus at the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center
* Dr. Keith Payne, a principal architect of the most recent Nuclear Posture Review and current professor at Missouri State University

For the sake of brevity I am only providing brief excerpts from Perry and Payne - the entire audio transcript can be listened to here if you want more.

DR. WILLIAM PERRY – NOT DOWN WITH THE RRW

The United States should not pursue the development of a new generation of nuclear weapons through the Reliable Replacement Warhead program.
One specific question faced by this committee is whether to authorize the Reliable Replacement Warhead program. There are two valid arguments for proceeding with that program: first, that it will maintain the capability of our nuclear weapon designers, and it allows the design of a warhead that cannot be detonated by a terror group, even if they were able to get one.

Our countervailing argument is that if the United States proceeds to develop new nuclear warheads, it will undermine our ability to lead the international community in the fight against proliferation. My best subjective judgment at this time is that the proliferation argument outweighs the other two.

DR. KEITH PAYNE - WANTS RRW RESEARCH FUNDING

In a world with myriad unpredictable threats to the United States, nuclear weapons should not be taken off the table.
The painful truth is that now no one truly knows what constitutes a stabilizing force structure or whether or how deterrence will work across the wide spectrum of contemporary opponents, states and circumstances we may confront.
Deterrence is essential, and nuclear weapons still play an important deterrence role.
It's important to understand what types of U.S. deterrent threat would be best suited to deterring a particular opponent in a particular circumstance for a particular purpose. In some cases non- military approaches to deterrence will be best. In others non-nuclear force options are likely to be adequate and advantageous. And in still other cases, nuclear threat options may be necessary to deter.
Research should continue for RRW, but not manufacturing. Also, there is no urgency to build new weapons.
The RRW needs to proceed carefully with research on design modifications before moving ahead to consider development and manufacture of new warheads. In other words, it has to stay at the moment in Phase 2A.

We must recognize that implementing design changes is not time urgent. The legacy stockpile is strong. The pace of the work should not consume human and budgetary resources to the extent of savaging the important and highly successful stockpile stewardship and life extension programs that are going on now. It will take more money, if you want to consider doing that.

Monday, July 23, 2007

Sen. Dorgan on Funding for Complex 2030 and RRW

Below is a constituent response letter from Sen. Byron Dorgan, chairman of the key Energy and Water Development Appropriations Subcommittee, regarding funding for Complex 2030 and the Reliable Replacement Warhead program.

In the letter, Dorgan expresses skepticism that RRW will receive funding next year when a decision is expected to be made about whether to authorize activities beyond the 2A research phase. This contrasts sharply with recent statements made by Thomas D'Agostino, deputy administrator for Defense Programs within the National Nuclear Security Administration.

According to Defense Daily (subscription required), D'Agostino said last week that (despite recent cuts in the Senate and being zeroed out in the House) he is still confident that RRW will receive funding from Congress in FY '08 once key lawmakers who have been critical of the project have a better understanding of its importance via classified briefings that he is hosting.

Optimistic or just plain naïve?


July 3, 2007

Dear [Constituent],

Thank you for contacting me about the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) program as well as Complex 2030. We have just completed writing the Appropriation Subcommittee bill that contains these issues, and as chairman of the committee, I have zeroed out funding for Complex 2030. I do not support funding for that proposal.

In addition, I decreased by 20 percent the President's request for the RRW program. My intent is to allow them to continue research through what is called, "Phase 2A," following which there must be an authorization of that program. I believe that next year there will be no funding for that program unless it is authorized, and frankly I have grave doubts about whether it should be authorized. I believe it causes very serious questions about our commitment to nonproliferation if we are in the business of building new nuclear weapons through the RRW program.

This country needs to have a national discussion, and to make a decision, about what will be the role of nuclear weapons in our future. How many nuclear weapons do we need? How much of a reduction of nuclear weapons can be made? What kind of nuclear weapons should exist, and how will we meet our commitment under the nuclear nonproliferation treaty to reach zero nuclear weapons at some point in the future?

The United States is the nuclear superpower that has a responsibility to provide leadership in nonproliferation issues. We must stop the spread of nuclear weapons and prevent terrorists form acquiring them. That is why this debate about the RRW program is so critical. We need to take seriously our responsibility to keep nuclear weapons out of the hands of terrorists. We also need to be sending the message to the world that we are serious about reducing the number of nuclear weapons. Thank you for sending me your thoughts. I hope this information is helpful.

Sincerely,

Byron L. Dorgan
U.S. Senator

Updated List of Key Senate Amendments to FY08 Defense Authorization Bill

After the Senate voted 52 - 47 for cloture last Wednesday on the Levin - Reed amendment on Iraq (with 60 votes required to close debate), Majority Leader Harry Reid pulled the Defense Authorization bill from the Senate floor. The bill may not be reconsidered until September after General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker submit their report on the situation in Iraq.

Highlighted below are the numerous amendments related to nuclear weapons and nonproliferation issues. New information is bolded.

AMENDMENTS FILED

Missile defense

Sens. Vitter (R-LA) & Kyl (R-AZ) filed amendment No. 2010 to authorize an additional $87 million for Aegis missile defense for destroyers. Sens. Kyl (R-AZ), Vitter, Inhofe, Lieberman, and Lott filed amendment No. 2178 for the same purpose.

National Guard equipment from missile defense funds

Sen. Dodd (D-CT) filed amendment No. 2033 to provide $500 million for the Army National Guard to repair and replace war-battered equipment to address critical shortfalls identified by the National Guard Bureau, with the funds to be cut from the European Missile Defense system ($225 million) and Airborne Laser ($275 million).

Retirement of B-52 bombers

Sens. Conrad (D-ND), Dorgan, Landrieu and Vitter filed amendments No. 2053 & 2172 to require maintaining 63 B-52 bombers with 11 in reserve.

Chemical weapons destruction

Sens. McConnell (R-KY), Salazar, Allard and Bunning filed amendment No. 2061 to increase funding for chemical weapons demilitarization at Blue Grass Army Depot, Kentucky, and Pueblo Chemical Activity, Colorado, by $49 million.

Nuclear terrorism

Sens. Clinton (D-NY) & Whitehouse (D-RI) filed amendments No. 2109 and No. 2222, a version of her bill S. 1705, the Nuclear Terrorism Prevention Act, to establish the position of “Senior Advisor to the President for the Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism” and urging the President to make the prevention of a nuclear terrorist attack on the United States of the highest priority and to accelerate programs, requesting additional funding as appropriate, to prevent nuclear terrorism.

Cost of replacing nuclear warheads

Sen. Bingaman (D-NM) filed amendment No. 2118 which would add to the nuclear posture review included in the Defense Authorization bill requirements that any plan for replacing or modifying the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile include an assessment of the estimated cost and anticipated schedule for replacing warheads.

Nuclear workers

Sen. Reid (D-NV) filed amendment No. 2170 to include nuclear program workers in the occupational illness compensation program.

Protecting space assets

Sen. Kyl (R-AZ) filed amendment No. 2223 saying that it is the policy of the United States to protect its military and civilian satellites and to research all potential means of doing so.

Space test bed

Sen. Kyl (R-AZ) filed amendment No. 2225 to restore the Administration’s $10 million request for the Ballistic Missile Defense Space Test bed that the Senate Armed Services Committee had cut.

Minuteman III missiles

Sens. Baucus (D-MT) and Tester (D-MT) filed amendment No. 2325 to bar more than 40 Minuteman III missiles from being removed from the Malmstrom Air Force Base in Montana until the Pentagon identifies additional missions for the base. The Air Force had planned to retire 50 of the 80 missiles.

AMENDMENTS ALREADY CONSIDERED

Protection against Iranian ballistic missiles

Sessions (R-AL) modified amendment No. 2024 stating that it should be the policy of the United States to develop and deploy, as soon as technologically possible, an effective defense against “the threat from Iran” was adopted 90 – 5 (July 12). [Note: See my previous post about the Sessions amendment for more information.]

National Security Legislative Wrap-up, July 16-20 2007

After the Senate voted 52 - 47 for cloture on the Levin - Reed amendment (with 60 votes required to close debate), Majority Leader Harry Reid removed the Fiscal Year 2008 Defense Authorization bill from the Senate floor. The bill may not be reconsidered until September. The House Appropriations Committee is scheduled to take up the Fiscal Year 2008 Defense Appropriations bill on Wednesday, with the full House to consider the bill next week. In the meantime, there could be additional Iraq votes in the House this week and next.


KEY NATIONAL SECURITY BILLS IN 2007

- DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BILL:

After the Senate voted 52 – 47 for cloture on the Levin (D-MI) - Reed (D-RI) amendment (with 60 votes required to close debate), Majority Leader Harry Reid pulled the Defense Authorization Bill from the Senate floor. The bill may not be reconsidered until September after the report of General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker. In reality, the cloture vote was 53 - 46; Majority Leader Harry Reid changed his vote at the last minute so that he could move to reconsider the motion. Thus, the pending motion when the bill is brought up again will be the Reid motion to reconsider the cloture vote on Levin-Reed.

- DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS BILL:

In full committee mark-up scheduled for July 25, amendments are possible to mandate withdrawing troops from Iraq, close the Guanatanmo Bay detention center and bar permanent bases in Iraq. The bill is then scheduled to be considered by the full House the week of July 30, the last week before the summer recess.

- ENERGY AND WATER APPROPRIATIONS BILL:

On June 20, the House completed action on all but the earmarks portion of the bill. While doing so, it rejected 121 - 312 a Udall (D-NM) amendment to transfer $192 million to the Los Alamos National Laboratory for nuclear weapons work. After considering the earmarks portion of the bill on July 17, the House approved the bill by a vote of 312 - 112.

Thursday, July 19, 2007

Connect the Dots: Likelihood of Nuclear or Radiological Attack by al Qaeda Growing

The National Intelligence Estimate, secret and not-so-secret reports, and even Michael Chertoff’s gut all point in the same direction: the threat and likelihood of an attack by al Qaeda, possibly nuclear or radiological, is growing.

Dot one: Prepared earlier this year but disclosed only last week, a classified National Counterterrorism Center report entitled “Al-Qaida Better Positioned to Strike the West” indicates that al Qaeda is gaining strength, despite nearly six years of the so-called War on Terror. Flying in the face of President Bush’s insistence that al Qaeda has been considerably weakened, the report says that the group is as strong as it was in 2001.

Dot two: A declassified summary of the authoritative National Intelligence Estimate released on Tuesday states that “al-Qa’ida’s Homeland plotting is likely to continue to focus on prominent political, economic, and infrastructure targets with the goal of producing mass casualties, visually dramatic destruction, significant economic aftershocks, and/or fear among the US population.”

Significantly, the report, which represents the consensus of the intelligence community, also states that “al-Qa’ida will continue to try to acquire and employ chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear material in attacks and would not hesitate to use them if it develops what it deems is sufficient capability.”

Dot three: Government Accountability Office (GAO) investigators recently found that “security measures put in place since the 2001 terrorist attacks to prevent radioactive materials from getting into the wrong hands are insufficient.” (Yes, these are the same investigators that were able to smuggle enough radioactive material into the U.S. to make two dirty bombs using fake documents just last year).

Having set up a bogus company armed only with a postal box, the GAO investigators were able to obtain a license from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission that would have allowed them to buy the radioactive materials needed for a dirty bomb. The bomb would not have caused widespread damage or major contamination, but could have had serious economic consequences and caused mass hysteria and fear.

Dot four: A recently disclosed secret report prepared for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) warns that al Qaeda is planning a terror "spectacular" this summer. An unnamed senior official with access to the report was quoted as saying, "This is reminiscent of the warnings and intelligence we were getting in the summer of 2001."

DHS Secretary, Michael Chertoff, responded that the U.S. did not "have any specific credible evidence that there's an attack focused on the United States at this point." Yet not long after he made that comment, Chertoff (with a little help from his gut) said that he believes "we are entering a period this summer of increased risk" and that “summertime seems to be appealing to [al Qaeda].” This after a news report that “new intelligence suggests a small al Qaeda cell is on its way to the United States, or may already be here.”

I don’t need to connect the dots for you; their connection is visible from miles away. But it is my greatest fear that the fifth dot may be the one that goes boom.

Wednesday, July 18, 2007

Lt. Gen. Robert Gard: National Missile Defense in Europe Premature and Unwise

The Center’s Lt. General Robert Gard (USA, ret.) put out an insightful report on missile defense this week. Titled National Missile Defense In Europe: Premature and Unwise, the full report is available here.

I had a chance to talk with General Gard about his report, which you can watch here or on the Council for a Livable World’s V-blog.



Gard’s report starts out with an overview of the administration’s proposal:

p.1 - The plan for the new European complex is to transfer a narrow-beam X-band midcourse tracking radar from the Pacific Test Range to the Czech Republic and to deploy up to 10 silo-based long-range inceptor missiles in Poland. The program also calls for forward-basing an acquisition radar—designed to provide detection, initial tracking, and cueing information—to a location not designated.

The national missile defense system, now called the Ground-Based Midcourse Missile Defense System (GMD), is being developed to protect the United States against a limited attack from warheads launched on long-range ballistic missiles by so-called rogue states. The intent is to destroy incoming weapons during their flight in space, called the “midcourse” phase of their trajectory.

Gard then identifies multiple problems with the system that demonstrates the Bush proposal to indeed be “premature and unwise”, as suggested by the report’s title. Below are some highlights of the report, with the full text available here.
p.1 - GMD is still in its developmental phase, by no means ready for deployment. It has not demonstrated the capability under realistic conditions to destroy a target in space, and operational testing of the system is not yet even scheduled. Knowledgeable defense scientists believe the system will never be able to defeat countermeasures that any nation capable of fielding complex intercontinental ballistic missiles will be able to employ with ease.

p.2 - Recently… the [Missile Defense Agency, MDA] concluded that without deploying elements of GMD in Europe, other system components could protect the entire U.S. against an Iranian attack by 2011, well before that country will be able to field an intercontinental missile capability.

MDA also claims that deploying GMD in Europe will promote regional stability. But the announcement of the deployment and the reaction to it has in fact created considerable instability. Russian President Vladimir Putin has angrily denounced the deployment… Carrying out Putin’s earlier threat, Russia formally suspended participation in the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty on July 14.

p.3 - The complex in Europe will have only 20 minutes to detect, track, and intercept a missile launched from Iran. This would present a highly difficult challenge to a system that has met stringent test standards and is manned by a well-trained crew on quick-reaction alert. But essential operational testing to prove the effectiveness of the system is not yet even projected for the European complex.

The European deployment is currently estimated to cost a little more than $4 billion. If past is prologue, this will increase substantially.

The bottom line is a no-brainer: the third GMD missile defense complex, programmed for deployment in Europe, should be put on ice.

Tuesday, July 17, 2007

Updated List of Key Senate Amendments to FY08 Defense Authorization Bill

Debate has largely been dominated by the Iraq war, but there are numerous amendments related to nuclear weapons and nonproliferation issues. New information is bolded.

AMENDMENTS FILED

Missile defense

Sens. Vitter (R-LA) & Kyl (R-AZ) filed amendment No. 2010 to authorize an additional $87 million for Aegis missile defense for destroyers. Sens. Kyl (R-AZ), Vitter, Inhofe, Lieberman, and Lott filed amendment No. 2178 for the same purpose.

National Guard equipment from missile defense funds

Sen. Dodd (D-CT) filed amendment No. 2033 to provide $500 million for the Army National Guard to repair and replace war-battered equipment to address critical shortfalls identified by the National Guard Bureau, with the funds to be cut from the European Missile Defense system ($225 million) and Airborne Laser ($275 million).

Chemical weapons destruction

Sens. McConnell (R-KY), Salazar, Allard and Bunning filed amendment No. 2061 to increase funding for chemical weapons demilitarization at Blue Grass Army Depot, Kentucky, and Pueblo Chemical Activity, Colorado, by $49 million.

Nuclear terrorism

Sens. Clinton (D-NY) & Whitehouse (D-RI) filed amendments No. 2109 and No. 2222, a version of her bill S. 1705, the Nuclear Terrorism Prevention Act, to establish the position of “Senior Advisor to the President for the Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism” and urging the President to make the prevention of a nuclear terrorist attack on the United States of the highest priority and to accelerate programs, requesting additional funding as appropriate, to prevent nuclear terrorism.

Cost of replacing nuclear warheads

Sen. Bingaman (D-NM) filed amendment No. 2118 which would add to the nuclear posture review included in the Defense Authorization bill requirements that any plan for replacing or modifying the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile include an assessment of the estimated cost and anticipated schedule for replacing warheads.

Nuclear workers

Sen. Reid (D-NV) filed amendment No. 2170 to include nuclear program workers in the occupational illness compensation program.

Protecting space assets

Sen. Kyl (R-AZ) filed amendment No. 2223 saying that it is the policy of the United States to protect its military and civilian satellites and to research all potential means of doing so.

Space test bed

Sen. Kyl (R-AZ) filed amendment No. 2225 to restore the Administration’s $10 million request for the Ballistic Missile Defense Space Test bed that the Senate Armed Services Committee had cut.

AMENDMENTS ALREADY CONSIDERED

Protection against Iranian ballistic missiles

Sessions (R-AL) modified amendment No. 2024 stating that it should be the policy of the United States to develop and deploy, as soon as technologically possible, an effective defense against “the threat from Iran” was adopted 90 – 5 (July 12). [Note: See my previous post about the Sessions amendment for more information.]

Max Postman: Arms Industry to Lobby for NPT-Busting U.S.-India Nuclear Deal

*Another great guest post by Max Postman, intern-extraordinaire at the Center

This week, a top-level delegation from India is in Washington to continue negotiations on the U.S.-Indian nuclear agreement. Congress cleared the way for the deal last year by authorizing an exception to laws against transferring sensitive nuclear technology to states outside the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This exception, however, threatens to undermine the basic premise of the treaty, which is that civil nuclear cooperation is a reward that states receive in exchange for not developing nuclear weapons.

The finalization of the agreement has been delayed by India’s refusal to accept provisions of the deal that ban reprocessing of Indian fuel and mandate the return of U.S.-origin nuclear fuel if India tests a nuclear weapon. This disagreement has made a second, compromise agreement necessary.

But here’s where it gets especially interesting. The Asian news service Press Trust of India reported on Sunday:

“Major American companies like GE and Boeing…are ready to launch a big lobbying campaign to persuade the Congress to bless the Indo-US civil nuclear deal as soon as any compromise between the two governments is nailed down.”

While it makes sense that a company like GE, with its fingers in both energy and defense, would be chomping at the bit to open up the Indian nuclear market, how did the Indian government manage to get free lobbying work out of the U.S. arms industry?

The answer lies in the Indian government’s intention to link future conventional weapons contracts with nuclear energy cooperation. Though no official statement has been made, the Asia-Times Online reported that there are “indications New Delhi may peg big-ticket business decisions and purchases on the nuclear pact.”

One such “big ticket” item is the Indian government’s $9 billion order for 126 fighter jets—the largest order for combat aircraft in the last 15 years. India is currently accepting bids from American, European, and Russian companies.

The revelation of the Boeing lobbying campaign suggests that the rumored linkages between the nuclear deal and the fighter deal are more than just rumors. Boeing would not be mobilizing such a lobbying effort unless it was confident that the U.S. defense industry will receive a bigger slice of Indian weapons contracts if the nuclear deal goes through.

What are the implications of this arms industry lobbying campaign?

First, when a compromise nuclear deal goes before Congress, opponents of the deal (i.e. advocates of strong non-proliferation policy) will be going head-to-head with one of the most influential and well-funded lobbies in Washington.

Second, the influence of arms manufacturers shifts the paradigm of the debate somewhat from security to economics. Non-proliferation advocates should be able to explain why the U.S.-India nuclear deal is not economically desirable in the long run.

Third, in the future, states seeking exceptions to U.S. non-proliferation policy can be expected to use arms deals as leverage. It may become more difficult to enforce non-proliferation rules against countries that are also important markets for U.S. weapons dealers.

The news this week that Boeing and GE are planning lobbying campaigns in support of U.S.-Indian nuclear cooperation comes close to confirming a rumored linkage that has been suspected for some time. If the Indian delegation to Washington successfully reaches a compromise agreement with the White House this week, the new deal will move again to Congress, where the defense industry’s lobbying power will be key. Understanding the defense industry’s interest in the deal will prove important to understanding the political fate of the deal itself.

Monday, July 16, 2007

Trinity Test Remembered

Sixty-two years ago today, the power and destruction of the atom was first released during the Trinity test at the Alamogordo Test Range in New Mexico. The test was of an implosion-design plutonium bomb, the same type dropped on Nagasaki Japan a few weeks later that yielded a 20 kiloton explosion and killed approximately 74,000 people. After watching the Trinity test, a stunned Los Alamos director J. Robert Oppenheimer quoted the Bhagavad Gita: I am become Death, the destroyer of worlds.

For more information on the Trinity test, click here to watch a clip from the movie "Trinity and Beyond" which includes footage of the explosion itself. Note the plug by Edward Teller of Leo Szilard, Manhattan Project scientist and founder of Council for a Livable World, the sister organization of the Center. The success of the Trinity test led Szilard to draft a petition the very next day urging President Harry Truman to consider his moral responsibilities, and not merely expediency, in deciding whether to use the atomic bomb. The petition was signed by 68 other Manhattan Project scientists.

Leonor Tomero Rebukes John Bolton on North Korea

In case you missed it, earlier this month the always bombastic John Bolton wrote an op-ed published in the Wall Street Journal discussing the North Korea nuclear negotiations. A former U.S. Ambassador to the UN, John Bolton is now a senior fellow at the conservative think tank American Enterprise Institute, where he joins the ranks of other defamed former Bush administration officials, including the infamous ex-World Bank president Paul Wolfowitz.

On Thursday, Leonor Tomero, Director of Nuclear Non-Proliferation at the Center, published a letter to the editor in the Wall Street Journal refuting Bolton’s combative argument.

In his July 3 editorial-page commentary "Pyongyang Pussyfooting," John Bolton lambastes the negotiation process with North Korea as a return to the "Clinton-era... flawed conceptual framework," but offers no viable solution to the North Korean problem. His recommendation to concentrate on the "true solution" of "peaceful reunification of the Korean Peninsula" and to repudiate the Feb. 13 deal at the first sign of trouble is the same ill-advised approach that allowed North Korea to pursue its nuclear weapon program unchecked since 2002. Mr. Bolton fails to mention the costs of this tried and failed approach: From 2002 to 2006, it is estimated North Korea produced enough material for about 10 nuclear weapons and became the eighth country in the world to test a nuclear weapon.

He also fails to mention the report by International Atomic Energy Agency Deputy director after his visit to North Korea that North Korea has been upgrading its nuclear weapon material-producing facilities since 2002.

Attempting to negotiate in good faith with a country that is hostile to the U.S., as distasteful as this may be to Mr. Bolton, is a process inherent to effective diplomacy; it was used successfully by the Reagan administration with the "Evil Empire" and helped usher an end to the Cold War, and it remains the most effective way to stop Kim Jong Il's nuclear weapons program. Failing to do so will result in significant cost to national security. Negotiating with North Korea and making progress on this difficult issue as the Bush administration is doing does not make North Korea a trustworthy partner; it does, however, provide the opportunity to build the foundation for necessary agreement and verification on stopping and rolling back North Korea's nuclear weapons program that remains a clear and present threat to its neighbors and to the United States.